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Abstract 
 
This paper suggests a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts and 
investigates the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture. Firstly, it 
incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics 
(combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political 
Sciences) and describes major mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity – 
institutional environment, market competition, private, collective and public order; and 
defines features of agrarian sale-purchase, lease, employment, service, loan, insurance 
and coalition contracts; and identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, 
dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice and specifies effective 
modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture; and determines the effective 
boundaries and sustainability of farm and agrarian organizations. Secondly, it analyzes 
the post-communist institutional and organizational modernization of Bulgarian 
agriculture, and assesses the efficiency of various modes for governing of land supply, 
and labor supply, and service supply, and inputs supply, and finance supply, and 
insurance supply, and marketing of output in different type of farms.  
  
Key words: mechanisms of governance, contract management, type of agrarian 
contracts, factors and efficiency of contractual choice, economic boundaries and 
sustainability of farm, transitional agriculture, Bulgaria 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A significant part of farmers relations with other agents are governed though 
various contracts. For instance, when chemicals or fuel are purchased on market a 
spotlight contract is used, indicating an acceptance to acquire a particular good for a 
certain price against agent’s obligation for at spot payment. When a labor is hired an 
employment contract is applied stipulating negotiated terms on how labor will be used, 
conditions and terms of work, modes of payment etc. In marketing of farm produce long-
term contracts with wholesales, processors, and food-chains are frequently used 
specifying quantities, qualities, time of deliveries, prices etc. When a farmer sets up or 
joins a cooperative (firm) he signs accepting the terms of organization’s constitutive 
contract with members’ rights and obligations. Similarly, when a farmer joins a public 
funding, training etc. program he agrees to get a public contract for services, subsidies 
etc. for free or against some commitments - e.g. to use funding purposely, provide 
environmental protection services etc.   
Forms and factors of agrarian contracts have been intensively studied during the last 
twenty five years around the world [Bachev and Tsuji; Boger and Beckman; Eswaran and 
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Kotwal; Fertő; Guo et al.; James, Klein and Sykuta; Hayami and Otsuka; Little and 
Watts; Sporleder; Swain; Wilson]. A considerable progress has been made in 
understanding the economic logic and efficiency of contractual choice, “make or buy 
decision”, sharecropping and employment arrangements, vertically integrated forms, 
industry and countries specificities etc. Most studies focus on a particular type contract 
(land tenure, employment), a specific functional area of farming activity (land or labor 
supply, marketing), a generic mode of contract (private, public), an individual sector 
(horticulture, swine), a certain factor of contractual choice (agency or transaction costs, 
agents opportunism) etc.  
At the same time, a little attention is put on importance and combination of 
institutional, behavioral, economic, technological, ecological etc. factors of contractual 
choice as well as on comparative efficiency, interdependency and complementarities of 
different governance arrangements. With few exceptions [Bachev and Tsuji; Boger and 
Beckman; Fertő; Guo, Jolly and Zhu] there are no comprehensive studies on structure and 
factors of contracts in transitional agriculture. 
In this paper we suggest a holistic framework for analysis of agrarian contracts 
and investigate the contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture.  
First, we incorporate the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics and: specify type and importance of different mechanisms of governance of 
agrarian activity; define types and features of agrarian contracts; identify technological, 
institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual 
choice; specify effective modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture; and 
determine the effective boundaries and sustainability of farm and agrarian organizations.  
Second, we analyze the post-communist institutional and organizational 
modernization of Bulgarian agriculture, and assess the efficiency of various modes for 
governing of land supply, labor supply, service supply, inputs supply, finance supply, 
insurance supply, and marketing of output in different type of farms. The study is based 
on official and original data collected from the managers of 2,8 % of the cooperatives, 
1,2 % of the agro-firms, and 0,3% of the unregistered farms in the country as all holdings 
were selected as representative for the nation’s main regions1. 
 
 
Part 1. Framework for analysis of agrarian contracts 
 
1.1. Mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity 
 
In modern society resources, activities and interactions of individual agents are 
governed by a number of distinct mechanisms (Figure 1).  
First, institutional environment or the “rules of the game”– that is the distribution 
of rights and obligations between individuals, groups, communities, and generations, and 
the system(s) of enforcement of these rights and rules [Furuboth and Richter; North]. The 
spectrum of rights could embrace the material assets, natural resources, intangibles, 
certain activities, labor safety, clean environment, food security, intra- and inter-
generational justice etc. A part of the rights and rules are constituted by the formal laws, 
                                                 
1 The interviews with farm managers were held in 2002 in the eve of the first post-communist (and the 
latest) Agricultural Census in Bulgaria.   
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regulations, standards, court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules 
and rights determined by the tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral 
norms etc. The enforcement of various rights and rules is done by the state 
(administration, court, police) or other mechanisms such as community pressure, trust, 
reputation, private modes, self-enforcement etc.  
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity 
 
 
 
 
Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, restrictions 
and costs for intensifying exchange, increasing productivity, inducing private and 
collective initiatives, developing new rights, decreasing divergence between social 
groups and regions, responding to ecological and other challenges. For example, 
(socially, legally) acceptable norms for use of labor, plant, livestock, and environmental 
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resources; employment of certain forms of contracts or organizations; trade with 
particular resources and products etc., all they could differ even between various regions 
of the same country.  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public authority, international 
actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and collective actions of 
individuals. It is associated with the modernization and/or redistribution of the existing 
rights; and the evolution of new rights and the emergence of novel (private, public, 
hybrid) institutions for their enforcement. Specific institutional environment is a key 
parameter which eventually determines the potential for and the particular type of 
development in different communities, regions, and countries [North]. 
In the modern society a great deal of individuals’ activities and relations are 
regulated and sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and informal institutions. 
However, there is no perfect system of preset outside rules that can govern effectively the 
entire activities of individuals in all possible (and quite specific) circumstances of their 
life and relations. Principally individual agent finds out (can not easily change) the 
institutional environment and frequently there is not a voluntary (“contractual”) choice - 
agent is to follow socially imposed rules of the game otherwise risks to be punished. 
Second, “invisible hand of free market” (market price movements, market 
competition) which importance for the coordination (direction, correction) and 
stimulation of economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among 
fundamentals of political economy for more than 200 years. Individual agents use (adapt 
to) markets profiting from specialization and mutually beneficial exchange (trade) while 
their voluntary decentralized actions govern overall distribution of efforts and resources 
between activities, sectors, regions, countries.  
Generally, individual agents can not affect the price level (“price taking”) but are 
free to accept or not (a voluntary contract) whether to use certain markets, counterparts, 
prices etc. and take associate costs and risks. However, there are also instances of lack of 
individual choices and unwanted exchanges (contracts) - e.g. missing markets, monopoly 
and power relations, externalities etc. Consequently, free market “fails” to govern 
effectively the entire activity, exchanges, and resources of individuals.  
Third, private modes (“private or collective ordering”) – those are diverse private 
or collectively designed special contractual and organizational arrangements governing 
bilateral or multilateral relations between private agents. Individuals take advantage of 
institutional, market etc. opportunities and deal with institutional and market deficiency 
by selecting or designing mutually beneficial private modes (rules) for governing of their 
relations and exchanges. Private mode negotiates own rules or accepts existing private 
(collective) order, transfers existing rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and 
safeguards absolute (assigned by institutions) and/or contracted rights. In most cases 
private governance is based on voluntary and mutually beneficial contracts. However, 
there are instances of unwanted private or collective order (contract) cased by a 
monopoly or a power situation of some private agents or organizations.   
In modern society a great part of agrarian activity is governed by private 
negotiations, “visible hand of the manager”, or collective decision-making. Nevertheless, 
there are many examples of “private sector deficiency and failures” in governing of 
socially desirable activity such as environmental preservation, food security etc.  
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Forth, public intervention (“public order”) – these are various forms of a third-
party public (Government, community, international) involvement in market and private 
sectors such as public guidance, public regulation, public taxation, public assistance, 
public funding, public provision, property right modernization etc. Public modes are both 
mandatory and voluntary (e.g. public contract) for all or qualified private agents. 
The role of public (local, national and transnational) governance has been 
increasing along with the intensification of activity and exchange, and the growing 
interdependence of social, economic and environmental activities. In many cases, the 
effective organization of certain activity through a market mechanism and/or a private 
negotiation would take a long period of time, be very costly, could not reach a socially 
desirable scale, or be impossible at all. Thus a centralized public intervention could 
achieve the willing state of the system faster, cheaper or more efficiently2. Nonetheless, 
there are a great number of bad public involvements (inaction, wrong intervention, over-
regulation) leading to significant problems of sustainable development around the globe. 
Fifth, hybrid forms – some mixture combining features of market and/or private 
and/or public governance. 
“Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) system of governance 
“put in place”, the outcome of the development is quite different with diverse levels of 
socio-economic progression and environmental conservation (Figure 1). Subsequently 
there has been quite unlike results of agrarian transition of different industries and 
countries around the world [Bachev 2010]. 
 
 
1.2. Essence and type of agrarian contracts 
 
The contract is a mean for voluntary exchange of rights and obligations between 
two or more parties by which they govern their relations in mutual benefit. The rights that 
agents give and receive could be on human capital, natural resources, material and 
financial assets, liabilities etc. The subject of contract are rights agents really posses as 
right of ownership, rights of management, user rights, rights to generate income etc. 
Rights can be transferred entirely (sale) or partially (hiring, lease). The exchange can 
occur instantly in the present (e.g. a cow for cash) or in some moment or period of time in 
the future after contracting (sale of future yield, land lease, employment of labor etc.). 
The later opens up possibility some of the parties to “steal” rights (non-fulfillment of 
promises) transferred with a contract [Furuboth and Richter]. 
Initial distribution of rights and obligations between agents in society is done by the 
laws and regulations, tradition, moral, religion and ethical norms etc. In modern society a 
great part of relations between agrarian agents are regulated (governed) by laws and 
formals norms. For instance, it is not allowed to trade farm products not meeting formal 
standards for quality and safety; subject of sale could be only the right to use labor but 
not the personality of the worker3; employment of children is forbidden; marketing of 
certain products is to be done at fixed prices or by certified organizations etc.  
                                                 
2 At current stage (“globalization”) many of the challenges facing economical and agrarian development 
(food security, effective management of environmental resources, fight against diseases, climate change,) 
requite trans-border or even global governance. 
3 Slavary is prohibited around the world but still practiced in some countries. 
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Preset outside rules and restrictions (should) facilitate relations of economic agents. 
However, they can hardly regulate all their aspects in the specific conditions of individual 
agents. The contract is the mean by which individual agents optimize relations creating 
private rules of exchange (of owned private rights) adapted to their specific conditions 
and needs [Williamson]. The only formal (institutional) restriction is that private contract 
must not contradict laws and harm interests of third parties. Furthermore, there are 
widespread informal (unwritten) contracts which enforcement through formal (e.g. court) 
system is difficult or impossible4. 
There is a big variety of contractual relations in which agrarian agents participate or 
may take part in. Particular type of contracts have different specific characteristics – 
specific subject, formal requirements, possibility for an effective transfer and protection 
of various rights, costs for preparation, enforcement, disputing, and termination of 
contractual terms. “The rational” agrarian agents take into account the potential benefits, 
advantages and shortcomings of divers contractual forms when chose modes for 
governing of their relations with other agents.  
A particular attention is put on assessment of possibilities for opportunistic 
behavior of counterparts and inclusion of special contractual terms for safeguard against 
it. Tendency for opportunism means that if there is an opportunity for a party to get non-
punishably an extra rent from exchange (performing unwanted exchange by others) the 
agent will likely “steal” the rights of others [Williamson]. 
Agrarian contracts can be classified in some of the following major categories: 
- Sale-purchase contract – that type of contract arranges a permanent transfer of 
rights on particular resource or object against payment of a certain price. The major risk 
for buying farmer is from pre-contractual opportunism of seller. The buyer usually does 
not have full information for the quality of acquired object, and seller is not interested in 
revealing the existing shortcomings. For instance, when a second-hand tractor is 
purchased it is difficult to evaluate whether the technical state correspond to the claims of 
seller (problems appear later on during exploitation); real yield of a new seed variety is 
discovered in cropping time etc. In order to safeguard against these risks a preliminary 
testing, a trying period before final purchase, giving a guarantee by seller etc. are 
negotiated. 
There is also possibility for post-contractual opportunism if a long-term asset (e.g. 
equipment) combined with after-sale technical service (e.g. maintenance, upgrading etc.) 
is purchased. Since the trade is completed (money transferred) the promise for future 
servicing is not fulfilled or it is executed badly or with delays. The opportunistic behavior 
of seller decreases (self-restricted) when a long-term contract is employed or there is a 
high likelihood for new contracts between counterparts in future. 
On the other hand, farmer as a seller often faces post-contractual opportunism in 
terms of delayed payment or non-payment for marketed farm output. In order to protect 
from this risk a safeguard term (e.g. advance payment, cash payment, cash and carry) is 
applied or interlink deals is contracted (crediting and/or inputs supply by buyer against 
marketing of farm produce). In any case, risk diminishes considerably when farmer 
chooses a seller/buyer to whom he trusts or selects market agents with built a good 
reputation. 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless they are quite effective and broadly applied in agrarian sector of transitional, developing and 
developed countries alike. 
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- Lease contract – this type of contract arranges the transfer of right on a 
temporary use of certain resource or object against payment of a rent. Major risks for 
farmers here are from pre-contractual opportunism associated with the quality of leased 
item (similar to a purchase contract) and from employment of a fix rent. For instance, 
when a fix rent is contracted the tenant takes the entire risk of losses (or benefits) from 
the variation of productivity and income of leased resource (object, land, animal). That 
sort of risk could be shared with the owner through contracting a share rent or even 
entirely eliminated through applying a market rent. 
The lease contract also gives possibility for pre- and post-contractual opportunism 
from the lease-holder. In the former case, the tenant does not declare his intention to use 
ineffectively leased resource (object) while in the later case he is practicing such behavior 
(bad maintenance of leased building and equipment, poor care of leased animals, 
improper crop rotation, insufficient compensation of nutrition intakes through 
fertilization, pirate sharing or trade of new variety seeds, software or technology). 
Moreover, it is common a delayed or non-payment of contracted rent by tenants. 
- Employment contract – this contract arranges the right to receive a particular 
service from hired for a certain period of time labor against payment of salary or wage 
by the employer. Special feature of this “service” contract is that the one party (the 
employer) acquires the right to direct, control and fire another side – thus there is a 
relation of subordination. This mode gives possibilities for rapid adaptation to current 
labor needs of farm. Alternatively either is has to be prepared a very detailed service 
contract (with relevant rights and obligations of partners in all possible contingencies 
during the period of their relationship) or to permanently (re)negotiate new contracts 
along with changing conditions and needs of each partner. 
Major risks for farmers associated with this type of contract are from pre- and post-
contractual opportunism. In the first case, the applicant-worker could misinform for his 
capabilities or intentions in order to get the job. Farmers can protect asking 
recommendations, selecting candidates with certain education level or training certificate, 
organizing interview and/or test for determining the applicant’s ability etc. In the second 
case, hired worker may not put the necessary (contracted) efforts after receiving the job. 
The later is facilitating by the fact, that in agriculture permanent supervision of labor is 
impossible and/or productivity is not always proportional to the labor input (e.g. positive 
or negative impact of climate factor). Besides, a highly qualified worker may leave the 
job in a critical for the farm moment (e.g. combine operator during harvesting time) 
because of offered a higher salary by the competitor farm.  
In order to restrict these forms of opportunism farmers apply: a permanent 
employment contract, appointment of team-leaders (supervisors), output-based 
compensation, payment of bonuses, give incentives for improving productivity through 
labor participation in farm management, rights for pay holidays, providing free services, 
housing etc.   
- Service contract – this type of contract arranges the right to receive a certain 
service against payment of a price. The service could be material (cultivation of land, 
plant protection, transportation, advertisement, software, water and electricity supply) or 
for accomplishing a particular task (maintenance of equipment, veterinary service, 
agronomic advice, education, guarding, garbage collection).  
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Unlike employment contract here both sides are in equal position (rather than of 
subordination). In many instances, the farmer is not even able to “direct” service provider 
as it is with medical treatment, education, consulting, guarding etc. Frequently it could be 
utilize an output-based payment which significantly restricts the opportunism of service 
supplier. Nevertheless, often the employment of a time-based or fixed payment is the 
only possible option. Principally a long-term supply contract improves the quality of 
provided service – getting familiar with a particular farm (land parcels, equipments, 
animals), desire to keep or renew the contract etc. In any case, selection of a supplier with 
a good reputation diminishes the risk from opportunistic behavior.  
Nevertheless, there are widespread instances of a (semi)monopoly situation when 
farmers have to accept the terms and the modes of implementation of a service contract –
in electricity and water supply, garbage collection, public (e.g. extension, information) 
and administration services etc.  
- Loan contract – this type of contract arranges a temporary transfer of property 
right on some amount of money (money loan) or product (loan in kind) against payment 
or not of a certain price (interest). Unlike lease contract the debtor is not obliged to 
return the identical money/product which is borrowed, but just the same quantity of 
borrowed assets (usually with some interest above the loan).  
In modern conditions most common is the contract for money loan from a 
commercial bank, private individual or entity, or public agency. The control over 
utilization of the loan by the creditor is very difficult because of the high “mobility” of 
money. In order to avoid the opportunism of debtor a strict selection of applicants is 
practiced by crediting agent (studying out credit history, reputation, papers of property 
ownership; requirement for guarantors), and a significant collateral, guarantee and/or 
coo-financing is requested. All these considerably increase the cost of (or entirely block) 
using that type of contract by farmers.  
On the other hand, farmers often face a pre-contractual opportunism of creditors 
taking advantage of their (“monopoly” or power) position and employing unfavorable for 
farmers terms and/or not informing borrowers about the “hidden” costs associated with 
the loan contract. 
Increasingly other more-efficient forms for giving loan are applied in package with 
sale of long-term assets (leasing), short-term assets (in installments or delayed 
payments), or interlinked credit against marketing of farm output or services. 
- Insurance contract – this contract arranges the transfer of particular risk-taking 
during a period of time against payment of a certain price. When event (incident) 
covered by the insurance contract occurs, the insurer pays an insurance premium 
according to negotiated terms. Assurance is offered (sold) against various risks - damages 
on property, yield, animals and persons caused by natural (hail, frost, storm, flood, fire), 
health (injury, disease, dead) or social factors (destruction, theft). 
Usually, opportunism may occur by insured person before signing the contract (not 
disclosing the real information for possible risks) or during contract execution period (not 
taking actions for reducing damages when event occurs; consciously provoking damages 
in order to get insurance premium etc.). That augments considerably the insurance prices 
and restricts utilization of insurance contracts by farmers. 
On the other hand, farmers often “discover” the pre-contractual opportunism of 
insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event. Then they find out that not all 
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assurance terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of assessment of 
damages, payments etc.) had not been well explained and/or adapted to farmers needs 
before signing the contract.  
For many kind of farm related risks markets evolve very slowly and/or insurance 
services are practically inaccessible by majority of farmers. What is more, for many 
important risks insurance is not available for purchase at all – e.g. risk of lack of market 
demand of farm products, fluctuation of prices of farm produce, possible opportunism of 
counterparts in contractual relations etc. That is why farmers have to develop other 
(private, collective) modes to safeguard their investments and rights or lobby for a public 
intervention in assurance supply [Bachev and Nanseki]. 
- Coalition contract – this type of contract regulates rights and obligations in 
coalition of actions and/or resources of two or more agents. Members of the coalition 
exchange certain rights associated with the ownership, control and direction of particular 
resources, management of the coalition, distribution of income and other benefits of the 
activity, coalition period, ways of expansion of the coalition and termination of 
membership etc.  
According to the specific goals it may be established different type of coalitions – 
informal partnerships (coalition of resources and/or activity), cooperatives (non-for 
profit), firms (profit-making), associations (collective actions) etc.  
In coalition contract most often there is a risk of post-contractual opportunism, 
when some member(s) does not fulfill obligations to the coalition or uses improperly the 
organization in their own private interest. In order to avoid that risk partners with a high 
mutual confidence are selected (family members, relatives, friends), and the membership 
of collation is restricted (mutual control on opportunism is practically possible). In 
coalition with open membership (cooperative, corporation) effective mechanisms are put 
in place to motivate members (preferences for working members of coalition) and secure 
direct members participation in the management and control of the coalition. 
In a very big open membership coalition it is possible a particular pre- and post-
contractual opportunism as well. Creation and development of such coalition is 
associated with significant costs (for initiation, establishment, registration, organizational 
modernization) while the efficiency and sustainability of the new form is uncertain. That 
is why there are no incentives for individuals to participate in that process and make the 
necessary investments of efforts and means. However, in case of a successful 
organization, the willingness to join and benefit (“free-riding”) from new the coalition 
greatly increases. 
In the real agrarian economy there is a great variety of contractual arrangements 
designed to fit the needs of counterparts – natural, pure, complex, interlinked, 
complementary, bilateral, trilateral, multilateral etc. forms. For instance, in the 
traditional (non-cash) agrarian economy natural exchanges are typical – goods, resources 
and services are traded against other goods, resources and services (barters, gifts); loans, 
interests, wages, rents and membership fees are paid in kind etc. Furthermore, in the 
modern economy there are wide spreading more complex and interlinked contracts 
arranging: inputs (service) supply and crediting, inputs (service) supply and/against 
marketing of farm output, acquiring a share in the property (cooperative, partnership) 
against servicing, crediting and marketing etc.    
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1.3. Factors for choice of contract form 
 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governing of agrarian 
activity. For instance, a natural minimal size of farm organization is determined by a 
technological parameter such as non-separability of activities (e.g. a biological 
nonseparability of individual animal). Also in Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water 
supply could not have been conducted by individual farmers (high interdependency, 
nonseparability of water use) and since earliest period water use organization developed 
as public projects [Mori]. Effective governance of some environmental activities requires 
a certain scale and thus collective actions at local, regional, national or transnational scale 
[Bachev 2009]. Nevertheless, beside few examples, in farming is almost impossible to 
find cases where the choice of form of governance is unilaterally determined by 
technological parameters. 
Another technological factor which could define the mode of governance (e.g. farm 
size) is possibilities to explore technological economy of scale and scope. For instance, in 
order to use a large harvester capacity a farmer increases the operational size; or he 
produces two or more products under different technologies in order to use “free” 
resources (e.g. available family labor). Nevertheless, development of technology usually 
follows demand and in fact is a changeable parameter as well5. Moreover maximum 
economy of scale can be reached not through internalizing activity but by market 
exchange with a specialized activity - e.g. selling or buying harvesting service. Free farm 
resources could also be traded (sell, lease out) more effectively in market place instead of 
using them in own non-specialized activities (opportunity costs reason).  
In fact there is an opposite tendency in the real agrarian economy - dependence of 
technological development from the governance structure. It is common when 
institutional restrictions (for land transfer, hiring labor etc.) and the high level of 
transaction costs (e.g. for outside credit supply) prevent exploration of the potential of 
available technologies. Domination of primitive technologies is a rule rather than an 
exception in the farming sector of transitional and developing countries. In other 
instances, high transaction uncertainty or imperfect institutional arrangements extend 
farming organization far beyond “technologically optimal” size. For instance, it has been 
typical “over-concentration” of East-European agriculture during communist era, and 
“over-integration and over-cooperation” in transitional period thereafter [Bachev 2006]. 
Often the choice of governing mode is pre-determined by institutional restrictions 
as some forms for carrying out farming activities, land and labor supply, trade of output 
etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal in certain countries or period of time. For 
instance, corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many 
countries; market trade of farmland, natural resources, and some outputs (inputs) is 
illegitimate, private management of natural ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not 
allowed etc.  Nevertheless, when costs associated with the illegitimate governance is not 
high (possibility for disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while 
                                                 
5 Otherwise it is very difficult to explain widespread distribution of small scale machinery in agriculture. 
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benefits are considerable, then the more effective modes prevail – large gray or black 
sectors of economy are common around the globe. 
Principally, the choice of contractual form will greatly depend on the efficiency of 
(outside) institutional environment – regulations, stability and enforcement of property 
rights, extend of direction of private relations, possibility for rapid and costless dispute 
resolution, efficiency of punishment of offenders etc. For instance, in conditions of well-
working public system of regulations (quality standards, price guarantees) and laws and 
contract enforcement a preference will be given to spotlight and classical (standard) 
contracts. On the other hand, if rights on major agrarian resources are not defined or not 
well defined, and absolute and contracted right effectively enforced (as was the case 
during most of the post communist transition) that lead to domination of primitive 
subsistence farming, informal, personal and over-integrated forms, unsustainable 
organizations, undeveloped and missing markets etc. 
Usually, every agrarian activity and exchange could be governed through a great 
variety of alterative forms. For instance, cultivation of land by a tractor can be governed 
in different ways: a farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a 
tractor (input and credit supply interlinked contract); farmer could buy cultivation service 
from market (contract service); number of farmers may buy a tractor (joint ownership) 
and use it in a group (producers cooperative) or individually; farmer can join a 
cooperative providing cultivation services (non for profit organization); farmers may 
lease land out to a tractor owner and share output (share tenancy contract); farmer can 
hire a tractorist to work on farm (employment contract), and may even sell out cultivation 
service to market (profit making organization); cultivation service to farms could be 
subsidized by Government (trilateral mode), or provided by a municipality or state 
company (public organization). 
One extreme for the farm manager is to specialize exclusively in governing of 
market transactions rather than production management6. For example, leasing-in 
farmland and long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and 
harvesting of output, buying needed short-term material assets, selling all primary 
products on market. Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-person 
or group subsistent farm - farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, labor, 
technological knowledge) and consume the entire product. Between these two polls there 
is a spectrum of feasible modes for governing of agrarian activity and exchange: various 
sort long-term contracts, association, cooperation, interlinked organization, hybrid forms, 
farms of different type (partnerships, corporations, complex hierarchies) etc. 
The different governance modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes for 
organization of activities. Each of them has distinct advantages and disadvantages to 
protect individuals rights and investments, coordinate and stimulate activities, explore 
economies of scale and scope, save production and governance costs etc.  
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand of 
market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from 
specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with a 
high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing an 
opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc.  
                                                 
6 That is not a hypothetical case – “contract farming” is quite popular in Japan where many part-time 
“farmers” contract out most or all of major paddy operations to professional (specialized) farms. 
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The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of activity. However, it may require large costs for 
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions, 
enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control on 
activity (direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). 
However, extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries 
(allowing achieving the minimum technological or agronomic requirements; exploration 
of technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
Separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, public 
farm/firm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting 
efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies of 
scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in 
product promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts and authorities. 
However, it could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling 
opportunism, and adaptation. The cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from 
low capability for internal long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-
tradable character of shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
The choice of contractual form also depends on personal characteristics of 
individual agents – preferences, knowledge, capability, experience, risk-aversion, 
reputation, trust, “contract” power etc. For instance, farming organization is often 
restricted to a family partnership. Moreover, if farmer is a good manager he will be able 
to design, control and implement more efficient form adapted to his specific needs (e.g. 
effective management of more contracts for outside supply with specialized services 
and/or inputs). Similarly, high risk-taking farmer will prefer more risky but productive 
contractual forms (e.g. extension of farms through bank credit for a new profitable 
venture). Likewise, when counterparts are family members (close friends) there is no 
need for complex contracts since relations are easily “governed” by the good will and 
mutual interests of parties. 
Finally, the choice of governing mode depends on transaction costs. Governance is 
usually associated with significant costs for protection, contracting and exchange of 
individual rights. For example, farmers have costs for finding best prices and partners; 
negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and registration; enforcing 
negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and safeguarding; disputing 
through a court system or another way; adjusting or termination along with evolving 
conditions of exchange etc.  
Therefore, rational agents will seek, chose, and develop such modes for governing 
their activity and exchanges which maximize transacting benefits and minimize 
transaction costs. Moreover, both (current) transaction costs for using governing forms 
and long-term transaction costs for development (initiation, modernization, liquidation) 
of governance mode are taken into account.  
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If transaction costs were zero then the mode of the governance would not be of 
economic importance [Williamson]. In such a world individuals would manage their 
relations with an equal efficiency though free market, or through private organizations of 
different types, or in a single nationwide company. All information for the effective 
potential of transactions (exploration of technological opportunities, satisfying various 
demands, respecting assigned and transferred rights) would be costlessly available. And 
the individuals would costlessly define new rights, and protect their (absolute and 
contracted) rights, and trade owned resources (and products) in mutual benefit until 
exhausting the possibilities for increasing productivity (situation known as “Pareto 
optimum/efficiency”).  
Thus the type of governance becomes crucial since various modes give unequal 
possibilities for participants to coordinate activities, and stimulate an acceptable behavior 
of others (counterparts, dependents), and protect their contracted and absolute rights from 
unwanted expropriation. Nevertheless, often the high costs make it difficult or block 
otherwise efficient (mutually beneficial) transactions. For instance, despite the great pay-
off of investments in agrarian research and innovation, market and private agents do not 
organize such activity in a sufficient scale because of their high uncertainty and low 
market and private appropriability [Bachev and Labonne]. There is a strong need for a 
“third-party” (Government, NGOs, international assistance etc.) intervention in order to 
make such activity more effective or possible at all.  
If there is a market and private sector failure but an effective government 
intervention is not introduced in a due time the agrarian “development” is substantially 
deformed (Government failure is possible). In Bulgaria for instance, there has been a 
great number of bad examples for Government under- and over-interventions in agrarian 
sector. Consequently, primitive and uncompetitive small-scale farming; predominance of 
over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and corrupted agrarian 
bureaucracy; blocking out of all class of agrarian transactions (such as innovation and 
extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental 
goods); and development of a large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a 
result [Bachev, 2007].  
In the long term only effective governing structures for the specific economic, 
institutional and natural environment and personal characteristics of agents will 
dominate in agriculture [Bachev 2004]. Thus there will be no singe (universal) mode for 
effective organization of all type of agrarian activity and exchange in any possible 
natural, institutional, and economic surroundings. In any particular moment of time 
agrarian activities will be carried out (governed) through a great variety of modes: some 
will be governed by “invisible hand of market”, other will be carried out through a 
special contract mode, some will be managed within hierarchy, some will be supported 
by a third party, some would require more complicated and mixed modes.  
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1.4. Effective forms for contractual choice 
 
In addition to production costs, the agrarian agents make significant transaction 
costs for governing relations with other agents - individuals, private entities, public 
authorities7.  
The institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs of 
individual agents. For instance, when private rights are well defined and protected, and 
(public) system for contract enforcement work well - that facilitates transactions between 
individuals and the effective allocation of resources. (Development of) institutional 
environment also imposes significant transaction costs to agents – e.g. for studying out 
and complying with various institutional restrictions (community or state norms, 
regulations, standards), formal registration of contracts and entities, efforts to deal with 
bureaucracy etc. A good example in this respect are current problems of many Bulgarian 
farms to meet the new EU requirements (“institutionally determined” costs) related to 
new product quality, food safety, labor, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards 
[Bachev, 2008]. Furthermore, EC is increasingly criticized for imposing unnecessary 
regulations (and related costs for agrarian agents) for the size, shape and color of 
vegetables and fruits for trade in EU etc. 
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
tendency for opportunism [Williamson]. Economic agents do not possess full information 
about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, adverse effects of activities on others, 
trends in development) since the collection and processing of such information would be 
either very expensive or impossible (e.g. for future events, for partners intention for 
cheating, time and space discrepancy between individual action and adverse impacts on 
others etc.). In order to optimize decision-making agents have to spent costs for 
"increasing their imperfect rationality" - for data collection, analysis, forecasting, training 
etc.  
Individuals are also given to opportunism in two major forms: pre-contractual 
("adverse selection") - when some party uses "information asymmetry" to negotiate better 
contract terms; and post-contractual ("moral hazard") - when some counterpart takes an 
advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner or by 
a third party) or when he takes "legal advantages" of unpredicted changes in transacting 
conditions (costs, prices, environment etc.).  
A special third form of opportunism occurs in the development of large 
organizations (known as “free-riding”). Since the individual benefits are often not 
proportional to the individual efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for 
the organizational development and later on to benefit from the successful new 
organization [Olson].  
Commonly, it is very costly or impossible to distinguish the opportunistic from non-
opportunistic behavior (because of the bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents 
have to protect their transactions and rights from the hazard of opportunism through: ex 
ante efforts to protect their “absolute” (given by dominating institutions) rights, and find 
a reliable counterpart and to design an efficient mode for partners credible commitments 
                                                 
7 Production costs are the cost associated with proper technology (“combination of production factors”) of 
certain farming, servicing, environmental, community development etc. activity. The transaction costs are 
the costs for governing the economic and other relations between individuals. 
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to “contracted” (voluntary transferred) rights; and ex post investments for overcoming 
(through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism 
during contract execution stage. 
Technological development also affects enormously the structure and level of 
transaction costs [North]. For instance, mechanization and standardization of farming 
operations (products) increases bounded rationality of farm manager, and diminishes 
possibility for opportunism of hired labor and counterparts. That leads to the extension of 
activities and transactions under a singe management (the farm size) – enlargement of 
internal transactions (internal division and specialization of labor) as well as outside 
market and/or contract transacting (procurement, trade, cooperation etc.).  
Possibilities that progression and application of modern production (e.g. precision 
farming), transportation, measurement, information, communication etc. technologies 
gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and minimize related costs are immense  - 
easy assessment and traceability; on line information, coordination, monitoring, 
detecting, advise; direct low costs exchanges (expressing demands, finding best prices 
and partners, negotiating, trading, disputing) and collective actions (coalitions) of 
interested agents at national and international scales; rapid detection of problems and 
interventions by the governments and international agencies; full participation of 
individuals in and control on public decision-making etc.  
However, that enormous potential for increasing productivity, effective allocation 
of resources, conservation of environment etc. meets the restrictions of imperfect 
institutional arrangements which eventually slow-sown scientific and technological 
progress, impede individual market and private transactions, allow particular agents 
(bureaucrats, interest groups) to benefits from the status-quos, and lead to unsustainable 
“development”. It is widely recognized that constant “food crisis” has been a 
consequence not of the lack of sufficient (world) technologies and resources for food 
production but the bad governance - inefficient Governments, inefficient international 
organizations, and inefficient global governance. 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of alternative contractual arrangement is 
the direct comparison of costs for each transaction in different forms. Organization which 
requires fewer costs is more efficient – e.g. it is more economical to use a marketing 
cooperative instead of own direct marketing of farm output.  
Part of the transaction costs can be easily specified – costs for management, 
licensing and registration, agro-market information, promotion and marketing of output, 
general management, hiring lawyers and court suits, guarding property and yields, 
payment of bribes etc.  
However, a significant portion of transaction costs is either very difficult (too 
expensive) or impossible to be assessed. In that group we can include the costs for 
finding best partners, negotiation, controlling and enforcement of contractual terms, 
organizational development, interlinked transacting, unrealized (failed) deals etc. 
Besides, it is often extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from traditional 
production expenditures8. For example, while executing farming operations a farmer 
supervises hired labor; during transportation of chemicals he negotiates marketing of 
output etc.  
                                                 
8 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical models 
simply by adding a new "transacting" activity [Furuboth and Richter]. 
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Component comparison of transacting costs could not always give an idea for 
efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of costs 
while increasing another type transacting costs – e.g. internalization of a transaction 
(replacement of market with integral mode) is associated with reduction of costs for 
information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along 
with constantly changing conditions of exchange, safeguarding investments from outside 
opportunism etc. On the other hand, it enlarges costs for organizational formation, 
decision making, integral management, supervising and motivation of hired labor etc. In 
above example with alternatives for marketing of farm output the “internal realization” 
(personal consumption, production “consumption”, processing) could be chosen as more 
efficient form to direct sell or use of marketing cooperative.  
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high transacting 
costs entirely block development of an alternative organization. For instance, market for 
agrarian credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the transition and the internal 
supply (utilization of own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible 
form for finance supply of farms [Bachev, 2006]. Here it is impossible to determine the 
comparative level of transaction costs and appreciate the “high” efficiency of integral 
mode for financing. In that case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are 
not real alternatives but completely different governing arrangements.  
Finally, a good part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but 
through complex, interlinked and/or supplementary modes - e.g. inputs supply in a 
“package” with know-how, credit, and/or service supply; crediting of production against 
marketing of output; governing of critical activities within own farm and membership 
cooperative  etc. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the overall (total) costs 
for organization of transactions of different types - all external and internal transaction 
costs of the farm. 
Another direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of alternative governing 
forms is the Discrete structural analysis [Williamson]. Here the assessment of absolute 
levels of transaction costs of alternative governing structures is not necessary. This 
approach aims to evaluate the relative levels of transacting costs between alternative 
modes of governance, and selecting that one which most economizes on transacting costs. 
Actually, farm managers are interested not in absolute level of transaction costs in 
different form, but in organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular 
transaction.  
First the “critical dimensions” of transactions, responsible for the variation of 
transaction costs, are to be identified. “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” 
have been identified as critical factors of the transaction costs by Williamson 
[Williamson] while the “appropriability” has been added by Bachev and Labonne 
[Bachev and Labonne].  
When the recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then both 
(all) sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding 
opportunism, building reputation, setting up adjustment mechanisms etc.). Besides, the 
costs for development of a special private mode for facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) 
exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange.  
When the uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for 
carrying out and secure the transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, 
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safeguarding against risk etc.). Certain risks could be diminished or eliminated by a 
production management or through a special market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance). 
However, the governance of most transacting risk would require a special private forms – 
e.g. trade with origins; providing guarantees; using share-rent or output-based 
compensation; employing economic hostages; participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-
supply or marketing cooperative; a complete integration [Bachev and Nanseki].  
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with a 
particular partner are to be deployed9. In this case it is impossible to change a partner of 
transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of the specific capital. 
Relation specific (dependent) investments are "locked" in transactions with a particular 
buyer or seller (personality of partner matters), and cannot be recovered through a 
"faceless" market trade. Costless redeployment (alternative use) of specific assets is not 
possible if transactions fail to occur, they are prematurely terminated, or less favorable 
terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal time and before the end of life-span of 
specific capital). Therefore, dependant investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a 
special form such as a long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint 
investment, quasi or complete (ownership) integration. Often, the later is quite expensive, 
investment in specific capital are not made, and activity either can not take place or 
occurs without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect to productivity 
If symmetrical assets dependency (a regime of bilateral trade) exists there are strong 
incentives in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. However, 
when unilateral dependency exists then dependent side (facing mini or total monopoly) 
has to protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty or 
certainty) either through integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, 
cooperative)10; or safeguarding them with interlinked contract, exchange of economic 
hostages, development of collective organization to outstand asymmetrical dependency 
(for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations) etc. 
The transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on products, 
services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of the agrarian 
intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new 
varieties and technologies, software etc. Besides, all products and activities with 
significant (positive or negative) externalities are to be included in this group. If the 
appropriability is low the possibility for unwanted (market or private) exchange is great, 
and the costs for protection (safeguard, detection of cheating, disputing) of private rights 
and investments extremely high. Agents would either over produce (negative 
externalities) or under organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are 
governed by an efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic alliances, long-
term contract, trade secrets, or public order.  
Second, we have to “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with the 
governance structures (differing in their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly 
                                                 
9 Specificity is not a technological but transacting characteristic of assets. In one situation a particular 
capital (investment) could be highly universal (easy deployment to another internal usage or outside trade) 
while in others - highly specific (a big dependency from the relations with a certain counterpart (buyer, 
seller, coalition partner). 
10 When technological opportunities for economy on scale (scope) on specific assets can be achieved. 
Otherwise integration of transactions will be lost-making comparing to outside price (production costs) 
competition. 
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in transaction cost economizing) way” [Williamson]. According to the combination of the 
specific characteristics of each activity and transaction, there will be different the most 
effective form for governance of that particular activity (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Effective modes for contractual arrangement in agriculture11 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low 
Assets Specificity 
          Low           High 
Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low       High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High  Low High   Low  High   Low  High   Low 
 
Free market ? ?    
Special contract form  ? ?    
Internal organization  ? ?   
Third-party 
involvement 
 ?  ?  
Public intervention    ? 
  ? - the most effective mode; ? - a necessity for a third party involvement 
 
 
Agrarian transactions with a good appropriability, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments (the partner can be changed anytime without significant 
additional costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight or 
classical contracts. Here the organization of transactions with a special form or within 
the farm (firm) would only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits.  
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and a high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. The relational 
(”neoclassical”) contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at 
outset (a high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than a 
specification of obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are 
motivated to settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of a frequent 
bilateral trade). Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be easily 
(costlessly) redeployed to another use or users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with a low 
uncertainty, high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be 
                                                 
11 Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels (high-low) of the 
critical factors are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical dimensions, 
and thus of the effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc. governance). 
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successfully safeguarded through contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce 
relevant obligations of partners in all possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds 
transactions)12. Here the occasional character of transactions does not justify 
internalization within the farm (firm).   
Transactions with a high frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity (dependency), 
and appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm (internal ownership mode). 
For instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite specific to a farm, and its 
supply has to be always governed through a permanent labor contract and coupled with 
ownership rights [Bachev, 2004]. Capital investments in land are to be made on owned 
(or long-leased-in) rather than a seasonally rented land (high site and product specificity). 
All “critical” to the farm material assets will be internally organized - production of 
forage for animals; important machineries; water supply for the irrigated farming etc. 
While universal capital could be effectively financed by a market form (e.g. a bank 
credit), the highly specific investments can be only made through an internal funding 
(own funds, equity sell, joint venture).  
If the specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the 
farm (economy of scale and scope explored, funding made)13, then an effective governing 
form outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, 
cooperative, lobbying for a public intervention.  
When a strong assets (capacity, technology, time of delivery, site, branding) inter-
dependency with an upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to 
govern transactions through a contract mode (strong mutual interests for cooperation and 
restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective supply (procurement) contracts 
between farmers and processors are widely used in dairy, meat, vine, organic industries 
(symmetrical dependency). 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need an effective 
(ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting costs for initiation and 
maintaining of such “collective organization” is usually great (big number of coalition, 
different interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is either 
unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That creates serious problems for the efficiency 
(and sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly 
situation, impossibility to “induce” a public intervention etc.  
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Here the elaboration of 
a special governing structure for a private transacting is not justified, specific investments 
are not made, and activity (restriction of activity) fails to occur at an effective scale 
("market failure" and "contract failure"). Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare 
transacting associated with a high uncertainty and appropriability.  
In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in 
transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make 
them more efficient or possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of 
organic farming, and systems of trade with origins and “fair-trade” are good examples in 
                                                 
12 Practically it is difficult (costly) or impossible to write a complete contract for complex transaction 
[Williamson]. 
13 Integration of transactions would either increase management costs (needs to buy from or sell to a 
competitor) or it would be loss-making comparing to outside production costs (price) competition. 
 20
that respect. There is an increasing consumer’s demand (a price premium) for organic, 
original, and fair-trade products in many countries. Nevertheless their supply could not be 
met unless effective trilateral governance (including an independent certification and 
control) has been put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction (activity) is low, there is no pure 
market mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Nevertheless, respecting others 
rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting out” additional rights to others (needed 
transactions carried) could be governed by a “good will” or charity actions of individuals, 
NGOs, government or international organizations.  
For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives (agreements) 
have emerged driven by the competition in the food industries, farmers’ preferences for 
eco-production, and responds to the public pressure for a sound environmental 
management. Unprecedented development of “codes of behaviors”, eco-labeling and 
branding, environmental cooperatives, and “green alliances”, all they are good examples 
in that respect. Nevertheless, environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and 
“environmental audit” is not conducted by an independent party, which does not 
guarantee a “performance outcome”. Therefore, most of these initiatives are seeing as a 
tool for an external image manipulation. Recent huge food safety, animal safety, and eco-
scandals have demonstrated that such private schemes could often fail (result of high 
bounded rationality and possibility for opportunism).  
In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand 
especially if they require significant costs. Some private modes could be employed if a 
high frequency (a pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual assets dependency 
(thus an incentive to cooperate) exists. For example, inter-dependency between a dairy 
farm and a milk processor in a remote region (capacity and site dependency); or a bee 
keeper and a neighboring orchard farm (symmetric dependency between needs of flower 
and needs for pollination).  In all these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral 
or collective agreements, close-membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, 
alliances, internal organization etc. are used.  
However, emerging of special (private) large-members organizations for dealing 
with low appropriability (and satisfying the entire “social” demand) would be very slow 
and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free riding” problem). 
Therefore, there is a strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, 
international assistance etc.) intervention in order to make such activity possible or more 
effective [Bachev, 2004].  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of low appropriability, high 
uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, 
charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, the supply of additional 
environmental protection service is very costly (in terms of production and organization 
costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial 
compensation (price-premium) of farmers by willing consumers through a pure market 
mode is also ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, massive enforcement 
costs etc. A third-party mode with a direct public involvement would make that 
transaction effective: on behalf of the consumers the State agency negotiates with 
individual farmers a public contract for “environment conservation and improvement 
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service”, coordinates activities of various agents (including a direct production 
management), provides public payments for compensation of farmers, and controls 
implementation of negotiated terms.  
 
  
1.5. Economic boundaries of farm and agrarian organizations 
 
 
Analysis of efficiency and factors of agrarian contracts let better understand and 
determine the effective size (boundaries) of farms and other agrarian organizations for the 
specific institutional, economic and natural environment of a particular industry, country 
etc. In the traditional (Neoclassical) framework, the farm is presented as a “production 
structure” and analyses of efficiency are restricted to production costs (“factors 
productivity”, “optimization of technological factors according to marginal rule”). 
However, the traditional approach fails the explain: why (given competitive setting) there 
exist so many farms with different productivity of resources utilization14, and why there 
is so big variety of agrarian organizations at all (one-person farms, group farms, 
cooperatives and firms of different kind, subsistent farms, small and large farms etc. 
The modern approach studies farm and other agrarian organizations as a 
governance structures which efficiency depends not only on their capacity to minimize 
on production costs, but also to economize on transaction costs [Bachev, 2004]. 
In a one-person subsistent farm there are no transaction costs (one agent), but 
limited possibility for extension of farm size through investment in specialized (and 
specific) human, material and natural capital, expansion of consumption etc. “Internal” 
opportunities for increasing productivity (through division of labor, investments, 
exploring economy of scale and size, new demand) augments along increasing the 
members of coalition (family or group farm, partnership) and/or outside trade of 
resources and products. The later is associated with additional transaction costs for 
making the coalition (finding complementary and reliable partners), increased internal 
costs for management (coordination, reducing bounded rationality, controlling 
opportunism of coalition members) and for outside market or contract trade (employment 
of labor; land and inputs supply; financing, marketing of output).  
Thus the effective boundaries of farms will be determined by the trade-off between 
the additional gain in benefits (productivity, consumption etc.) and the transaction costs.  
Furthermore, the high costs of outside exchange make it more profitable to carry 
out division and cooperation of labor (a transaction) within an organization (firm, group 
farm) instead across the market15. For instance, a specialized livestock farm organizes 
internally a crop (forage) production activity (hiring additional labor and farmland) 
because of the significant costs and risks for market procurement of needed forage. 
Nevertheless, the internal management of transactions is also associated with costs 
(for directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; coordination and controlling 
                                                 
14 For instance, production costs productivity of Bulgarian cooperatives has been 5 times lower than in 
private farms [Bachev, 2006]. 
15 Fundamental “discovery” that "there are costs of using the price mechanism" [Coase, 1937] explained 
why production can not be carried out without any organization and why there are organizations of 
different type and size in agriculture. 
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activity of partners) which restricts unlimited expansion of borders of an organization16. 
Thus a transaction will be carried in an organization if the costs are lower than for 
governing that transaction across market or in another organization [Coase, 1937]. 
Accordingly a farm becomes bigger if integrates the governance of more internal and 
outside transactions. Similarly, the farm becomes smaller if ceases previously organized 
transaction(s) and let them to market or another organization(s).  
Moreover, the effective size and economic boundaries of farm will be determined 
through optimization of total benefits and minimization of the total (production and 
transaction) costs [Bachev, 2004]. Consequently, the distribution of overall (agrarian) 
activities between different farms and agrarian organizations will be determined by the 
comparative costs (efficiency) for using various governing arrangements.  
Transacting modes and acceptable net benefits vary according to individual’s 
preferences, entrepreneurship ability, risk aversion, opportunity costs of owned resources 
etc. Depending on the personality of resource owners and the (transacting) costs and 
benefits of their coalition, different type of farm will be preferred - one-person farm 
(firm), family farm (firm), group farm or partnership (firm), cooperative farm, and 
corporative farms (firm) [Bachev, 2004]. Expected benefits for farmers could range from 
the monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect revenue; pleasure of self-
employment or family enterprise; enjoyment in agricultural activities; desire for 
involvement in environment, biodiversity, or cultural heritage preservation; increased 
leisure and free time; to other non-economic benefits17. 
In the specific economic, institutional and natural environment (socio-economic 
development, legal framework, support policies, tradition, access to new technology, 
level of transacting costs) various types of farm will have quite different effective 
horizontal and vertical boundaries. For instance, in transitional conditions of high 
market and institutional uncertainty, and inefficient property rights and contract 
enforcement system, most agrarian investments happened to be in a regime of high 
specificity (dependency). As a result (over)integrated modes such as low productive 
subsistent household and group farming, or large production cooperatives and agro-
companies, have been dominating in most East-European countries. Alternatively, in 
more matured economies, where markets are developed and institutions stable, the 
agrarian assets (activity) are with more universal character. Therefore, farm borders are 
greatly determined by the family borders, and more market and mixed (contract rather 
than entirely integrated) forms prevail. 
Transaction costs minimizing helps us understand the reason of emergence and the 
efficiency of a great variety of agrarian organizations in the modern world – economic 
boundaries of farms (“make of buy decision”; extend of internal division and 
specialization, and product diversification), divers contractual arrangements and  type of 
coalitions (partnerships, firms, cooperatives), economic needs for cooperation with 
competitors (inputs supply, marketing, lobbying etc. associations) or vertical 
(downstream, upstream) counterparts, joint ventures, pace and limits of development of 
agrarian markets etc. What is more, efficiency of a particular organization can hardly be 
assessed without analyzing the efficiency of complementary and/or competing 
                                                 
16 Otherwise all agricultural production could be effectively carried on by one big company.  
17 A “desire for preservation of farm for future generation” has been a major reason for the persistence 
(sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan 
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organization(s). For instance, “high” efficiency of small-scale farms and the producers 
(inputs supply, marketing) organizations in most countries can not be properly evaluated 
without analyzing their high complementarities18.   
In order to assess the farm’s efficiency we have to put individual transaction in the 
centre of analysis, and assess the level of associated costs and benefits. Major types of 
transactions of a farm entrepreneur are associated with:  
-    management supply, 
- know-how supply, 
- innovation supply,  
- supply of land and other natural resources,  
- labor supply,  
- inputs supply,  
- service supply,  
- finance supply,  
- insurance supply,  
- marketing of services and products. 
Next, we need to identify alternative forms for organization of different farm 
transactions in the specific market, institutional and natural environment, and assess their 
comparative efficiency. For illustration, the principle modes for governing of transactions 
in major functional areas of Bulgarian farms are presented in Figure 3.  
Comparative efficiency is assessed for the conditions of each farm as contractual 
(governance) form providing biggest net benefits is selected. For instance, in order to 
explore technological economies of scale a farmer is considering an expansion through 
application of modern machineries and leasing cheaply available farmland (Figure 4). 
Tree contractual forms for securing needed machineries are feasible19 – a partnership 
with another farmer, buying mechanization service from a specialized market provider, 
and a purchase of necessary machineries. While alternative forms for machinery supply 
(inputs and services) are associated with the same additional transaction costs, the later 
mode gives biggest additional benefit in terms of growth in productivity and additional 
income. Nevertheless, the considerable transaction costs for outside funding (securing a 
bank loan) make it impossible (inefficient) to select the third form otherwise allowing 
maximum productivity (and farm expansion). 
 
Figure 3: Principle contract forms for functional areas of Bulgarian farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 E.g. the high efficiency and sustainability of small scale subsistence and semi-market farms, and 
production cooperatives in transitional Bulgarian agriculture [Bachev, 2006]. 
19 transaction costs for supply of additional farmland could be ignored because they are insignificant. 
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Alternative contractual modes Functional 
areas 
Market contract  Special contract Special 
organization 
Supply of 
management 
na Employment contract with 
guaranteed minimum salary 
and output-based bonuses 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
Supply of land 
and other 
natural 
resources 
Purchase 
Short-term lease 
Long-term lease with a fix 
rent  
Long-term lease with a share 
rent 
Long-term lease with a 
market rent 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
 
Labor supply Daily hire 
Seasonal hire 
 
Permanent labor contract with 
a fix remuneration 
Permanent labor contract with 
result based payment 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Supply of short-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term procurement 
contract 
Supply contract interlinked 
with a credit supply, service 
supply, and/or marketing of 
farm produce 
Cooperation 
Supply of long-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term lease contract 
Contract for purchase 
interlinked with crediting 
(leasing) and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Service supply Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked 
with other services, products 
or crediting 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Innovation and 
know-how 
supply 
Purchase with 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Free consultation in 
the farm advisory 
system 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked 
with supply of material assets 
and/or crediting 
Cooperation 
 
Financing Bank loan 
Loan from an 
individual agent 
Co-investment 
Crediting interlinked with 
supply of material assets and 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
 25
Loan from a private 
organization 
services 
Contract with a public 
funding program  
Insurance Purchase of insurance 
Purchase of 
“assurance service” 
Insurance contract interlinked 
with material assets 
Long-term insurance contract 
Cooperation 
Marketing of 
products and 
services 
Retail sale 
Wholesale trade 
Standard contract 
 
Long-term contract for 
marketing 
Marketing contract 
interlinked with crediting, 
supply of material assets 
and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Assessment of alternative contract forms for farm expansion 
Alternative contract forms Criteria 
Partnership Service contract Purchase of 
machinery 
1. Additional benefit (growth in 
productivity and income) 
  
 
 
<
 
 < 
 
 
 
 
2. Additional transaction costs 
 
   - for inputs and service supply 
 
 
   - for financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
 
=
 
 = 
< 
 
3. Net benefits negative positive negative 
Most effective form  ☺  
 
Generally, the contract with the highest transaction costs (for credit supply in the 
above example) eventually determines (limit) the farm boundaries. A major factor 
restricting farm extension, which is generally identified around the world, is the 
enormous costs for enforcement (monitoring, measuring, controlling) of non-family labor 
contracts [Hayami and Otsuka]. That is why an owner-operated farm is the most common 
form for farm organization around the world. On the other hand, enormous “credit 
supply” and “marketing” costs were specified as the critical factors limiting farm 
enlargement in the transitional Bulgarian agriculture [Bachev and Kagatsume]. 
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Subsequently, despite favorable natural environment, cheap labor and farmland, good 
tradition, and growing market demand, a great part of overall farming activity has been 
carried out in numerous small, semi-market and subsistence farms with primitive 
technology, productivity and eco-standards. 
Finally, we can use our new framework to define the sustainability of different 
farms and agrarian organizations. A farm will be sustainable if it manages all transactions 
in the most economical for the owner(s) way – that is the situation when there exist no 
activity which could be carried out with a net benefit [Bachev and Peeters]. If a farm does 
not govern activity or transactions effectively, it will be unsustainable since it 
experiences high costs and difficulties using institutions (possibilities, restrictions) and 
carrying out activity (transactions) comparing to other feasible organization. In that case, 
there will be strong incentives for exploring the existing potential (adapting to a 
sustainable state) through reduction or enlargement of farm size, or via reorganization or 
liquidation of the farm. Thus either alternative farm or non-farm application of resources; 
or farm expansion through an employment of additional resources; or trade instead of 
internal use of owned land and labor; or taking over by (or merger with) another farm or 
organization20, will take place. 
Furthermore, we have to estimate farm’s potential (incentives, ability) for 
adaptation to evolving market, institutional and natural environment through effective 
changes in the governing forms (saving on transacting costs) and production structure 
(exploring technological possibilities for growth in productivity) [Bachev and Peeters]. 
Thus if a farm does not have a potential to stay at or adapt to new more sustainable 
level(s) it would be either liquidated or transformed into another type of farm. For 
instance, if a farm faces enormous difficulties meeting institutional opportunities and 
restrictions (e.g. new quality and environmental standards, production quotas); or has 
serious problems supplying managerial capital (as it is in a one-person farm when an 
aged farmer has no successor), or supply of needed farmland (a big demand for non-
agricultural use of land), or funding activities (insufficient own finance, impossibility to 
sell equity or buy credit), or marketing output (a changing demand for certain products, 
strong competition with the imported products), then it would not be sustainable despite 
high historical or current efficiency. Currently there are numerous unsustainable farms in 
most EU countries, which can hardly adjust to fundamental changes in CAP, and 
associated enhanced competition and new safety, environmental, animal welfare etc. 
standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 In most developed countries, the sustainable development has been associated with disappearance of 
traditional farming organization in major sectors (poultry, beef, pig) which is taken over by or integrated 
into related industries [Barry et al.; Martinez]. 
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Part 2. Contractual structure in transitional Bulgarian agriculture 
 
2.1. Post-communist institutional modernization 
 
A fundamental transformation of Bulgarian economy has taken place since 1989 
when a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy started. “Bulgarian” 
model for agrarian reformation and institutional modernization has a number of specific  
characteristics: 
First, a specific form for privatization of agricultural lands and a gradual removal 
of restrictions for acquisition and management of farmland. 
The 1991 Law for Ownership and Use of Agricultural Lands (known as Land Law) 
restored private rights of ownership on agricultural lands pulled into cooperative and state 
farms or otherwise nationalized after 194621. Rights on farmlands have been restored to 
all previous owners - individuals, legal entities, schools, Church, and municipalities. 
After the essential 1992 amendment of the Land Law restitution of land is made only in 
real boundaries - historical real borders (if they exist or could be easily recovered) or in 
new comparable real borders in the original locations of land plots. 
Modifications of the Land Law in 1993 removed existing restrictions for the 
maximum size for compensation of landowners22. The 1998 amendments of the Law 
made it possible for juridical person with foreign capital to acquire ownership on 
agricultural lands. Since January 2007 an ownership on agricultural lands can be taken by 
physical and juridical persons from countries of the European Union and the Agreement 
on the European Economic Area. 
The restitution of private rights on agricultural lands was an unprecedented and 
complex process. It affected more than 85% of agricultural lands in the country turning 
three-quarters of households into land owners [MAF]. More than 1,7 million claims for 
restoration of farmlands were processed with an average size per claimant 2,7 ha for 
property usually situated in a number of different locations. Eighty six percent of the 
claims were made by heirs of previous owners who (according to Inheritance Law) get 
equal shares in the restituted farmland. Thus acquired “new” private rights on lands 
affected several millions plots in many instances smaller than 0,1 ha. 
The process of land restoration continued almost 10 years due to frequent changes 
in legislation, technical difficulties associated with identification and practical allocation 
of lands, a great number of disputes and complicated procedures for resolution, 
insufficient funding for land surveys and preparation of land division plans, little 
competence and existing corruption in some Land Commissions etc. [Bachev 2000]. 
Besides, most new owners were not eager to get land titles since the lack of interests in 
farming or a strategy to prolong a 5 year tax holiday period after full restitution of land 
rights. 
By 1994 most claimants got recognized their rights on farmland and had it restituted 
in so called “ideal borders”. Owners were able to get up to 90% of declared land for 
temporary (one season) use before land reallocation is entirely finished. Until the middle 
of 1999 merely a quarter of owners restored full rights (with notarial acts) on their land 
                                                 
21 Until the end of Communist period (1989) most part of agricultural activity was carried out in a small 
number of large public farms - cooperatives, state farms, agro-industrial complexes etc.  
22 30 ha in Dobrudja region and 20 ha for the rest of the country. 
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predominately in "old real boundaries" and mountainous and semi-mountainous regions 
of the country. The 1999 amendment of the Land Law ruled for the decisions and sketch 
plans of Land Commissions to act as juridical documents for ownership. Consequently, 
by the end of that year the restitution of almost all agricultural lands were completed 
(Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Restitution of agricultural land in Bulgaria (percent of land subject to 
restoration) 
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Source: National Statistical Institute 
 
The Land Lease Law was passed in 1996 with aim to facilitate the effective transfer 
of farmland management. Its 1999 amendments removed existing restrictions for the size 
of leased land (maximum 600 ha for individual tenants) and for the period of lease 
contract (between 4 and 50 years). Besides, transfers of ownership and user rights on 
agricultural lands were not taxed in order to promote the evolution of farmland markets.  
Second, implementation of a specific form for reorganization and privatization of 
former farming structure.  
The 1991 Land Law ruled out for all non-land assets of ancient cooperative farms 
and other organizations established on their bases to be distributed into individual shares 
between members and workers of these organizations. In accordance with the important 
1992 amendments of the Law all old cooperatives and other organizations established on 
their bases have been liquidated and their assets transferred to eligible share-holders.  
Most of divisible cooperative assets (livestock, equipment, fruit trees, vineyards 
etc.) have been physically distributed among the eligible shareholders. A great part of 
machinery and buildings have been sold out on internal auctions while the remaining 
portion of individual shares (predominately passive assets) transferred to the new 
emerging cooperatives. Initially a significant amount of farmland had been cultivated in 
“organizations under liquidation” (Table 1). However, by 1995 the management of all 
agrarian activity was transferred to newly evolving private structures.  
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Table 1:  Pace of privatization of ancient agrarian structures in Bulgaria 
 
Year  Organizations under liquidation  State farms and agri-firms 
 Number Share in cultivated  
land (%) 
Number Share in cultivated  
land (%) 
1992 2101 - - - 
1993 1166 42.2 1340 8.6 
1994 500 18.1 1251 7.9 
1995 157 0 1002 7.2 
1996 0 0 488 5.4 
1997   475 5.3 
1998   308 5.7 
1999   311 3.6 
2000   232 1.7 
  Source: National Statistical Institute 
 
 
The liquidation of ancient cooperative structures took more than 4 years as for some 
individual assets the final distribution was not completed until recently. In most cases the 
reorganization has been associated with large direct costs (for identification, allocation, 
disputing), enormous physical distortion of cooperative assets, mismanagement of 
production process, and unfair allocation of individual shares [Bachev 2000]. 
The 1992 Law for Transformation and Privatization of State and Municipal 
Enterprises launched privatization of state farms and agri-firms. Most agrarian assets 
have been sold through actions (public tenders), contests (competitive selection) or direct 
negotiations, while in some instances buyer has been the managers or workers teams of 
these organizations. The majority of agrarian enterprises were privatized during the 
period 1996-2000 (Table 1). Nevertheless, implementation of the Government program 
for overall privatization continued until recently23.  
Following the 2001 Water Users Associations Act a process for privatization and 
demonopolization of the state company “Irrigation Systems” started and its assets 
transferred to newly evolving Water user associations.  
Privatization of some state agrarian property has been slow because of the problems 
with the identification and separation of state property, the excessive debt of some 
companies, the existing opposition of various interests parties in rapid completion of the 
process etc. The privatization and restructuring of state companies have been associated 
with ineffective organization of activity, bad management and corruption, and in certain 
cases with formation of new (quasi)monopolies concentrating critical assets and services. 
Third, a lack of efficient system for public support to agriculture.  
Transitional Bulgarian farming was one of the least supported in Europe. Until 2000 
the public aid was mainly in the form of preferential short-term credit for grain producers 
and insignificant support to capital investments. There were also sporadic inefficient 
measures to support producers through price guarantees and foreign trade regimes 
(OECD). Besides agricultural income, farmland, and cooperative transactions with 
                                                 
23 it is still incomplete for some assets. 
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members have not been taxed during transition now. Nevertheless, the Aggregate Support 
to Agriculture was close to zero and even negative until 2000 (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Aggregate Producer Support Estimate in Bulgarian agriculture 
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Source: OECD, 2000 
 
There has been a considerable progress in public support to agrarian sector since 
2000 in form of current and investment subsidies, preferential credits, minimum price 
guarantee etc. However, most public aid before 2007 EU accession affected cereals and 
tobacco producers, and overall support to farms were very low. For instance, EU Special 
Pre-accession Program for Agrarian and Rural Development (SAPARD)’s investments 
and subsidies in the Gross Value Added (GVA) were 3,6% and 1,8% accordingly [Bachev 
2007]. At the same time, portions of the State Fund Agriculture (SFA)’s investment credit 
in the GVA were 0,4% while short-term (credits and subsidies) support in Gross 
Agricultural Product was 0,8%. Besides, only a small proportion of farms benefits from 
some form of public assistance most of them being large enterprises in most developed 
regions of the country. For example, SAPARD supported merely 7,7% of the agro-firms, 
2,3% of the cooperatives, and 0,1% of the unregistered farms.  
Since 2007 there are huge EU and national funds to support agriculture. However, 
public assistance continues to benefit unevenly different farms as bulk of subsidies goes 
to few farms - the larger operators specialized in field crops (Table 2). For instance, in 
2008 less than 16% of all farms got EU Area Based Payments and around 13% received 
national top-ups [MAF]. Furthermore, due to mismanagement and corruption SAPARD 
(along with other EU funds) was suspended by the EC in 2008, and a considerable EU 
funding under that scheme lost. 
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Table 2: Share of EU and national support in Net Income of different Bulgarian 
farms in 2008 (percent) 
 
Share of subsidies in farms Net Income  Type of farm 
Current subsidies Investment subsidies 
Field crops 63.2 2.1 
Horticulture 1.3 1.8 
Permanent crops 0.4 2.2 
Livestock 0.3 0 
Source: MAF Agro-statistics     
 
 
In the last few years before EU accession, country’s laws and standards were 
harmonized with the immense EU legislation24. The Community Acquis have introduced 
a modern framework for agrarian governance including new rights, rules and restrictions, 
strict public regulations, and effective control and support measures. Nevertheless, there 
is not enough readiness for an effective implementation of the new public order because 
of the lack of experience in agents, adequate administrative capacity, and/or practical 
possibility for enforcement of novel norms (lack of comprehension, funding, deficient 
court system, widespread corruption etc.). 
What is more, modern public institutions and infrastructure crucial for farming 
development have not been built in the country: public system for enforcement of laws, 
regulations, and contracts does not work well; essential property rights (on environmental 
resources and biodiversity, special and organic products, intellectual agrarian property 
etc.) are not well defined or enforced; public support programs are rarely governed 
effectively and in the best interest of legitimate beneficiaries; newly established 
agricultural advisory system does not serve the majority of farms; urgently needed public 
system for agrarian insurance has not been introduced; crucial agrarian and rural 
infrastructure (wholesale markets, irrigation, roads, communication technologies) has not 
been modernized; public support for initiating and developing farming associations has not 
been given; multifunctional role of agriculture has not been recognized and supported etc. 
[Bachev, 2010]. Furthermore, there have been a great number of bad government (under 
and over) interventions in agrarian sphere during the transition now which affected 
adversely development of new farming structures. 
 
 
2.2. Evolution of new farming structures 
 
Privatization of agrarian resources has contributed to a rapid development of private 
farming in the country. There emerged more than 1,7 million private farms of different 
type after 1990 (Table 3). 
 
                                                 
24 The Acquis Communitaire adapted before EU accession (January 1, 2007) contains 26000 pieces of 
legislation accounting for 80000 pages. 
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Table 3:  Evolution and importance of different type farms in Bulgaria 
 
Public farms Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms  Total 
Number of farms 
    1002   1772000     2623    2200 1777000 
     232    755300     3125    2275 760700 
    515300     1525    3704 520529 
    458617     1281    5186 465084 
Share in number (%) 
     99.7      0.1     0.1   100 
     99.3      0.4     0.3   100 
     99.0      0.3     0.7   100 
     98.6      0.3     1.1   100 
Share in farmland (%) 
      7.2     43.1     37.8     11.9   100 
      1.7     19.4     60.6     18.4   100 
     33.5     32.6     33.8   100 
     32.2     24.7     43.1   100 
Average size (ha) 
    338.3      1.3     800     300   2.8 
    357.7      0.9    709.9    296.7   4.7 
      1.8    584.1    249.4   5.2 
      2.2    613.3    364.4   6.8 
Source: National Statistical Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Food  
 
 
Majority of newly evolved farms are unregistered farms (Physical persons). They 
concentrate the main portion of agricultural employment and key productions like 
livestock, vegetables, fruits, grape etc. (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Share of different type farms in all holdings, agrarian resources and 
productions in Bulgaria 
Indicators Physical 
persons
Coope-
ratives 
Sole 
traders
Com-
panies 
Associ-
ations 
Number of holdings with Utilized 
Agricultural Area (UAA) (%) 
99.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.05 
Utilized agricultural area (%) 30.3 40.3 11.7 16.1 1.6 
Average size (ha) 1.4 592.6 118.8 352.5 126.2 
Number of breeders without UAA (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.1 
Workforce (%) 95.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.3 
Labor input (%) 91.1 4.1 1.4 2.8 0.6 
Cereals (%) 26.6 41.8 13.0 17.3 1.3 
Industrial crops (%) 20.5 45.1 14.2 18.6 1.6 
Fresh vegetables (%) 86.4 4.4 4.2 4.6 0.4 
Orchards and vineyards (%) 52.3 29.5 2.9 10.7 4.6 
Cattle (%) 90.2 5.1 1.5 2.5 0.7 
Sheep (%) 96.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Pigs (%) 60.3 1.4 7.0 30.5 0.8 
Poultry (%) 56.5 0.2 13.3 29.3 0.7 
Source:  MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census in Bulgaria’2003 
 
Unregistered farms are predominately subsistence, semi-market and small-scale 
commercial holdings. According to the official data the farms smaller than 2 European 
Size Unit (ESU)25 comprise the major share of all farms in main agricultural subsectors 
(Figure 7). What is more, in livestock activities they account for the bulk of the Standard 
Gross Margin (SGM) in related subsectors.    
Agrarian reform has turned most households into owners of farmland, livestock, 
equipment etc. An internal organization of available household resources in an own farm 
has been an effective way to overcome a great institutional and economic uncertainty, 
protect private rights and benefit from owed resources, and minimize costs of transacting 
[Bachev 2000]. During transition, market or contract trade of much of household capital 
(land, labor, money) was either impossible or very expensive due to: unspecified or 
completely privatized rights, “over-supply” of resources (farmland, unemployed labor), 
“missing” markets, high uncertainty and risk, asymmetry of information, enormous 
opportunism in time of hardship, little job opportunities and security etc. Running up an 
own farm has been the most effective (or only feasible) mode for productive use of 
available resources (free labor, land, technological know-how), providing full and part-
time employment or favorable occupation for family members, and securing income and 
effective (cheap, safe, sustainable) food supply for individual households. Specialization 
                                                 
25 1 ECU=1200 Euro. According to the EU classification farms with a size of 2-4 ESU are considered as 
“semi-market farms”. The actual number of subsistence and semi-subsistence farms is unknown since many 
of them are not covered by the Agricultural Census. 
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or diversification into small-scale farming has taken place [Bachev 2008], and even now 
the agriculture is an “additional source of income” for one out of 7 Bulgarians [MAF]. 
 
 
Figure 7: Share of farms with SGM smaller than 2 ESU and bigger than 100 ESU in 
total SGM and farms with different specialization (percent) 
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Management of the small-scale farms is not associated with significant costs. They 
are mainly individual or family holdings, and farm size is exclusively determined by 
household resources – family labor, own farmland and finance. Internal governing costs 
are non-existent (one-person farm) or insignificant because the coalition is between family 
members (common goals, high confidence, and no cheating behavior dominate). Farmers 
have strong incentives to increase efficiency adapting to internal or market demand, 
intensifying work, investing in human capital etc. since they own the whole residuals 
(income). Nevertheless, there has been a constant decrease in the number of unregistered 
farms as a result of labor exodus (competition with other farms or industries, retirement, 
emigration), organizational modernization (change in type of enterprises), increasing 
market competition (massive failures and take-overs), and impossibility to adapt to new 
institutional requirements (standards) for safety, quality, environmental preservation, 
animal welfare etc.   
More than 3000 new production cooperatives emerged during and after liquidation 
of ancient “cooperative” structures in 1990s (Table 3). They have been the biggest farms 
in terms of land management concentrating a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, 
and key services to members and rural population (Table 4).  
The cooperative has been the single effective form for farming organization in the 
absence of settled rights on main agrarian resources and/or inherited high 
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interdependence of available assets (restituted farmland, acquired individual shares in the 
actives of old cooperatives, narrow specialization of labor) [Bachev 2000]. After 1990 
more than 2 millions Bulgarians have got individual stakes in the assets of liquidated 
ancient public farms. In addition to their small size, a great part of these shares have been 
in indivisible assets (large machinery, buildings, processing and irrigation facilities). 
Therefore, new owners have had no alternative but liquidate (through sales, consumption, 
distortion) or keep these assets as a joint (cooperative) ownership. In many cases, the 
ownership rights on farmland was restituted with adjoined fruit trees and vineyards, and 
much of the activities (e.g. mechanization, plant protection, irrigation) could be 
practically executed solely in cooperation. Most “new” landowners happened to live 
away from rural areas, have other business, be old of age, or possess no skills or capital to 
start own farms. In the absence of a big demand for farmlands and/or confidence in 
emerging private farming during first years of transition, more than 40% of the new 
owners pulled their land and assets in the new production cooperatives.  
Moreover, most cooperatives have developed along with the new small-scale and 
subsistent farming. Namely, “non-for-profit” character and strong member (rather than 
market) orientation have attracted the membership of many households. In transitional 
conditions of undeveloped markets, high inflation, and big unemployment, the production 
cooperative has been perceived as an effective (cheap, stable) form for supply of highly 
specific to individual farms inputs and services (e.g. production of feed for animals; 
mechanization of major operations; storage, processing, and marketing of farm output) 
and/or food for households consumption.  
The cooperative rather than other formal collective (e.g. firm) form has been mostly 
preferred. Cooperatives have been initiated by older generation entrepreneurs and a long-
term “cooperative” tradition from the communist period has a role to play. Besides, this 
mode allows individuals an easy and low costs entree and exit from the coalition, and 
preservation of full control on a major resource (such as farmland), and “democratic” 
participation in and control on management (“one member-one vote” principle). In 
addition, the cooperative form gives some important tax advantages such as tax 
exemption on sale transactions with individual members and on received rent in kind. 
Also for coops there are legal possibilities for organization of transactions not legitimate 
for other modes such as credit supply, marketing, and lobbying at a nation-wide scale26.  
Relatively bigger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for 
efficient use of labor (teamwork, internal division and specialization of work), farmland 
(cultivation in big consolidated plots, effective crop rotation, environment protection), 
and material assets (exploration of economies of scale and scope on large machinery 
etc.). In addition, they have a superior potential to minimize market uncertainty 
(dependency) and increase marketing efficiency (“risk pooling”, advertisement, storing, 
integration into processing and direct marketing); and organize some critical transactions 
(better access to commercial credit and public programs; stronger negotiating positions in 
input supply and marketing deals; facilitate land consolidation through simultaneous 
lease-in and lease-out contracts; introduce technological innovations; effective 
environmental management); and invest in intangible capital (good reputation, own 
labels, brand names) etc. In a situation of “missing markets” in rural areas, the 
                                                 
26 Forbidden for business firms by the Double-taxation and Antimonopoly Laws. 
 36
cooperative mode is also the single form for organization of certain important activity 
such as bakery, processing, retail trade, recreation etc.  
The cooperative activity is not difficult to manage since internal (members) demand 
for output and services is known and “marketing” secured (“commissioned”) beforehand. 
In addition, cooperatives concentrate on few highly standardized (mass) products (such as 
wheat, sunflower etc.) with a stable market and high profitability. Furthermore, the 
cooperative applies low costs long-term lease for the effective land supply from 
members. Output-based payment of labor is common which restrict opportunism and 
minimize internal transaction costs. Besides, cooperatives provide employment for 
members who otherwise would have no other job opportunities - housewives, pre- and 
retired persons. Moreover, they are preferable employer since they offer a higher job 
security, social and pension payments, paid day-offs and annual holidays, opportunity for 
professional (including career) development. Giving the considerable transacting benefits 
most cooperative members accept a lower (than market) return on their resources - lower 
wages, inferior or no rent for land and dividends for shares.  
There have been some adjustments in cooperatives size, memberships, and 
production structure. A small number of coops have moved toward a “business like” 
(popularly known as “new generation cooperative”) governance applying market 
orientation, profit-making goals, close and small-membership policy, complex joint-
ventures with other organizations etc. That has been a result of overtaking the 
cooperatives management by younger entrepreneurs, improving the governance, taking 
advantage from new market opportunities and public support programs, and establishing 
of some of coops as key regional players. Besides, some cooperatives have benefited 
significantly from the available new public support (product or area based subsidies), and 
the comparative advantages to initiate, coordinate and carry out certain (environmental, 
rural development etc.) projects requiring large collective actions.  
At the same time, many cooperatives have shown certain disadvantages as a form 
for farm organization. A big membership of the coalition (averaging 240 members per 
coop) makes individual and collective control on the coop’s management very difficult 
and costly. That gives a great possibility for mismanagement and/or let using 
cooperatives in the best interests of managers or groups around them (on-job 
consumption, unprofitable for members’ deals, transfer of profit and property, 
corruption)27. What is more, majority of the new cooperatives did not overcome the 
incentive problems associated with the collective team working in the old public farms28.  
Furthermore, there are differences in the investment preferences of diverse 
members (old-younger; working-non-working; large-small shareholders) due to non-
tradable character of cooperative shares (so called “horizon problem”). While working 
and younger members are interested in long-term investments and growth of salaries, 
income in kind, other on-job benefits, the older and not working members favor higher 
current gains (income, land rent, dividend). Given the fact that most members are small 
shareholders, and older in (pre-retired and retired) age, and non-permanent employees, 
the incentives for long-term investment for land improvement and renovation of outdated 
                                                 
27 The latter has been “assisted” by the lack of any (outside) public control on the cooperative’s activity.  
28 Over employment, equalized remuneration, authoritarian management, adverse feeling towards private 
farming, system of personal plots etc. all they have been broadly practicing in many new cooperatives 
[Bachev 2006]. 
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and physically amortized machinery, buildings, orchards, vineyards etc. have been very 
low.  
Finally, many cooperatives fall short in adapting to diversified (service) needs of 
members, and evolving market demand and growing competition. For all these reasons, 
the economic performance of production cooperatives has not been good. Accordingly, 
the efficiency of cooperatives has diminished considerably in relation to other modes of 
organization (market, contract, partnership etc.). Many landlords have pooled out their 
land from the cooperatives since property rights on farmland were definitely restored in 
2000. Consequently, a significant reduction of cooperative activity has taken place and a 
big amount of cooperatives ceased to exist in recent years. 
There has been a “boom” in creation of different type agri-firms after 1990 as their 
number and importance have augmented enormously (Table 3). They account for a tinny 
portion of all farms but concentrate a significant part of UAA, material assets, major 
productions and significant portion of the SGM of cereals, industrial crops, orchards, 
poultry and swine (Table 4, Figure 7).  
Business farms are commonly large specialized enterprises. Most of them have 
been set up as family and partnership organization during first years of transition by 
younger generation entrepreneurs - former managers (specialists) of public farms, 
individuals with high business spirit and know-how etc. Majority of these farms are 
formally registered as Sole Traders. In addition, some state farms and agri-firms have 
been taken over by former managers and teams and registered as Shareholdings 
(Companies, Associations). Furthermore, different sort of joint ventures with non-
agrarian and foreign capital increasingly appear as well.  
The specific management skills and the “social” status as well as the combination 
and complementarities of partner’s assets (technological knowledge, business and other 
ties, available resources) have let a rapid extension of business farms through enormous 
concentration of (management of, ownership on) resources, and exploration of economies 
of scale and scope, and modernization of enterprises [Bachev 2000]. The specific mode 
and the pace of privatization of agrarian resources29 have facilitated a fast consolidation 
of the fragmented land ownership and agrarian assets in the large farms. During the long 
period of institutional and market transformation (unsettled rights on resources, imperfect 
regulations, huge uncertainty and instability) the personal relations and “quasi” or 
entirely integrated modes have been extensively used to overcome transaction 
difficulties. Furthermore, the large operational size of these enterprises gives enormous 
possibilities to explore technological opportunities (consolidation of land, economies of 
scale and scope on machineries, cheap and standardized produce etc.) and achieve a high 
productivity. Business farms have been constantly extending their share in managed 
agrarian (and related) resources taking over smaller farms, incorporating new types of 
activities, and applying new organizational schemes. 
Business farms are strongly market and profit-oriented organizations. Farmer(s) 
have great incentives to adapt to market demand and institutional restrictions investing in 
farm specific (human, material, intangible) capital because they are sole owners of 
residual rights (benefits). The owners are commonly family members or close partners, 
and the internal transaction costs for coordination, decision making, and motivation are 
                                                 
29 Namely the “ideal” titles on farmland during restitution process, the indivisible individual shares in 
material assets of ancient cooperatives, the “managerial” privatization of state farms etc. 
 38
not high. Increased number of the coalition (partnership) gives additional opportunity for 
internal division of labor and profiting from specialization – e.g. full-time engagement in 
production management, technological development, market and “public” relations, 
paper works, keeping up with changes in laws and standards etc. 
Their large size and reputation make business farms a preferable partner in inputs 
supply and marketing deals. Besides, these farms have a giant negotiating power and 
effective (economic, political) mechanisms to dominate markets and enforce contracts. 
They also possess a great potential to collect market and regulatory information, search 
best partners, promote products, adjust to new market demand and institutional 
requirements, use outside experts, prepare business and public projects, meet formal 
(quantity, quality, collateral) requirements, “arrange” public support, bear risk and costs 
of failures.  
In addition, business farms effectively explore economies of scale and scope on 
production and management - e.g. “package” arrangement of outside funding for many 
projects; interlinking inputs supply with know-how supply, crediting, marketing etc. 
Furthermore, large farms have strong incentives and potential for innovation – available 
resources to test, adapt, buy, and introduce new methods, technologies, varieties; 
possibility to hire leading (national, international) experts and arrange direct supply from 
consulting companies or research institutes. What is more, they are able to invest a 
considerable relation-specific capital (information, expertise, reputation, lobbying, 
bribing) for dealing with funding institutions, agrarian bureaucracy, and market agents at 
national or even at international scale. The last but not least important, these farms have 
enormous political power to lobby for Government support in their best interests. All these 
features give considerable comparative advantages of business type of farming 
organization.  
The firm mode is increasingly preferred since it provides opportunities to overcome 
coalition difficulties (e.g. formation of joint ventures with outside capital, dispute 
ownerships right through a court system); and diversify into farm related and independent 
businesses (trade, agro-tourism, processing); and develop firm-specific intangible capital 
(advertisement, reputation, brand names, public confidence) and its exploration 
(extension into daughter company), trade (sell, licensing), and intergeneration transfer 
(inheriting); and overcome existing institutional restrictions (e.g. for direct foreign 
investments in farmland, trade with cereals, vine and dairy); and have explicit rights for 
taking parts in particular types of transactions (e.g. export licensing, privatization deals, 
assistance programs) etc.    
 
 
 
2.3. Governing of land supply 
 
According to the latest data the greatest part of the UAA in the country is owned 
by physical persons (Figure 8). At the same time, owner-farmed land comprises 
around a fifth of utilized land while the main portion of used farmland is under some 
sort of leased-in contracts (Figure 9).   
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Figure 8: Ownership on Utilized agricultural area             Figure 9: Type of tenure of Utilized     
                                                                                                                   agricultural area 
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Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 2003               Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 
2003 
 
Our survey has found out that there is a significant distinction in forms of land 
supply in different type farms (Figure 10). The ownership is a major governing mode 
for most unregistered and smaller-size farms while leasing is a dominant form in 
large agro-firms and cooperatives. There is a tendency with the enlargement of farm 
size to increase the portion of leased land. Hence, the lease-in contract has been the 
main form for the extension of cultivated land in surveyed farms. 
 
Figure 10: Governing of land supply in different type of farms 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
 U
nre
gis
ter
ed
 Co
op
era
tiv
es
Ag
ro-
fir
ms
 Sm
all
 M
idd
le 
siz
e
 La
rge
pe
rc
en
t
Farms with owned lands
Owned land in total UAA
Farms with leased lands
Leased land in total UAA
Farms with group cultivated land
Group cultivated land in UAA
 
 
 Source: interviews with farm managers  
 
 40
 
 Group cultivation is practiced by insignificant amount of surveyed farms. 
Nevertheless, contract for joint cultivation of land covers a significant portion of 
farms applying this form of land organization. In many instances, this mode of 
governance is associated with a number of advantages to intra-farm cultivation. In 
some cases it gives opportunity for “group” exploration of technological economies of 
scale and size (equipment, operations etc.) unachievable within individual farm. Very 
often it is combined with some transacting benefits for individual farms such as: 
protection of dependant assets, access to outside credit, meeting (size, membership) 
requirements for taking part in certain public programs, exploring economies on 
management and overhead (e.g. for security guards) costs etc. 
Our survey demonstrates that a main form for acquisition of land property in all 
types farms is “ownership restoration, inheritance, or getting as a present”. Only a 
forth of surveyed farms has acquired ownership on agricultural land through 
“purchase” with a significant share of the larger farms participated in such 
transactions.  
Acquisition of ownership rights (purchase of land) is an alternative form of land 
supply to lease-in contract (the later only concern the purchase of “cultivation 
rights”). The former mode is associated with significant capital investments (for 
paying land price, preparation of papers and formal registration of deals), and efforts 
(for finding good land plots, checking out and securing purchase provisions etc). 
Besides, it allows a low flexibility in optimization of farm size through reallocation of 
land plots and/or quick emergency sell. Despite that, it is often a preferable mode 
since it gives a reliable protection of long-term investments in land against possible 
opportunism of outside landlord (e.g. termination of lease contract before the end of 
the effective life-span of invested specific capital). Our survey proves that land supply 
trough procurement of ownership governs transactions only if there is a condition of 
high mutual (or unilateral) dependency of assets with adjoint land plots. All farms 
applying that mode indicate using purchased land for buildings, orchard and vineyard, 
irrigation or other long-term amelioration of land. When there is no assets dependency 
and/or cite-specificity of investments to a land plot is insignificant, then either short 
lease or middle-term lease-in contracts are the most effective forms for extension of 
farm operations (less capital intensive or one season crop productions). 
All surveyed farms participate either “never” or “rare” in purchase transactions 
for agricultural lands. It means that actual costs for land supply through a purchase 
contract are insignificant. Besides, more than a half of farms carry out purchase deals 
with “relatives”, and these transactions are facilitated by close relationships, 
confidence, and cooperation between partners. Typical partners for the remaining 
farms are “non farmers”. Similarly, these deals are not associated with high costs for 
professional farmers since: they either know (from previous lease-in contract) or 
easily determine the real value of traded land parcels (seller can not behave 
opportunistically). Furthermore, agricultural land does not pose a special value for 
non-farmers, and they tend to complete deals fast according to existing market norms. 
Lease-in contact is an alternative form of land supply to a land purchase 
contract. For surveyed farms, that has been a dominant form for farm extension 
through integration of new land plots. One of the reasons for preferences to this mode 
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for organization has been unsettled property rights on farmland during transition now 
- lack of notary certificates, uncompleted land division process, disputed rights 
between claimants or heirs etc.  
Another principal factor for domination of this form for land supply is its 
comparative efficiency for individual farm: Firstly, land lease requires less direct 
investment in comparison with a land purchase. Economy on capital investments has 
been a crucial factor for preferences to that mode in the transitional conditions of 
significant lack of own funding, and extremely high costs for credit financing, and 
absence of public programs for new land procurement30.  
Secondly, this form allows a greater flexibility for rapid optimization of farms 
size along with current market and technological changes (e.g. quick inclusion or 
exclusion from operation of needed land plots). Third, this mode permits inexpensive 
verification (“production test”) of real values of a particular land for the certain farm. 
Thus it restricts the risk in case of bad deals (e.g. unsuitable partners or land plots) to 
the period of lease contract. Forth, in some instances (e.g. mono culture) that is the 
best form for annual (or seasonal) supply of divers new land plots to any alternative 
modes of land supply and organization (purchase, exchange, group farming, and crop 
rotation)31. Finally, until recently the lease contract was one of two the legitimate 
ways to acquire rights on farming the land by a foreign entrepreneur32.  
The continuous land supply through a lease contract increases relatively the 
costs of transactions. That is determined by the high recurrence of contracts for supply 
of a particular amount of land (needs for renegotiations deals for the same plots after 
the end of each lease contract), and costs for resolution of possible conflicts with land 
owners etc. However, these expenses are negligible comparing to the additional 
benefits of that mode of governance. Here market for short lease (the competition) and 
long-lasting relationships between counterparts regulate satisfactorily transactions. 
Besides, standard lease contracts are usually offered by a large farm to numerous land 
owners which minimize contracting costs. Nonetheless, when significant farm-
specific long-term investments in land are to be made (e.g. long-term improvement, 
permanent crops, trees, building etc.), then a special form is designed to safeguard 
land supply from possible opportunism of the partner – e.g. use of long-lease contract, 
acquisition of ownership, joint venture with the landlord etc.  
Furthermore, one-third of lease-in contracts are with relatives and familiar 
farmers, and mainly personal (rather than anonymous market) relationships govern 
transacting. The later form, based on personal ties, is preferred since: it permits an 
efficient information exchange (in respect to demand and supply, partner’s reliability), 
cooperation in contracting and dispute resolution, and low cost control (self-control) 
on obeying contractual terms. Besides, leasing business and cooperative farms are 
often a provider of jobs and services for landlord’s households. These interlinks 
additionally diminishes any opportunistic behavior in land deals.    
                                                 
30 While short-term, and recently long-term public credits are becoming available through various support 
programs (SFA, SAPARD, CAP measures, National Plan for Agrarian and Rural Development - NPARD), 
for participating in public projects there is an explicit requirement to possess needed farmland.   
31 However, widespread application of short-lease contracts have created serious problems in some regions 
of the country as a result of not observing crop-rotation, soil and water pollution, inadequate compensation 
of extracted from soil N,P and K, abandoning of large areas of productive lands etc. [Bachev 2010]. 
32 Second to the joint venture with a local partner owning agricultural land. 
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Portion of surveyed farms which sell-off land gradually increases since 1995 but 
it is still at a very low level of 3.3%. What is more, prevailing part of farms 
participates in land sells either “rare” or “not at all”.  Selling out cultivation rights 
(lease-out) is an alternative form for selling-off the land property (all “residual” 
rights). One of the reasons for domination of this mode has been the lack of full 
ownership rights on land (incomplete process of restitution or disputes over land), and 
therefore a practical possibility for complete trade with changing ownership titles. 
Another main reason is the condition of some specificity (dependency) between 
temporally free land and other farm assets (adjacent plots, accomplished 
improvements etc.)33. That is why, farms tend to transfer management rights rather to 
lose the entire control (full ownership rights) on such agricultural lands.  
The alternative form for leasing out of (owned) land is the internal organization 
through utilization of available land within the farm, investing additional capital, 
hiring additional labor etc. The manager prefers to lease the land-out to another farm 
instead of organizing new operations within own farm (on available land) because of 
the comparative advantages of this form of governance. The internal management of a 
particular land plot would increase farm income, but also would be associated with 
augmentation of costs for management of additional transactions. For example, it 
would require supplementary efforts for hiring, directing, and monitoring labor; extra 
efforts to find working and investment capital; additional cares for protection and 
marketing of farm output etc. That is why, instead of internal organization the 
manager prefers much cheaper outside “land supply” (a lease-out contract). In this 
case, either reduces farm size or extends farm with land saving transactions (e.g. 
intensive crops, livestock operations, processing, marketing etc.). 
Manager’s transacting costs for lease-out plots are limited to finding a partner, 
negotiating, and controlling contractual terms. Those are exclusively costs for 
managing land property rather than costs for organizing farming activity (which are 
actually brought by the tenant). Generally, there are economic or another incentives 
for preferring the form of a temporary transfer of cultivation rights in contrast with 
selling out the “excessive” (for a farm) land. As our surveys shows, those are the 
plans for farm extension in future; desire to keep up an emergency reserve from 
owned land; expectation for appreciation of value of a particular land plot; special 
(“traditional”) respect to farmland, desire to keep land for future (after retirement) use 
or next generations. 
Share of farms leasing out land has increased three times comparing to the 
period before 1993, and now more than one-fifth of surveyed farms are involved in 
such deals. Only few unregistered and small farms practice this mode for optimization 
of resources. Reduction of farmland through lease takes increasingly place after 1996 
for 13% of cooperatives. For agro-firms, large and middle-size farms, leasing out 
turns to be the main form for optimization of size of cultivated farmland. Namely, 
these farms are highly sensitive to market signals and tend to manage their resources 
according to efficiency rule. 
Predominant part of surveyed farms either does not take part in land lease-out 
transactions or they do it rarely. Solely cooperatives share, involved in this kind of 
                                                 
33 In a long run, these plots are indispensable for optimization of farm size.  
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deals is higher - 45%, including 22% which report doing it “frequently”. In fact the 
goal of a producer cooperative is to farm instead of trading (profit on) members 
land34. Nevertheless, cooperatives have a number of extra advantages in carrying 
(mediation of) land deals between landlords and tenants in comparison to other modes 
(direct trade; using of market agent or state agency). The later are mainly associated 
with: scale economy on lease in and out activities (information, transacting and 
operational costs), technical opportunity for consolidation and reallocation of land 
plots within large managed area, authority and power to enforce land deals etc. That 
new “free service” (mediation of land deals) makes production cooperatives a specific 
and effective mode for governing of land supply in Bulgarian conditions.    
For most of the farms frequency of lease-out transactions with a particular 
partner is high. That is caused by the lower costs for contract renewal in comparison 
with new contracting; stronger incentives for self-restriction of opportunistic behavior 
of tenant; opportunity to elaborate effective control and dispute resolution 
mechanisms etc. Nonetheless, a significant portion of lease-out contracts (43%) is 
with low recurrence, and it is particularly true for the cooperatives and the firms. The 
later farms often have other devices for preventing possible opportunism and careless 
utilization of land such as economic influence, strong regional authority and power, 
interlink transacting (e.g. land plus service supply) etc. However, there are a number 
of instances, of inefficient for members’ land deals at the best interests of the coops 
managers or related private interests (mismanagement, corruption).  
Considerable share of land purchase and sell deals in surveyed farms are 
carried out through “written contract”, which in most instances is “notary legalized” 
or “registered in agricultural office”. To a great extend the written mode and formal 
registration of (changes in) ownership titles are determined by the official regulations. 
However, preferences to a paper form are usually strong when “residual rights” on a 
unique resource like farmland are transferred. This form provides a long-term legal 
protection of rights on indispensable, “eternal”, and often a highly specific to a farm 
asset. 
Part of investigated farms report they use a “verbal agreement” as the form for 
accomplishing purchase and sell contracts (21% and 14% accordingly). Informal 
transfer of ownership presumes a high trust between partners and existence of reliable 
(informal) mechanisms for effective contract enforcement (e.g. family or friendship 
relations). In many cases, this mode assumes an unfinished (uncompleted) ownership 
transfer transaction. For examples, a land purchase is negotiated, but a payment is not 
made (due to shortage of cash, desire for a “trial” period); or actual utilization of land 
is undertaken, but partial payment over several years, is in place. It is not an accident 
that later form for ownership transfer is practiced by less stable and financially weak 
structures – unregistered and smaller-size farms. 
A good part of land lease-in deals and a significant part of lease-out deals are 
governed by “oral agreement” between partners (28% and 45% correspondingly). 
Since mutual expectations of parties are to a great extend standardized, and contract 
terms well-defined and understood by counterparts, there is no need for written 
specifications of transactions. The economic value of different land categories in a 
                                                 
34 2000 changes in the Cooperative Law have ruled out possibility for cooperatives to own farmland, and 
thus entire land supply of cooperatives comes through lease-in contracts.  
 44
particular region is generally well known (often “officially” determined). Therefore, a 
standard (market) rent reflects quality variations, and technological specificity are 
easily negotiated (e.g. situation of land plots, accomplished improvements etc.). 
Specificity of investment in agricultural land is low and mostly restricted to a season 
(one-year crops). Contract term is not of importance for either partner since 
transactions can be terminated any time (after each season) without significant loses 
for neither party. Agreement is reached easily and it is not difficult to enforce contract 
provisions (cares for land, rent payments etc.). Putting into a written form of 
standardized obligations has no sense, and all notary and formal registrations are only 
coupled with useless additional costs (for preparation, registration, disputing etc.).   
Formal lease contracts are used mainly by cooperatives, firms, and bigger 
farms. They are put to use because of the explicit legal requirements (as in the case of 
cooperatives) when violation of such institutional restrictions is easily discovered by 
authority. However, a major reason for selecting written and formally registered 
contracts is existence of considerable economic advantages for this mode of 
organization. Our surveys proves that, those are possible direct economies for big 
tenants (farms, firms, cooperatives) from applying standard contracts to numerous 
(usual small) land owners, and avoiding individual negotiations of universal 
transactions. Besides, these farms commonly practice a long-term lease and therefore 
realize economies form constant (annual) renewal of contracts after each season. 
Next, formal contracts better safeguard pay-back of investment in leased-in land 
through third-party (e.g. court) enforcement of agreements and against possible early 
termination of contracts. The later is particularly important for large farms, which 
cultivate land in big and consolidated plots investing significant capital with high farm 
(and land) specificity. And finally, for participation in public support programs 
usually there is a requirement for land ownership or a signed long-term lease contract 
which makes that written mode necessary.  
In lease-in contracts around 43% of surveyed farms use a “share rent” as that 
portion is higher for unregistered and cooperative farms and small and middle-size 
farms. “Fix-rent” is employed by rest 30% of farms, as firms and large farms favor 
more that sort of rent. One-forth of farms use “mix rent” contract. For all farms the 
major factor for rent choice is “the specific product grown on land”. Next important 
factor for rent selection is “good/bad relations with land owner”. In the rent-formation 
process the firms and large farms use “as a base the dominant rent in region”. The 
small and unregistered farms fix the rent “through a concrete negotiation”. 
Cooperatives and middle-size farms apply equally both market and negotiated rent 
arrangements. 
In lease-out contracts unregistered farms and firms, and small and large farms 
give a priority to prior rent fixing. Mix form is preferred by most of cooperatives and 
middle-size farms. Specific product grown on land is the most important factor for 
rent choice in firms and cooperatives, and medium farms. Unregistered and small size 
farms report as the main consideration “good/bad relations with a partner”. Besides, 
“economic stability/instability in the country” is a significant factor for all kind of 
farms, and the most important for the large farms. While majority of firms employ as 
a base the predominant rate in the region, all cooperatives and nearly all of 
unregistered farms form the rent through concrete negotiation. 
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Rent choice is important for minimization of overall cots for lease contract. 
When a fix rent is adopted a land owner saves the cost for controlling of tenants 
conscientiousness (in respect to efficiency of land use, and fair payment of negotiated 
share-rent). This mode also contains strong incentives for intensive exploitation of 
leased land since tenant keeps the entire surplus product of his efforts. On the other 
hand, all risk in fix-rent contract is bearded by the tenant-farmer. Generally, in 
farming a great natural uncertainty (climate, diseases and pests attacks, yields) is 
coupled with a big economic uncertainty (level of production costs, demand, output 
prices). Therefore, most surveyed farms give a preference to shared or mixed-rent 
(some share participation in the output) in lease-in deals. As land owners (in lease-out 
deals) the same agents favor fixed rent due to high uncertainty associated with 
transactions. 
In land purchase and lease in deals merely one-third of surveyed farms “usually 
do not have any problems”. The portion of farms not confronting any problems in 
sell-off deals is a forth and very tiny for lease-out contracts. For dealing with 
transacting problems farms mostly apply “additional negotiation”, “go to dispute in 
Court”, need to “hire a lawyer”, or resort to “other measures”35. Nevertheless, a good 
proportion of farms report they can “do nothing” to resolve conflicts but undertake a 
(cost saving) “waiting strategy”. Consequently, otherwise effective deals either do not 
take place or are not carried out according to wishes, expectations, or agreements of 
parties.  
The most common reasons for size reduction (through land sells-off or lease-
out) in surveyed farms are: “lack of gain from land cultivation”, “accumulation of 
funds for financing other activities”, “impossibility to manage all owned land”, and 
“ceasing some activities”. That proves that a main factor for the reduction of scale of 
land supply is the high level of transaction costs for organization of farmland within 
the farm borders. The management of outside deals (sell-off or lease-out contracts) is 
much more economical than the internal integration through hiring new workers, 
providing necessary finance, and organizing new activities on available lands. Farms 
restricting the internal land supply either minimize the farm size or extend the farm 
through organization of land-saving transactions (intensive crops, livestock 
operations, agricultural services etc.). 
Land deals are not only a means for changing the farm size but also a way for 
rationalization of land organization. Resulting land concentration enhances farm 
efficiency since: it minimizes considerably technological expenditures (allowing 
effective exploration of economies of scale and scope from utilization of machinery, 
saving on transportation costs etc.); it leads to a significant economy on transacting 
costs from an effective labor direction and supervision, quality control on contacted 
services, lesser needs for security guards etc. ; it permits farm extension since it 
increases the possibilities for effective organization of more internal and outside 
transactions under a single management.  
Thus in a situation of a significant portioning (scattering) of land ownership in 
the country the trade with rights on agricultural land has been a major way for 
consolidation of land plots. Our survey indicates that more than 40% of leasing-out 
farms simultaneously take part in lease-in transactions. Every tenth of leasing-in farms 
                                                 
35 In some cases, those are illegal means to enforce contracts. 
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also lease-out land. Not small portion of farms applying other forms for land supply 
(such as purchase, sell, lease out, lease in) at the same time practice “compensating” 
opposite deals (sell, purchase, lease-in, lease-out). 
According to most managers of surveyed farms the “contract enforcement” 
requires great “time and efforts” (Table 5). In addition, for the majority of large farms 
and agro-firms land supply contracts takes a big deal of the overall management 
efforts. A good part of cooperative and middle-size farms also spend significant 
transaction costs for “finding partners selling or leasing land”.  
 
Table 5: Time and efforts for governing of farm transactions (percent) 
 
 
Type of farms 
 
Efforts and time 
for: 
Level  
Unregistered Cooperative Firms Small Middle Large Total 
 big 18,91 14,28 12,5 18,91 18,18 0 15,46Finding new workers
moderate  8,10 42,85 37,5 5,40 45,45 31,25 27,83
 big 18,91 35,71 12,5 13,51 31,81 12,5 21,64Finding partners 
selling or leasing-out 
farmland                     
moderate  29,72 14,28 62,5 18,91 40,90 62,5 36,08
 big 24,32 21,42 50 21,62 34,09 50 31,95Finding suppliers for 
needed materials, 
equipment etc. 
moderate  29,72 67,85 25 35,13 45,45 31,25 39,17
 big 37,83 42,85 56,25 27,02 56,81 56,25 45,36Finding markets for 
outputs            moderate  13,51 35,71 28,12 27,02 20,45 31,25 24,74
 big 45,94 17,85 15,62 40,54 18,18 25 27,83Finding the rest of 
needed information     moderate  10,81 21,42 40,62 8,10 31,81 37,5 23,71
 big 18,91 35,71 40,62 16,21 40,90 37,5 30,92Negotiating and 
preparing contracts moderate  27,02 21,42 37,5 21,62 27,27 50 28,86
 big 48,64 42,85 37,5 45,94 36,36 56,25 43,29Controlling 
implementation of 
contractual terms 
moderate  5,40 14,28 31,25 5,40 22,72 25 16,49
 big 29,72 14,28 59,37 29,72 31,81 56,25 35,05Resolving conflicts 
associated with 
quality and contracts 
moderate  5,40 50 21,87 16,21 31,81 18,75 23,71
 big 35,13 42,85 59,37 32,43 47,72 68,75 45,36Relations with banks 
and preparing 
projects for crediting 
moderate  8,10 42,85 37,5 5,40 45,45 31,25 16,49
 big 18,91 17,85 15,62 18,91 18,18 12,5 17,52Associating with 
registration regimes moderate  2,70 21,42 9,37 10,81 13,63 0 10,30
 big 24,32 10,71 18,75 21,62 15,90 18,75 18,55Relations with 
administration moderate  21,62 42,85 40,62 32,43 38,63 25 34,02
 big 18,91 21,42 6,25 16,21 20,45 0 15,46Relations with 
membership 
organizations 
moderate  5,40 25 43,75 2,70 40,90 25 23,71
 big 5,40 14,28 0 0 13,63 0 6,18 Others 
moderate  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: interviews with farm managers  
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In the last several years the sale deals with agricultural lands and the traded area  
increased almost 6 times (Figure 11). However, the share of sold farmland (“without 
changing of the agricultural use”) in overall UAA is not significant. There is also a 
good dynamic of the number of formally registered lease contracts as the share of 
newly leased area overpass 10% of the UAA in some years. Rising preference to a 
formal lease contract is caused by increasing efficiency of that mode of carrying out 
lease deals - lower cost, higher security, better enforcement, and possibility to meet 
markets (banks, partners) and institutional (e.g. public programs) requirements for 
land supply arrangement. The formal user rights are particularly important for getting 
EU area-based subsidies and other public support which motivates bigger farms to 
accept the additional costs for preparation, registration and enforcement.  
 
Figure 11: Trends in sale and lease contracts for farmland in Bulgaria 
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After 2000 the state participation in agricultural land market has been active though 
selling out, leasing out, exchanging and giving away state lands. The state land has been 
mostly lease-out (though auctions or direct contracts for growing seasonal or permanent 
crops) to larger private operators (including foreign) or to landless and poor individuals36. 
To a lesser extend the state farmland has been sold out on auctions or granted to landless 
and poor. There has been a small amount of exchanges of the state with private 
agricultural lands aiming to consolidate farming land, concentrate lands for large 
investment projects, or extend land ownership related to privatized buildings. 
Nevertheless, the state participation in land markets has not be significant and affected 
merely 1,5% of the overall UAA (Figure 12). Generally, there has not a big demand for 
buying state farmland while purchases and exchanges of highly valuable agricultural 
lands are associated with inefficiency and corruption.  
 
                                                 
36 Using the State and municipality agricultural lands for land settlement of landless and poor individuals 
has been ruled out by the Land Law (1991). However, this process practically started after 2000 when land 
restitution was largely completed. 
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Figure 12: Share of deals with State agricultural lands in total UAA (percent)  
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In 2007 certain state pastures (0,6% of UAA) has been designated for common 
exploitation by livestock farms as some of them contracted to individual farms making 
them eligible for EU area based direct payments37. 
 
 
2.4. Governing of labor supply 
 
Family labor is the major form of labor supply in Bulgarian farms (Figure 13). 
Nevertheless, there is an increase in number and share of hired labor in recent years. 
Furthermore, fully employed is only a quarter of family labor and there is a tendency for 
enlargement of the share of part-time family workers. On the other hand, the hired labor 
is predominately for full time employment with a rising portion of part-time contracts in 
last years. Seasonal workers are typical for agriculture and their stake is Annual Work 
Units increased from just over 3% in 2003 to almost 5% in 2007 [MAF]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Most small-scale livestock producers manage insufficient (for EU area based subsidies) farmlands or 
have no lands at all. That is why this Government intervention actually aimed to give access of small 
livestock producers to EU subsidies. 
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Figure 13: Number of labor force in Bulgarian agriculture 
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Our survey has found out that different type of farms employ unlike modes for labor 
supply. More than 40% of surveyed farms use own and family labor as share of non-
cooperative farms in that type of employment is particularly big. The greatest part of agro-
firms and farms rely on own labor (self-employment) while most of unregistered and relatively 
smaller farms apply family labor. The share of own labor in overall workforce of farm is 
largest for unregistered and smaller farms (Figure 14). Family labor also accounts for a 
considerable portion of average workforce in all farms its part being especially big in 
employing family labor small, unregistered and cooperative farms. 
 
Figure 14: Share of different type of labor in average annual workforce of farms 
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Source: interviews with farm managers  
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Farm efficiency to a great extend depends on quality and timely implementation of 
“critical” operations such as sawing; watering; spreading chemicals and pesticides; protecting, 
harvesting and marketing of farm output etc. At the same time, high uncertainty and dependence 
from climatic factors make it very difficult to verify relationship between individual contribution 
and final output. Since individual role (in team production) is often impossible to estimate and a 
permanent control of labor (not rare in large geographical areas) is extremely expensive, own 
labor or low-cost family labor is generally used for farm critical operations. Therefore, 
utilization of family labor is the major form for governing of labor supply in most of the farms.  
Family labor has significant advantages comparing to both outside supply of labor (service 
supply contract), and internal organization of hired labor (market based employment contract). 
Family members are unified by common business and family interests. That creates strong 
incentives for cooperation in decision making, reviling complete information, conflict 
resolution, and self-controlling opportunistic behavior. That is why the effective limits for farm 
extension through labor supply are mostly determined by possibility to carry out critical 
operations by own or family labor [Bachev 2004]. For instance, the potential for farm 
enlargement mainly depends on managerial capital of the owner/manager and his personal 
capacity to control additional internal (hired labor) and external (contacting services, marketing 
etc.) transactions. In fact, the level of that managerial skill creates an additional rent which could 
be explored though internal organization of transactions38. Namely that differentiation of 
managerial capital explains why in the same farming industries exists so big variation of farm 
sizes [Bachev 2004].  
Employment of cooperative members is a major form for labor supply only for most of the 
cooperatives as 64% of them apply that mode. That is logical since majority of that production 
organizations exist in order to provide employment for their members. More than a half of  the 
overall workforce in these farms is of cooperative members. On the other hand, only 11% of 
unregistered farms use cooperative labor but the share of this type of labor supply is quite 
significant in the average annual workforce of there farms.  
Cooperative labor contains additional incentives for intra-farm realization since it 
participates in (share) ownership, management, and finale distribution of non-human assets. All 
these advantages of cooperation could be exploited only if it is possible an effective mutual 
control of activity and there are low-cost mechanisms to link individual contribution to overall 
(final) results of the team work. That mode of labor coalition is especially effective when the 
number of the members of cooperative (group farm) is not very big and most of them are 
working-owners in the coalition [Bachev 2004].   
Hiring (employment) contracts are broadly used form for labor supply in surveyed farms. 
Since possibilities for farm enlargement through own and family labor are usually (naturally) 
restricted an additional labor is hired (from market). A big part of surveyed farms organize labor 
supply through that mode - almost 68% of unregistered and small farms, more than 85% of 
cooperatives and middle size farms, more than 90% of firms, and all of the large farms. 
Moreover, hired labor accounts for a significant share in the workforce of hiring farms. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Otherwise, farmer would sell his standardized labor on market (instead of self-employing in own farm) and will 
get the normal price for labor. 
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Internal labor contract is an alternative form for farm extension to outside (market) 
contract for service supply. That mode possesses a number of transacting advantages such as: 
economy of costs for multiple negotiations and detailed specification of obligations; protecting 
transactions from possible opportunism in critical (labor demanding) moments; opportunity for 
effective investment in farm specific human capital etc. That mode for farm enlargement is often 
preferred because of undeveloped (missing or unstable) market for agrarian services, or the high 
potential for profiting on internally organized specific human capital (learning by doing 
experience, training etc.). 
In many instances the outside employment of labor comes to be an alternative for outside 
supply of agrarian inputs – e.g. buying instead of producing feed for animals, buying machinery 
and “replacing labor” etc. A main reason for the selecting that form for transacting is again the 
relative costs. In some cases, that is the “impossibility” to find a reliable supplier, or the high 
risk from strong dependency of farm from outside providers (e.g. forage supply for animals), or 
the necessity for finding “expensive” credit for market procurement of inputs etc. In other 
instances, grounds for choosing the internal mode is the availability of needed non-human assets 
(e.g. land, machinery) for intra-farm organization of transactions or existence of strong 
interdependence (specificity) of different farm assets requiring an integration.  
Finally, outside labor supply is an alternative for lease-out contract of available (owned, 
rented etc.) land39. In this case the farm size is reduced through (partial or full) transfer of land 
management to another farm entrepreneur.  
Permanent employment is the main form for labor organization in all type of farms – 
around 80% of unregistered farms, and almost all cooperatives and firms apply that mode of 
labor supply. The permanent (labor) contract with a specific farm assumes a high frequency of 
transactions between a farm entrepreneur and a worker throughout the year. It allows realization 
of considerable economies on governing of labor supply. Instead of negotiating each particular 
activity (a service supply contract, “daily” hiring etc) the manager and the worker sign a 
permanent employment contract. In that way both sides save costs for permanent 
(re)negotiations, and the farmer economizes on efforts to find “good” workers, for testing 
labor’s skills and reliability etc. Besides, a high recurrence of transacting between the same 
parties (a permanent contact) let develop “good” relationships between partners (getting to know 
each other, mutual efforts to avoid or overcome conflicts etc.), and creates incentives to invest in 
farm specific human capital (getting knowledge about quality of different land plots, learning 
the technology for specific products on farm, intimate acquaintance with individual animals 
etc.). The permanent employment also allows avoiding the risk of uncertainty in labor market 
(e.g. shortage of highly qualified labor) which is significant in agriculture in some activities and 
(pick) periods of time.  
For highly specific to a farm human capital (managerial, technological knowledge, 
personal contacts etc.) that mode is essential for protecting critical labor supply transactions. For 
example, acquired (through training, “learning by doing”) knowledge for the management of a 
                                                 
39 Namely that relationship (between labor supply and land supply); and incentives, costs minimizing, and risk 
bearing futures of alternative forms of land tenure has been commonly studied by traditional agrarian economy 
[Eswaran and Kotwal].  
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particular farm is very often highly specific for that farm asset40. That is why its supply is usual 
“integrated” through a contract for permanent employment. 
In one-person farms (self-employment) the permanent employment is a result of the 
combination of functions of farm management and effective (“own”) execution of intrafarm 
production and related activities. In Bulgarian conditions it is often a consequence of the low 
opportunity for alternative employment of labor (high redundancy, low qualification, old age) 
and other owned resources (e.g. farmland, livestock). In that case the only possibility for 
“business” is an internal organization of available resources (labor, land etc.). When it is 
impossible to utilize own labor throughout the year (during all seasons) it either stays unused 
(seasonal or part-time occupation, redundancy) or it is applied in other farms and industries 
(selling out labor). For instance, more than a fifth of surveyed farms have no permanent mode 
for labor supply. Finally, the ownership on a great part of the material (non-human) assets of a 
particular farm is frequently used to “secure” own employment in these (family, cooperative) 
farms without any economic (production, transaction) reason for internal organization of 
transactions.  
The permanent labor accounts for more than a half in the average annual structure of 
workforce in surveyed farms (Figure 15). This form of employment presents a major share in the 
average annual workforce in applying small, unregistered and cooperative farms. On the other 
hand, large farms and agro-firms which use permanent contacts rely to the lesser extend on that 
mode for supplying needed labor. 
 
Figure 15: Share of different type of employment in annual structure of workforce of 
farms 
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40 Unlike other industries market for farm managers usually do not develop. 
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Almost tree-forth of surveyed farms apply seasonal supply of labor. That is caused by 
the “seasonal” character of (some) activities in farming and necessity for “oversupply” in 
particular periods of the year (summer, autumn). Needed labor for extension of farms in such 
periods is secured by a temporary (short-term) contract. That mode allows flexibility in labor 
supply in accordance with the internal necessities of farm enlargement. It saves costs for a 
permanent contract (for finding permanent work for hired labor, for supervising etc.) and for 
daily renewal of contracts (for labor or service supply) during the active season. At the same 
time, that form protects transactions for specialized labor supply from failures in pick periods, 
certain campaigns etc. Bigger farms, cooperatives and firms use to a greater extend that mode 
for labor organization, while a considerable part of unregistered and smaller farms obtain labor 
supply through other forms. On average seasonal employment accounts for a good share in the 
workforce of farm applying that form of labor supply.    
Around 41% of surveyed farms use also irregular employment, as a half of agro-firms 
and a tree-forth of large farms apply that form for governing of labor supply. That organization 
of workforce is related to the necessity for “internal” organization of labor in particular days or 
short periods (e.g. seedling, harvesting etc.). In certain cases those are critical operations for 
the farm. Therefore, an internal employment under the management control rather than outside 
service supply contract is preferred. Usually, those are specialized and not rarely highly-
qualified activities where labor market works well. Finding out and securing needed labor is 
not expensive while major material assets for carrying out critical transactions are generally 
integrated within the farm (harvesters, dryers, irrigation facilities etc.).  
In some cases there is a need for additional low-qualified labor for various insignificant 
and for non-standardized operations. Since it is uneconomical to negotiate details for each 
individual service (“activity by activity”) moreover with different agents, irregular 
employment is used (daily, weekly, for a certain period) and labor is directed according to the 
specific needs. 
Finally, in agriculture there are technological operations which require in certain 
moment of time a big number of low-qualified labor for standardized activities (e.g. manual 
harvesting, manual cultivation etc.). Such labor is supplied through contracts for irregular 
employment which character is little different from standard service supply contracts (“output 
base” compensation). 
More than one-third of annual workforce in unregistered farms and firms which 
employ irregular labor is secured through that form of supply. Cooperatives supply 
insignificant share of workforce through that mode. In many instances, farms preferences to 
temporary contracts (seasonal, irregular) are associated with opportunities to economize on 
compulsory social and other (e.g. redundancy) payments which would be hardly escaped with 
permanent labor contacts (due to inspections, auditing, labor-unions pressures etc.). 
More than 11% of surveyed farms apply “other” employment along with the extension 
of variety of effective modes for supplying labor (mixed, “double” employment, interlinked 
contracts etc.). Mostly agro-firms innovates the modes for labor supply and use forms which 
are typical for business organizations. In overall workforce structure of farms applying that 
form, the share of labor supplied through that mode is still insignificant and varies according 
to the types of farms. 
A dominant part of surveyed farms use labor in production (94%). That is “natural” 
since farms are main production structures in agriculture. In the overall structure of workforce 
above 74% is employed in production, and that share is higher in unregistered farms and lower 
 54
in cooperatives and firms. Besides, small-size farms employ lesser share of their workforce in 
production in comparison with larger farms41. 
The portion of farms employing labor for coordination and controlling of various 
(internal and external) transactions of the farm is significant: accordingly 71% in 
administration and 63% in management. As much as 18% of the total workforce of farms is 
engaged in these specialized activities. The share of cooperatives and agro-firms, and middle-
size and large farms using their labor in that way is particularly high. Furthermore, various 
types of farms have quite different part of their workforce in administration and management 
activities. While in firms and large farms the portion of workforce in management is slightly 
above 4%, for other type of farms it is much higher. Likewise agro-firms and large farms 
apply relatively lesser share of its workforce in administration. All that demonstrates that 
governance efficiency in large farms and agro-firms (measured through direct relative costs for 
management and administration) is comparatively higher than in unregistered and cooperative 
farms. 
One-forth of unregistered and small farms utilizes labor for security. The segment of 
cooperatives and firms using specialized workers for protection from internal and outside 
stealing, and expropriation of property is especially great - 71% and 94% accordingly. The 
relative share of labor for security in the total workforce of farms is 9%. Unregistered farms 
apply considerably lower part of their workforce for that activity than cooperatives and firms. 
“Extension of business” is the reason for hiring a labor for each forth of surveyed 
farms. Share of agro-firms and bigger farms, which use that form for labor supply for 
enlargement of farm, is significantly bigger – 35% and 45% accordingly. For one-third of 
agro-firms the rationale for hiring additional labor is “for assisting own labor”. For large 
portion of unregistered farms (35%) the reason for applying that mode is “for assisting family 
labor”. Around 17% of farms hire labor in order to “substitute family labor”. Firms and 
middle-size farms are major employers of labor for extension of farm business, while 
unregistered and small farms hire labor mainly for assisting and substituting family labor.  
More than 43% of farms utilizing outside labor use hired labor in production, and  
around 23% hire labor for administration. Every tenth farm employs hired labor in farm 
management as share of cooperatives applying that form of hired labor is higher than in other 
farms (indicating bigger “needs” and less efficiency). One-fifth of farms hire labor for 
security, and that portion is minor only for unregistered and small farms (6% and 11% 
accordingly).   The latter is a result of lesser needs for security in small farms (small amount 
of property, insignificant output, single location of property and output, safer location of farms 
within or nearby residential areas) as well as smaller means (practical possibility) to invest in 
that activity. 
Diverse type of contracts is used for governing relations with different kind of hired 
labor. Written contract is the major form for hiring permanent labor in 62% of unregistered 
farms, in almost all cooperative and middle-size farms, and in all firms and large-scale farms. 
However, unwritten agreement for employing permanent labor is also practiced in a 
considerable part of unregistered and smaller farms (38% and 33% accordingly). The written 
form gives a greater transparency and security of employment relations as well as an 
opportunity to use a third party (e.g. court, local public and private authority etc.) for 
resolution of possible conflicts between parties. However, formal (written) permanent contract 
is associated with additional costs for: preparation, juridical consultations, in some cases - 
                                                 
41 Intrafarm specialization (and thus productivity) is less developed in small farms. 
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notary registration, compulsory payments (for working off-limits, for allowed leave of 
absence, for social security etc.), and termination (redundancy compensations). That is why it 
is not preferred mode by a part of farms. Moreover, in compact rural community everybody 
knows everybody and permanent relations are often governed by good will, trust, reputation, 
and community pressure. 
“Detailed specification” of obligations of both parties in permanent contracts with 
hired labor is practiced in main portion of firms and middle-size farms. Majority of the rest 
kind of farms negotiate each side responsibilities only “in general”. Most operations in 
agriculture are less standardized and hardly predicted. Often it is either extremely expensive or 
practically impossible to specify (plan) obligations of each side in all possible situations, and 
to put them in a written form. That is why in a good part of farms’ permanent labor contracts 
only a general negotiation of obligations dominates.  
For hiring seasonal workers written contracting is applied by a majority of firms and 
large farms as well as by a big part of cooperatives and middle-size farms. At the same time a 
major portion of unregistered and smaller farms favor oral agreements. For hiring irregular 
workers all small and unregistered farms, and a majority of other type of farms practice 
unwritten agreements. Merely a greater share of cooperatives use written form as a half of 
them give preferences for that mode for governing relations with irregular hired labor. 
Most farms negotiate obligations with hired seasonal and irregular labor only in 
general. Besides, 17% of farms do not make any negotiation of obligations in contracts with 
hired irregular labor. The period of duration of temporary contract in farming is relatively 
short, and the character of obligations of both sides is usually “not specific” (and well 
understood by either party). Therefore, in such contracts parties frequently economize costs for 
detailed negotiation and written specification of obligations. 
Personality of the labor is of a particular importance in employment contracts. For 
instance, one-fifth of surveyed unregistered farms and firms most often hire relatives for 
permanent work. Number of close friends employed in these farms is also significant. Each 
forth of all farms prefers to sign a long-term labor contract with person who is known prior to 
hiring. Previous information about the quality of partner and the trust minimize considerably 
the costs for finding labor, negotiation the terms of employment contract, controlling and 
overcoming conflicts of contract execution. More than 16% of farms hire permanent labor 
from universities, agricultural schools etc. and here the expectations for high qualification are 
important for selecting the employed labor. 
For hiring seasonal labor most of farms have a preference to “person who is known 
prior to hiring” and “renovation of contracts with the same person every time”. Relatives are 
also among employed seasonal labor in one-forth of unregistered farms. A good portion of 
cooperatives hire seasonal workers among close friends. All these proves that personal, rather 
than market relations are essential for selecting that sort of labor. Only larger share of agro-
firms report they chose “unknown before initial hiring” for seasonal work.  
Similarly, employed irregular labor is usually known before hiring and the same person 
every time for most farms. Therefore, for all forms of outside labor supply the previous 
knowledge about skills and reliability of workers are essential for initiation or renovation of 
employment contracts. In the close rural communities “everybody knows everybody” and built 
(good or bad) reputation is a principal factor for minimizing labor supply costs. 
“Unknown persons before hiring” are also used in temporary labor contracts (seasonal, 
irregular). However, they are usually employed for routine, standardized and low-risk 
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activities. Besides, temporary character of contract diminishes the risk of making mistakes in 
selection of proper labor (with inappropriate qualification, unwillingness for intense work, 
criminal behavior etc.). Undesired qualities are easily realized in course of labor utilization, 
and hired labor is either dismissed or contract is not renewed in next season or campaign. That 
contract mode gives the employer an opportunity for a rapid and low-cost enforcement 
(ceasing or not renewing labor contract without any payments of compensation etc.), and 
restricts significantly the opportunistic behavior of hired labor. 
The analysis of dominant forms of labor compensation for hired workers in different 
farms shows that they depend on the character of activity. When individual contribution of 
employed labor is difficult to measure then time-based (monthly or daily) compensation is 
used (e.g. for employees in management, administration, security). In these cases, additional 
mechanisms for controlling reliability of work are also applied such as direct monitoring and 
control, employment of division managers etc. For permanent workers various forms for 
connecting labor compensation with final (annual, overall) productivity is commonly applied. 
The later mixed mode increases incentives for amelioration of the overall efficiency of 
organization (through mutual control and self-control) turning hired labor in a co-owner of the 
final output (and a bearer entrepreneurial risk).   
When labor productivity is relatively easy to measure (standardized and routine 
activities) and there is a strong link with individual efforts then an output based compensation 
of labor is typically applied (e.g. livestock and services). Employment of labor under such 
payment mode contains strong incentives for increasing efficiency and self-restricting 
opportunism. In fact it is very close to a service supply contract. 
Majority of surveyed farms report they do not have or rarely have problems with 
permanently hired labor which lead to termination of employment contracts. That kind of 
problems encounter about 23% of unregistered and small farms, one-tenth of cooperatives, and 
only 9% of firms. None of the large-scale farms have serious problems with hired permanent 
labor which lead to failure of contract relations. Needs for a permanent employment contract 
are a consequence of the high frequency of transactions between both parties, and/or the 
existence of developed specificity (profitability) of human capital to assets of a particular farm 
(higher remuneration, higher productivity from exploitation etc.). Here continuation of 
contract relationships is in interests of both parties, and there are strong bilateral interests for a 
rapid and “peaceful” resolution of emerging disagreements. 
The “lack of entrepreneurial spirit” is indicated as a main reason for conflicts with 
hired permanent labor in more than 30% of farms.  Furthermore, “tendency for cheating, 
stealing etc.” is a main factor for conflicts in majority of cooperatives and agro-firms. The 
“lack of qualification” of employed permanent labor is a ground for disputes in 27% of firms 
while the “unwillingness for intensive work” is an important reason only for a greater part of 
unregistered farms (32%). 
Provisional feature of contracts with seasonal and irregularly hired labor is a 
consequence of the inferior or “temporary” mutual dependency of parties. Therefore, 
possibilities for opportunistic behavior are much greater for this type of contract. That is why 
the share of farms having often or always problems reaches 36% for seasonally hired labor, 
and a half for irregularly employed labor. For majority of the farms main reasons for conflicts 
with various kinds of temporary haired workers are “unwillingness for intensive work” and 
“tendency for cheating, stealing etc.” 
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According to the managers of surveyed farms in production related activity they spend 
considerable efforts and time devoted for “organizational activity”, “current planning of 
activity”, and “direct involvement in production activities”. At the same time, “controlling 
purchased services”, “directing and supervision of applied labor”, “introduction of new 
technologies”, and “strategic planning” are relatively less costly. Nevertheless “efforts and 
time for directing and supervising applied labor” are reported “high” or “moderate” by two-
third of the managers of surveyed farms.  Furthermore, in non-production activities the efforts 
and time for “finding new workers” is great only for 15-22% of farms. Thus the high 
governing costs associated with labor contracts (for finding a partner, negotiation contract 
terms, planning activity and innovations, direction and monitoring of labor, contract disputing 
and enforcement etc.) are among crucial factors restricting farm enlargement of farms at 
present stage of development. 
 
 
2.5. Governing of service supply 
 
Surveyed farms govern is a diverse ways the supply of different kind of services 
(Table 6). Share of farms using an own supply (“without outside provider”) of major 
agrarian services is significant. Mostly, larger operators benefit from the integration of 
services through exploration of the internal potential for economies of scale and scope 
on specialized and/or specific investments. What is more, very often an outside (market) 
supply of farm services is “too expensive” because of undeveloped markets of 
specialized services (high market prices, monopoly supply, missing markets), or a great 
risk from external supply (unilateral dependency) of “critical” to a farm activities. 
Due to the high market uncertainty (insecurity, possibility for opportunism of 
supplier), and the critical character of supply in particular time and quality, a particular 
service is self-supplied (internal organization) in order to avoid risk of production failure 
(not carried agro-technical activities, low yields and product quality, unharvested yields 
etc.). According to surveyed farms the main reasons for “not using” outside supply of 
different sort of services are: “possessing necessary qualification” or “having needed 
worker to carry out that activity”. That proves that a good part of farms integrate supply 
of critical for farm development (farm-specific) transactions through training, learning 
by doing experience, or hiring a specialized labor.  
Inner integration of “services” is efficient only when they are strongly specific to a 
farm (e.g. market fails to supply highly specialized technological knowledge to farm), and 
when it is necessary to protect unilaterally dependant transactions (such as irrigation, 
plant protection, veterinary care etc.). However, when technological economy of scale and 
scope from investments in specialized assets can not be explored within farm boundaries 
(for meeting own demand or outside sells of services), then a special (private, coalition) 
organization is usually used - cooperative, farm organization, group supply etc. The latter  
is more frequently applied for veterinary and mechanization services, and spreading 
chemicals and pesticides. 
Nevertheless, many needy small-scale farms can not develop or participate in such 
collective organization (unaffordable development or maintenance costs) and these 
transactions either fail to occur or they are not carried out in an effective scale. All that has 
significant negative implications for many smaller-scale farms in terms of competitiveness 
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and compliance with modern labor, quality, technological, environmental, and animal 
welfare standards. Principally, overuse of manual labor and low labor (safety, intensity 
etc.) standards, employment of animal power and primitive technologies, insufficient 
compensation of intakes of N, K and P from soils, shortage of disease and pest protection, 
bad animals healthcare, low yields etc., all they are common in Bulgarian farms [Bachev 
2010].   
Table 6:  Governing of service supply in different farms (percent of farms) 
Type of 
services 
Modes Unregi-
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro-
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large
Own supply 24.32 39.29 25.00 24.32 18.18 68.75
Own cooperative 0.00 3.57 15.63 2.70 11.36 0.00 
Jointly with other 
farms 
10.81 10.71 0.00 10.81 6.82 0.00 Technological 
knowledge and 
advises Market supplier 13.51 10.71 25.00 13.51 25.00 0.00 
Own supply 18.92 42.86 40.63 13.51 40.91 56.25Mechanization 
services Own cooperative 2.70 14.29 6.25 5.41 11.36 0.00 
 
Your farm 
organization 
10.81 0.00 12.50 10.81 0.00 25.00
 
Jointly with other 
farms 
18.92 14.29 25.00 18.92 15.91 31.25
 Market supplier 10.81 7.14 28.13 8.11 15.91 31.25
Own supply 32.43 42.86 34.38 29.73 36.36 50.00
Own cooperative 0.00 32.14 15.63 10.81 18.18 12.50
Jointly with other 
farms 
5.41 10.71 12.50 5.41 6.82 25.00Maintenance of 
machinery and 
equipment Market supplier 8.11 7.14 12.50 8.11 13.64 0.00 
Own supply 40.63 39.29 28.13 28.13 38.64 43.75
Own cooperative 0.00 7.14 0.00 3.13 2.27 0.00 
Your farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 6.82 6.25 
Jointly with other 
farms 
15.63 14.29 9.38 18.75 13.64 0.00 Spreading 
chemicals and 
pesticides Market supplier 12.50 32.14 28.13 21.88 20.45 37.50
Own supply 31.82 57.14 15.00 24.00 28.00 83.33Veterinary 
services Own cooperative 0.00 21.43 15.00 0.00 24.00 0.00 
 
Jointly with other 
farms 
13.64 7.14 0.00 16.00 0.00 0.00 
 Market supplier 36.36 50.00 60.00 40.00 52.00 66.67
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
The last agricultural census also have proved that in a national wide scale the 
majority of key machineries (tractors and harvesters) are used by the largest farms – 
cooperatives and agri-firms (Figure 15). What is more, while most farms do (can) not 
employ owned key machineries they relay on tractors and harvesters “hired or used in 
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association” to safeguard the effective supply of a critical to farm mechanization services 
(Figure 16).  
 
Figure 15: Share of different type of farms with UAA using tractors and harvesters 
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Figure 16: Share of farms with UAA using “owned” or “hired and in 
association” machinery 
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Our study demonstrates that a significant part of surveyed farms still use no major 
services at all. For instance, more than 40% of unregistered farms, two-third of agro-firms, 
and one-quarter of cooperatives report they do not apply services for supply of 
 60
“technological knowledge and advice”. More than a third of unregistered farms, one-fifth 
of agro-firms, and some portion of coops do not use “mechanization services”. A half of 
unregistered farms and majority of small farms do not employ services for “maintenance 
of machinery and equipment”. Almost a third of unregistered and small crop farms do not 
use service for “spreading chemicals and pesticides”. “Veterinary services” are not 
employed by one-third of unregistered livestock farms and more than one-fifth of livestock 
firms.  
The “lack of any necessity” from services is a reason for “not using” for some 
portion of surveyed farms.  However, major factors for not applying a service supply 
contract are the “lack of outside supplier”, “high price for outside procurement”, 
“problems with contracting outside service supply”, and “quality problems of outside 
supply”. Markets for some services are still not well-developed in the (entire) country and 
there is a week contract position (contractual asymmetry, monopoly situation) of some 
type of (smaller-size, unregistered) farms. Subsequently, a significant fraction of farms 
block otherwise effective (in terms of needs, productivity) service supply transactions 
because of the lack of needed outside supply or the unacceptable prices. However, “the 
high price” for outside procurement is often a consequence of the “small farm size”42, 
which makes impossible the effective internal exploration of acquired services (e.g. know-
how, new technologies, mechanization etc.). As a result of not carrying out of these 
important for farms activities there are serious problems for meeting modern 
technological, market, food safety, environmental and animal welfare standards. 
Furthermore, a part of important services such as technologic-know how, disease 
control etc. are with non-material character (little appropriability), which impedes 
transactions though market or contract form (impossibility for mutually beneficial 
exchange and protection of rights). That is why the internal organization (own or co-
production, coalition) or public intervention (involvement of a third party through 
assistance, provision or mix mode) are the only feasible forms for governance. Most 
frequently market and private sector organize such supply along with (complementary to, 
in package with) supply of the major material inputs (machinery, chemicals etc.) in a form 
of “free” advices, consultations, maintenance etc.  
The amount of market supply of agrarian services is not significant and varies 
according to the type of farms and the kind of services. The outside contract for service 
supply (purchase of a service) is an alternative form for the internal organization of labor 
(“own production of services”). That mode of farm extension is usually used for 
standardized and less specific to farm operations (plugging, spreading of chemicals, 
guarding etc.). Here contracting and controlling (output assessment) of the service supply 
do not require high costs, and the maximum scale and scope economies are realized 
through specialized service market. Alternatively, the hiring and the internal utilization of 
labor would involve additional costs: for organization and monitoring of workforce, for 
“training” of labor, for social payments (insurance, redundancy etc.), for compensation in 
non-working days (holidays, rainy days, out of season periods etc.). Besides, inter-farm 
organization would be associated with necessity to supply (through purchase or lease) of 
                                                 
42 Insufficiently developed farm size usually is a result of blocking of other critical for the farm development 
transactions such as the high costs for credit supply, for marketing of output etc. [Bachev 2006]. 
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specialized machinery and other material assets for carrying out such services increasing 
additional procurement and transaction costs.  
Our survey has proved that major reasons for outside (market, contract) or collective 
(in a coalition) supply of certain services is the “best price”, “high quality”, “additional 
services”, “lack of problems in contracting and implementation”, “high confidence in 
supplier”, or “lack of another supplier in the region”. All these indicate that farms receive 
a certain benefit from extra-farm management of transactions - price, quality, 
supplementary services interlinked to main supply etc. This organization is preferred when 
there is built a good reputation of a supplier (high quality, big confidence) and costs for 
negotiation and enforcement of contracts are not considerable (more universal character of 
services and possibility for low costs control; simultaneous management of supplies of two 
or more interlinked services etc.). In many instances, services provided by specialized 
market agents or member organizations (cooperative, co-ownership) have such character.  
Nevertheless, there are many cases of mini-monopoly or undeveloped markets 
forcing farms to get needed services from a single supplier in the region. That is true not 
just for general services like public administration, garbage collection, energy and water 
supply, but for specialized farm services like veterinary, mechanization, extension and 
advice etc. Unilateral dependency (abuse of power) is particularly typical for diverse 
public (community, state) services which often are “too expensive” for farms43 in terms of 
complicated procedures, time, efficiency, formal and informal (bribe) payments etc.   
Most farms report that the frequency of using the same supplier is high (“always” or 
“predominately” the same provider) which minimize the costs of their relations (building 
reputation, confidence, system for coordination and stimulation, self-restriction of 
opportunism, standardization of transactions) and intensifies bilateral transactions. 
Nevertheless, more than 19% of surveyed farms have more than “one supplier” or “a new 
supplier every time” for outside services. That is a result of necessity to use diverse 
(“other”) services from various (specialized) provides or numerous smaller-scale suppliers. 
According to most of the managers of surveyed farms finding suppliers, negotiation, 
enforcement and dispute resolutions of contractual deals take a considerable time and 
efforts (Table 5). Thus transaction costs associated with the service supply are a major 
factor limiting the effective enlargement of farms. 
 
 
2.6. Governing of inputs supply 
 
Surveyed farms govern in different ways the supply of major inputs. An internal 
organization  (integration though “on farm making” and own production) is common for 
essential inputs such as seeds and seedlings in crop farms, and forage for animals and 
breeding animals in livestock farms (Table 7). The supply of building and animals is also 
practiced by a good number of farms as own production (reproduction, new construction, 
modification etc). 
 
 
                                                 
43 Even when these services are formally “free of charge”. 
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Table 7: Governing of inputs supply in farms (percent of farms) 
Inputs type Supplier Unregi-
stered 
Coope-
ratives
Agro-
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Chemicals Own production 17.86 0.00 0.00 19.23 0.00 0.00 
 Own cooperative 3.57 4.76 6.90 3.85 7.89 0.00 
 Own farm 
organization 
7.14 0.00 6.90 3.85 7.89 0.00 
 Market supplier 71.43 95.24 86.21 73.08 84.21 100.00 
Own production 46.88 52.27 32.65 58.33 40.32 29.63 
Own cooperative 3.13 15.91 12.24 2.78 9.68 25.93 
Seeds and 
seedlings 
for crop 
farms 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 10.20 2.78 6.45 0.00 
 Market supplier 50.00 31.82 44.90 36.11 43.55 44.44 
Own production 54.84 65.00 50.00 58.97 54.55 46.15 
Own cooperative 0.00 0.00 14.71 0.00 3.03 30.77 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 20.59 2.56 15.15 7.69 
Forage for 
livestock 
farms 
Market supplier 45.16 35.00 14.71 38.46 27.27 15.38 
Machinery Own production 12.00 23.33 19.51 12.00 19.15 25.00 
 Own cooperative 20.00 10.00 26.83 12.00 19.15 29.17 
 Own farm 
organization 
0.00 6.67 19.51 0.00 19.15 4.17 
 Market supplier 68.00 60.00 34.15 76.00 42.55 41.67 
Livestock Own production 36.84 50.00 27.78 40.91 39.13 25.00 
 Own cooperative 0.00 12.50 22.22 0.00 26.09 0.00 
 Own farm 
organization 
21.05 18.75 11.11 18.18 21.74 0.00 
 Market supplier 42.11 18.75 38.89 40.91 13.04 75.00 
Buildings Own production 73.33 64.29 41.38 82.35 51.43 45.00 
 Own cooperative 0.00 17.86 24.14 5.88 22.86 15.00 
 Own farm 
organization 
0.00 10.71 27.59 0.00 20.00 20.00 
 Market supplier 26.67 7.14 6.90 11.76 5.71 20.00 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
The internal organization of inputs supply is an alternative mode to external 
procurement (through purchase or lease) of assets, and/or outside service supply, or other 
(not input intensive) mode for farm extension. For instance, instead of supplying fertilizers 
a farm leases-in new fertile lands every season or applies more labor force (labor intensive 
expansion, organic farming). Similarly, alternative for the supply of material assets is the 
purchase of material services (mechanization, plant protection, harvesting, transportation 
etc.). 
Usually the restriction of a market supply of farm specific assets is a result of the 
high transaction costs associated with undeveloped markets for purchase and lease of 
inputs; high uncertainty and risk of price dynamics and/or availability of inputs in a 
needed periods or moments of time; difficulties in quality verification of seeds and forage; 
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monopoly or another dependency from a supplier etc. Besides, a part of the machinery 
(tractors, harvesters, milking installation), buildings and productive animals are either 
highly specific to a farm (strong mutual dependency with other farm assets) or especially 
needed in particular “critical” periods (harvesting, milking etc.). For instance, productivity 
of milking cows strongly depends on knowledge and care for individual animals, long-
term investments in animals (feeding, healthcare, breeding etc.), and in some instances 
even from the relationships of animals with a particular worker (typical for buffalo 
breading). In addition to their specific character, these types of assets have comparatively 
high frequency of use, relatively shorter period of effective life, and possibility for “full” 
exploration of technological economies within (small-size) farm boundaries. 
In order to avoid likely risk from using an outside contract, a preference is given to 
using of own organization (inputs supply cooperative or another farm organization) or 
entirely integrated mode (own procurement, on farm making). For instance, instead of 
extension of its specialized activity a livestock farm integrates supply of forage (an 
entirely different - crop activity) in order to avoid an unilateral dependency from a supplier 
of forage or to use free internal recourses (which otherwise are costly or impossible to 
trade on market). Also when there is potential for join (collective) realization of economy 
(scale and scope) in inputs supply or when it is economical to protect dependant 
transactions (through a better coordination and control, preventing possible opportunism 
of a supplier) then it is formed or participated in a private organization for inputs (service) 
supply such as cooperative and farm organization. The later is typical for supply of 
machinery, buildings and animals in surveyed farms.  
In a national-wide scale the majority of key machineries (tractors and harvesters) are 
also either owned, hired or used in association by farms in order to safeguard the effective 
supply of a critical to farm assets (Figure 16).    
For long-term assets there are two possible contractual forms for outside supply – 
purchase and lease. In some cases leasing of buildings and equipments is used in 
agriculture as a temporary or permanent form for governing relations with suppliers of 
these resources. Employment of leasing is determined by the long-term universal character 
of material assets (stable, greenhouse, storehouse, dry house) and the relatively shorter 
cycle of agricultural activities using productively these assets. Acquiring a full ownership 
on such assets is not necessary since they are with low specificity to a particular farm. The 
lease contract let an effective management of the supply and a full pay-back of investment 
in lease period. The purchase of assets would only increase the overall supply costs (for 
negotiation of sale, checking authenticity, preparation of documentation of transfer, notary 
registration etc.), freeze a considerable amount of farm finance in these assets, and require 
additional costs for ceasing supply in case of failure of venture or after production cycle is 
complete (selling out, leasing out of unnecessary assets). 
Furthermore, in the transitional period of restructuring of ownership (privatization, 
redistribution, demonopolisation), the lease contract was often the only possible form for 
supply of a great part of the long-term agrarian assets [Bachev 2000]. That was a 
consequence of indentified, disputed, or physically indivisible character of ownership of 
reorganized (liquidated, privatized, transformed) ancient farm structures – cooperative 
under liquidation, state and municipality farms and firms etc. 
Finally, unlike land lease contract the leasing conditions for very mobile assets such 
as machinery and animals (care, extend of exploitation, share rent, preservation and return 
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to owner) are quite difficult to control from the owner (big information asymmetry, and 
possibility of opportunistic behavior from the lesser). That is why leasing markets for such 
resources hardly develop and the ownership (farm, group, cooperative) is the dominant 
form for governing of these assets in agriculture44. 
Surveyed farms apply market procurement predominately for standardized inputs 
such as chemicals, machineries, and livestock. Those are mass products, with a secure 
supply, and an occasional purchase. There are multiple (alternative) suppliers and market 
competition works well and governs effectively supply. Besides, the frequency of deals 
with the same suppliers is high which reduces transacting costs since there is a strong 
interest for continuing bilateral trade (self-restriction of opportunism). What is more, it 
become economical to invest in a specific capital for maintaining of a “regular” supply 
(getting to know the partner; development of trust and mechanisms for coordination and 
motivation; interlink organization of transactions etc.). The universal (standardized not 
specific for a particular farm or a buyer) character of most of the agrarian material inputs 
also additionally restrict the opportunism of suppliers. Principally, unsatisfied farmer can 
always turn to another supplier without significant a change in the costs of supply. 
The reported cases of diversification of suppliers are usually cased by the needs of 
different type of inputs (diverse kind of chemicals, seeds, machineries) which commonly 
have different suppliers.  
Nevertheless, often the effective (technologically optimal, sustainable) farm 
extension through internal, collective and (or) outside inputs supply modes has been 
severely restricted as a results of the big institutional uncertainty (not working public 
system for enforcement of private rights and contracts) and the high transacting costs for 
supplying critical for a farm resources (technological knowledge, management skills, 
credit for fund the inputs supply etc.). For instance, the amount of used chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides in Bulgarian farms now represents merely 22% and 31% of the 
1989 level45; a negative and unbalanced rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P and K 
intakes from soils dominate46; there has been 20 folds reduction in irrigated farmland 
after 1990; and merely 0,1% of the livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites, around 
81% of them use primitive dunghills, and 116 thousand holdings have no facilities at all 
[MAF]. 
The major reason for choosing a supplier most frequently pointed out by farms is 
“the best price”. At the same time “ the lack of alternative supplier” is either not a factor 
or it indicated rarely as a reason for selecting a supplier for a particular input. Thus 
market prices and competition relatively well coordinate the supply of part of main 
agrarian inputs. Existence of numerous suppliers relatively increase the transaction costs 
of supply (for searching the best price, partner, terms of supply etc.). Nevertheless, the 
competition of suppliers leads to reduction of market prices, improving the quality, 
minimizing unilateral dependency, and absolute contraction of costs for market supply. 
                                                 
44 Nevertheless, in recent years leasing of farm machinery (tracks, tractors, harvesters) started to develop as 
a form for interlinked organisation of crediting and inputs supply in the conditions of not developed market 
for long-term credit supply in agriculture. 
45 That sharp reduction in chemical use has drastically diminished the risk of chemical contamination of 
soils, waters, and farm produce, and a good part of farm output has got “organic” character [Bachev 2008]. 
46 Accordingly, an average of 23595,4 t N, 61033,3 t P205 and 184392 t K20 have been irreversibly 
removed annually from soils since 1990, and there has been a considerable increase in agricultural land 
affected by acidification [MAF] 
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For a good part of surveyed farms a major factor for choosing a particular input 
supplier is “delayed (portion) payments” (with exception for animals). That mode 
effectively interlinks inputs supply with a credit supply to a farm. Short and long-term 
investments in agriculture usually require a longer pay-back period (at least until the next 
harvest season). Therefore, a delayed or fraction payment for outside input supply 
actually represents a parallel lending of a free or low interest (short or long-term) credit 
by a supplier. Such interlinked organization (“input supply plus crediting”) facilitates 
transactions, minimize the overall costs for management, and intensify inputs supply and 
relationships between counterparts. A supply of material assets “in package” with 
crediting (“loan in kind”) is beneficial for farms since: it either saves own finance of 
significant capital investments; or economize costs for finding and servicing an outside 
loan (from a bank or another agent). In a situation of vast shortage of own finance 
sources and a high costs for external credit supply, that is often the only available form 
for the enlargement (or the preservation) of farm size. Not rare such an interlinked supply 
of long-term assets in fact represents leasing (rent) rather than a sell of actives. That 
specific form for governing of transactions with inputs supply industries corresponds to 
development of a particular lease market for more universal and easy to supervise assets 
(such as large machinery, building etc.)47. 
“On farm delivery” is often a main reason for selecting a supplier for chemicals and 
forage. Here the preference of a supplier is determined by the provision of an 
“additional” (transportation) service in a “package” with input supply. That form 
economizes on direct transportation costs (when “supply is free of charge”) for needed 
inputs. Besides, a significant economy is made from over passing needs to maintain own 
specialized (e.g. for dangerous chemicals) transport or for finding a supplier of 
specialized transportation service. 
“The high confidence in supplier”, “high quality” and “good reputation of a 
supplier” are also among the common reasons for choosing a supplier by majority of  
surveyed farms. At the time of purchase information asymmetry is considerable in terms 
of quality, origin etc. of inputs. That is why controlling of possible opportunism in supply 
is either extremely difficult or very expensive (e.g. through costly laboratory tests, 
expertise etc.). Often the pre-contractual opportunisms is “practically” detected 
afterwards (e.g. low quality or non-corresponding to specifications chemicals, seeds, 
forage, animals, machinery) being quite expensive for farms. Mistakes in these 
transactions result in failed yield, low quality or non-authentic produce, low productivity 
of animals, unusable or costly maintained (“second hand”) machinery etc. In order to 
avoid risks from this kind of “failures” the farms usually do not rely on anonymous 
(market) counterparts for supply of such inputs. 
“Receiving additional benefit(s)” is another important factor for selecting a 
particular supplier for some of new chemicals, machineries, animals and feed for 
livestock. Suppliers usually provides “free” non-material assets or services like training, 
know-how, technical advise, maintenance etc. Since the appropriability of these 
transaction is low (a non-material character), the “package deal” with the main material 
                                                 
47 At the same time, similar lease market does not emerge for productive animals since lease contract is 
difficult to monitor (livestock could be easily consumed or resold). Therefore, purchase is the major form 
for outside supply of livestock.   
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input is the only effective modes for effective organization. The largest farms and firms 
are most open for innovation (strong competition, high efficiency of introduction of 
innovations, bigger entrepreneurship) and for them this specific form of contract is 
particularly important for supply of necessary technological innovations. 
For a considerable number of farms “inputs supplier buys the farm output”. That 
interlinked organization of inputs supply with marketing of farm output (“reciprocial 
supply”) minimizes the overall governance costs for two groups of transacting (a single 
contract for input supply and marketing). In many cases, this mode extends vertical 
coordination (quasi or complete integration) of farms with the supplier of a particular 
input (e.g. super elite and original seeds). In other instances, there is a mutual (e.g. 
capacity, time of delivery, perishability) inter-dependency and a buyer of farm produce 
(e.g. a milk or meat processor, dealer) organizes supply of a critical input (e.g. forage for 
livestock) in order to secure the origin, high quality, quantity, and time of delivery of 
critical raw material.  
There are also many cases “when input supplier assists the marketing of farm 
output” and that reason for choice of a partner is reported by some farms in animal, seed, 
chemical and forage supplies. Offering of a “free mediation” in marketing (interlinking 
with a new service) makes a particular supplier preferable among competitors, saving 
farms costs for marketing of output and overcoming market uncertainty. 
In the supply of short-term assets most surveyed farms use predominately “based 
on a market price” and “negotiated price in each deal”. The larger farms also apply a 
“fixed for a longer period of time price” for chemical and forage supply. Namely for the 
latter farms market uncertainty and fluctuation of prices to a great extend affect 
productivity (large consumers, high frequency of transactions, critical assets) and 
safeguarding supply through a special contract provision is essential. In the supply of 
long-term assets the most broadly employed form is negotiated price in each deal.  
The most common problems in inputs supply reported by surveyed farms are for: 
“finding needed inputs”, “finding a supplier”, “verification of quality”, “negotiation of 
prices”, “negotiating other terms of supply” as well as in the “process of implementation 
of contracts” and “resolution of emerging conflicts”. Furthermore, for a good number of  
farms “finding suppliers for needed materials, equipment etc.” and ”preparing, enforcing 
and disputing contracts” take a significant part of managers efforts and time (Table  5). 
All these is an indicator for the strong asymmetry in contractual position (contractual 
power) between farms and suppliers of certain inputs. 
 
 
2.7. Governing of finance supply 
 
A major form for funding the activities of surveyed farms is “own sources” (Table 
8). In transitional conditions of high institutional, market, and behavioral uncertainty 
most of the typical agrarian investments happen to be in a regime of high specificity 
(“berried in land” or “very mobile”). Besides, much of the human and intangible capital 
is highly specific to a particular farm (e.g. investment in training, learning by doing 
experience, organizational development, building of reputation etc.). Therefore, finding 
out an independent (market) investor to finance such assets has been quite expensive 
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(costs to find a supplier, efforts to negotiate loan terms, losses associated with meeting 
collateral requirements, extremely high interest rate or other “side payments”) or even 
impossible. Consequently, the internal rather than outside mode has been the most 
effective (or only possible) way to finance transactions (activity) supported by such 
assets.  
 
Table 8: Governing of finance supply in farms (percent of farms) 
Supplier Type of 
funding 
Unregi- 
stered 
Coopera-
tives 
Agro- 
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Own financing Short-term 91.4 81.5 79.3 91.2 81 75 
 Long-term 48.6 48.1 55.2 55.9 40.5 62.5 
Relatives and Short-term 31.4 7.41 10.3 23.5 14.3 12.5 
friends Long-term 20 7.4 3.4 5.9 19 0 
Outside investor Short-term 0 11.1 6.8 0 11.9 0 
 Long-term 0 0 20.6 0 4.8 25 
Farm organization Short-term 22.9 25.9 17.2 29.4 19 12.5 
 Long-term 14.3 3.7 13.8 11.8 14.3 0 
Commercial bank Short-term 5.71 18.5 37.9 2.9 31 25 
 Long-term 2.9 14.8 17.2 5.9 19 0 
Short-term 31.47 59.3 69 32.4 57.16 75 Public program 
Long-term 37.1 33.3 17.2 44.1 26.2 6.2 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
Our survey has found that most farms which integrate inputs supply (in-house 
production) with high land or farm dependency use internal procurement for finance as 
well – accordingly 58% of farms with internal livestock feed supply, 55% - for seeds 
self-suppliers, and 43% - for own buildings suppliers. At the same time, share of farms 
which simultaneously supply inputs and finance internally is insignificant for more 
universal and mobile assets – accordingly 28% of animals, 6% for machinery, and only 
4% for chemical self-suppliers. That proves that assets with low farm specificity tend to 
be financed by off-farm sources (e.g. loan contract). When specificity of transaction 
increases farms integrate not only the finance but also the input supply in order to protect 
dependant investments. 
Another reason for domination of internal mode for finance supply has been high 
transacting costs for off-farm investments. In insecure transitional environment, 
investment in own farm has been more or the most effective way to use available 
financial resources along with the internal utilization of other often non-tradable 
household recourses (land, family labor, knowledge).  
Survival of a large number of the (member oriented) production coops has been 
also based on advance payments for services trough system of orders (“commissioning 
contracts”) with individual members. These cooperatives have integrated assets 
associated with highly specific activities to members - services to individual farms and 
households (e.g. food for households, feed for households’’ and private farms’ animals), 
employment opportunities for members etc. Those are mainly assets with high 
indivisibility or with a great potential for economy of scale (and scope) unachievable 
within individual farm boundaries. Therefore, a collective (joint ownership) mode has 
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been broadly used to finance and govern such community-specific assets in order to 
overcome the “missing market” situation, to avoid any unilateral outside dependency 
(monopoly), and to secure productive use of existing large-scale facilities.  
For commercial farms the internal investment has been the most efficient way to 
use available financial resources as well. In highly risky financial markets (unstable 
nominal interest rate, skyrocketing inflation48, boom of banks failures) the direct internal 
control has been the cheapest (often the only possible) form to safeguard investments 
from outside opportunistic expropriation. Besides, investment in internal farm-specific 
assets (such as entrepreneurship, know-how etc.) has been much more productive since it 
brings higher than market (rates of interest, dividends on shares, yields on Government 
bonds etc.) return on invested specialized capital. That is why the large farms and firms 
(which tend to perform much more effectively) invest to a greater extend their capital in 
own long-term assets for increasing productivity. Moreover, even farms which could 
find easier (“often”) necessary funds from “outside sources” make the internal 
investment in own short and long-term assets - 30% and 13% of surveyed farms 
accordingly.    
Nevertheless, internal sources for financing are limited by family savings, coop 
members specific demand (and funding potential), internal profit generation etc. That 
puts severe restriction on effective farm enlargement through internal finance supply. 
When it is necessary only 15% and 41% of surveyed farms are able “always or often” to 
find outside supplier for their long-term and short-term financial needs. Only larger 
farms has a greater access to external financing for their short-term assets as 81% of 
them “often” find needed means. Almost a half of surveyed farms do not use the 
internal mode to finance long-term assets at all. Besides, some farms have been using 
other transactions to find additional sources for internal funding. For instance, all farms 
show as a major reason for farmland sells-out and lease-out deals the “financing other 
farm activities”. 
Therefore, most farms need outside (mix) sources to sustain and enlarge their 
activities. However, high transacting costs restrict or even block the outside finance 
procurement. Consequently chronical underinvestment, low productivity, limit of farm 
enlargement, backward technological development, unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources, all they have been wide-spreading among Bulgarian farms [Bachev 2010].  
Using “relatives and friends” as external suppliers of capital has been very popular 
in rural communities. It was especially common during transition period when 
uncertainty was so high that personal ties and trust (“bilateral reputation mechanism”) 
governed most economic transactions at national and even transnational scales. This 
mode for outside supply is still dominant for a good part of small and unregistered 
farms, being a singe mode for outside funding for the latter farms. Costs for negotiating 
and for contract enforcement are low since contracts are governed by “good-will” and 
personal trust between partners (usually as a part of broader friendships or family 
relationships). Often there is no a formal contract writing and registration, or any 
collateral requirements. Disputes associated with contract execution are less likely and 
they are easily overcome with no substantial efforts or needs for a third party (e.g. court, 
                                                 
48 Inflation was extremely high during transition period Consumer Price Index reaching 1231% in 1999 
comparing to 1990 level [NSI]. 
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authority) involvement. Besides, a “preferential” (not rare zero) interest rate is habitually 
applied and there is a greater flexibility for loan terms.  
In certain cases outside “support” of activities of smaller farms is a part of the 
interlinked “direct marketing” deals. Since market food prices are quite high for the 
pocket of mass consumers (retail profit, VAT), and there is high uncertainty associated 
with quality of “free marketed” products (e.g. high level of residual chemicals; uncertain 
origin etc.), many urbane households use personal and family ties to secure a stable 
supply of cheap, quality and safe49 farm products though system of advance (or current) 
orders and financing. 
Regardless of its relative efficiency “relative-friendship” form can not be a 
permanent mode for finance supply. There are “natural limits” of available (free, 
preferential) outside sources of that kind. While majority of farms using short-term 
crediting through this mode report they “always or often” find external sources when it 
is needed, no respondent confirms such state for long-term credit needs. Besides, when 
“farm efficiency” is not a criteria for investment decision-making neither form can be 
sustainable in a long-run. Therefore, personal relations will be used as supplementary 
and eventually as a “last resort” mode of financing.  
Share of surveyed farms which get a financial supply from an outside investor is 
still low. Most of the suppliers of funding are Bulgarian investors. They tend to finance 
working capital of registered middle-size organizations (cooperatives and companies). 
Besides, the proportion of large agro-firms which get direct outside funding of long-term 
investment is quite big. Foreign investors finance entirely the investments in middle-size 
firms of different type.  
Evolution of this specific private mode for financing of farming activities is 
determined by the strong relation specificity of farm investments to an outside buyer of 
agrarian output. That is either bilateral (e.g. capacity, time of delivery, origin etc.) or 
most often unilateral dependency of farm assets from a particular processor, retailer, or 
exporter. The latter assets are usually associated with some specification of products 
(“special” quality or production technology, “special” origin) which is of big importance 
for a buyer (vine producer, meat and dairy processor, produces of caned vegetable and 
fruit etc.). For the reason of high specificity of such investments to a particular (single) 
buyer they hardly could be financed by an independent outside supplier. Here risk from 
opportunistic behavior in post-contract (post-investment) stage in enormous. Farms 
would not make dependent investments unless they are safeguarded by some effective 
governing form such as long-term contract, taking economic “hostages”, or join 
investment. Therefore, either underinvestment in specialized capital (hold-up), or direct 
external (coo) investment by interested vertical partner. Our survey shows that all farms 
getting such funding of their long-term investments also provide an internal finance 
supply. Since farms are in a big shortage of working capital the outside investors 
(processor, trader) traditionally provide advance payments (financing current inputs 
supply) for interlinked future marketing deals.   
This mode for financial supply usually is a part of a larger contract(s) for 
governing of vertical links - reciprocial marketing, inputs and know-how supply, joint 
ventures etc. Participated farms get some interest, collateral etc. preferences as a part of 
the entire deal. On the other hand, the legal form of business organization (namely 
                                                 
49 Food safety is becoming an important issue particularly for new rich and middle class bulgarians. 
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“agro-firm”) becomes important since it allows to build a formal partnership (e.g. direct 
participation in Management Board), brand name capital, daughter organizations etc., 
and to dispute them before a third party (e.g. court, Government authority, international 
arbitrage). Not rare such farms have been initiated (or taken over) from outside (off-
farm) interests and develop as part of the diversification strategy of special business 
(bank, industrial, shadow etc) groups.  
Nevertheless, unilateral dependency of farms from downstream industries 
dominates. Only less than 9% of farms supported by the outside investors point out they 
are “often” able to find needed short-term financial resource from the outside sources 
and no farm gets an easy long-term external funding.  
Emergence of direct financing by foreign investors has been greatly associated 
with formal restrictions for foreigners to buy agricultural land until recently. That is why 
such a joint venture with a local agent is merely feasible way to govern foreign direct 
investment in farming sector. In recent years, cases of foreign direct investment in 
agriculture tend to be a result of increasing opportunities to profit from imported 
technological know how, modern organization, available marketing channels for special 
or mass products etc. Farms using that mode of funding get extremely favorable interest, 
terms, collateral, and overall paper work treatment (similar to “own” finance supply). At 
the same timer, that is not low-cost mode for outside financing – no farm credited by 
foreign investor testifies it is easy to obtain external financing when it is required.  
Agrarian agents also invent more complicated forms to mitigate problems and 
facilitate financial transactions. Interlinked organization has been widely used to govern 
exchange between farms and input suppliers. We have already demonstrated that for a 
good part of farms a major factor for choosing a particular supplier of inputs is “delayed 
(portion) payments” which effectively interlinks input with credit supply. Such 
organization facilitates transactions, minimize overall costs for management, intensify 
inputs supply and relationships between counterparts.  Supplying physical assets “in 
package” with crediting (“loan in kind”) is beneficial for farms since: it either saves own 
finance of significant capital investments; or economize costs for finding and servicing 
outside credit. In situation of a considerable shortage of own finance sources and high 
costs for external credit supply, that is often the only available form for enlargement (or 
preserving) farms size. 
One out of five surveyed farms use “cooperative or farm organization” as an 
outside finance supplier. Collective supply form is more important for short-term 
financial needs of smaller farms and for long-term funding of not-large and non-
cooperative farms. Main reasons for selecting that mode of financing are related to the 
comparative efficiency and the low costs: “small paper work and bureaucratic 
procedures”, “best interest rate and terms”, and “lack of need to pay for successful 
project for financing”. However, for a good number of farms that is the “only source for 
outside financing” of long and short-term activities. More than 79% of farms getting 
short-term funding trough the latter mode, and a half of long-term credit users, report 
they “always or often” are able to find external crediting they need. Therefore, when 
market fails or when market procurement is quite expensive, farms need, develop, and 
use own special private organizations for finance supply.   
Evolution of joint (collective) ownership mode for farm finance supply has been 
very difficult in Bulgaria [Bachev and Kagatsume]. There were no traditions in farm 
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association in the country. Transaction costs for initiation and maintenance of large-
members organizations are quite high. Also incentives for equity investment are low 
since individual influence on policy and receiving benefit (individual use of 
organization, profit distribution etc.) is independent from the invested capital (a 
shortcoming from the cooperative mode). Finally, the farms which need collective 
support the most (potential membership) are extremely poor to contribute significantly to 
that financial joint venture.  
A number of farm credit organizations have been initiated by private interest 
groups or by a third party (Government, international assistance program, NGO). 
Because of the mismanagement and corruption some of them failed – e.g. Bank of 
Agrarian Cooperatives, Bank for Agrarian Credit etc. Recently established Federation of 
Rural Mutual Credit Associations has got some success partly due to the significant 
public support in creation, initial granting of “equity” capital, and in exterior 
supervision. However it has been experiencing difficulties extending its activities since 
the exterior support was suspended. Some non-specialized in crediting farm 
organizations (inputs supply, marketing or producers cooperatives; professional 
association) also have credit programs. However, the latter activity is very limited and 
specialized - e.g. prioritized lending for breading animal, promotion of new products, 
introduction of know-how etc. Most of these organizations are “too small” to provide 
effective farm financing - to accumulate recourses, to realize economy of scale (and 
scope) on specialized lending activities etc. In some cases, they also heavily rely on a 
third party (Government, international assistance, NGO) support to carry out activity.  
Therefore, despite the obvious advantages of collective finance supply 
organizations in resource accumulation, risk sharing, non for profit operations, crediting 
preferences, “democratic” management etc., they cannot and have not develop as a pure 
private mode in transitional conditions. 
Market (credit, debt) finance procurement has been practically blocked for the 
much of the transition. It is effectively developing after 2000 but it is still not accessible 
for the majority of farms. “Flexibility” of financial recourses is considerable  and it is 
very difficult (and costly) for creditor to monitor debtors and to control if loans are used 
effectively and purposely. That is especially true for agriculture where investments are 
hidden (“berried”) in land and therefore not observable at low cost. Moreover, other 
major agrarian assets are very “mobile” and liquid - e.g. animals and yields could be 
easily consumed or untraceably sold, machinery is “on wheel” etc. Hence, using major 
agrarian assets for safeguard as a collateral is not always feasible. Agricultural land has 
been rarely accepted as guarantee against losses by the commercial bank for the reason 
of lacking real titles (until recently) and a low demand for purchase of farmland. On the 
other hand, farmers are not enthusiastic to offer their vital non-agrarian assets (e.g. 
houses) as collateral since farm investments are associated with a high risk.  
There have appeared many “new comers” on both sides of market (banks and 
farmers) and transacting parties usually do not know each other (no history of relations, 
trust is to be built). Costs for a first contract between unknown market counterparts are 
much higher than for transacting with a high recurrence (“history”) between same 
partners (where keeping relationships has a special value). Consequently, in transitional 
conditions of big uncertainty, high information asymmetry, and strong incentive for 
opportunistic behavior (survival consideration, reputation does not matter), market has 
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failed to organize effectively credit supply in agriculture [Bachev and Tsuji]. Moreover, 
farms have access only to market dept financing since equity market for trading agrarian 
shares have not developed at all in the country50.  
Only one-fifth of farms use commercial banks for funding short-term assets as 
share of farms using market for long-term capital procurement is twice lower. Agro-
firms and larger farms employ to a greater extent the loan contracts for short-term 
finance supply. These farms can better meet market criteria for efficiency and for high 
collateral requirements. Besides, they have a superior ability to face sunk costs for 
finding a creditor and for completing loan agreements.  
Creditors have preferences to formal registered) farm organizations which 
liabilities could be easier (than Physical persons) challenge in court throughout a longer 
period of time (the effective “life of investments”). The long-term credit market entirely 
“fails” for small farms. Large farms also do not prefer “pure” market forms for financing 
long-term activities since they have access to more economical modes for external 
finance (direct investment, joint venture).  
For majority of farms the main reason for choosing market mode for short-term 
and long-term finance is “the best interest rate and terms of credit”. It means that market 
(price) mechanisms govern well transactions for finance supply in these farms. Thus, 
majority of surveyed farms using commercial banks for finance procurement work 
according to the “rule of competition” meeting efficiency (pay–back) requirements and 
fulfilling financial obligations.  
Another major reason for selecting that form, especially for long-term credit users, 
is the “lack of need to pay for successful project for financing”. That proves that market 
than other “hidden” price mediates effectively relations between the supplier and debtor. 
However, for a great part of farms market form is the single (only possible) form for 
outside financing since “there are no other outside suppliers in the region”. Moreover, 
the latter farms have a single external lender as well as being in a situation of unilateral 
(funding) dependency. Consequently for a good number of farms there are only two 
(extreme) forms available for funding of long-term activities – internal (own) supply and 
(“free”) market mode.  
For a significant part of debtors of the bank short-term credit the “tradition” also 
plays an important role. A long-term customer relationships between a farm and a bank 
are coupled with development of relation-specific capital. It helps overcoming problems 
of information deficiency (asymmetry), builds confidence between partners, restricts 
pre- and post-contract opportunistic behavior, and ultimately minimizes the overall 
transacting costs for financial supply. Almost 74% of short-term credit users and a half 
of the long-term debtors of banks indicate they are able “always or often” to find 
external financing when it is necessary. It means that transacting costs for market mode 
for employing-farms are relatively small.  
In environment of high economic and behavioral uncertainty other specific forms 
have also emerged to facilitate agrarian credit supply. Share financing of investments 
with a loan from banks and own sources is commonly used – accordingly by 62% of the 
long-term credit users and one-third of the short-term creditors. This special (mixed) 
mode of finance supply increases farmers incentives for effective use of investment, 
divides risk between banks and users, and economize on total governance costs. 
                                                 
50 That could be also easily explained by transaction cost reasons [2004]. 
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According to the specific characteristics of clients different levels of credit volumes and 
equity requirements are practiced. Besides, sources are usually own used for financing of 
more farm-specific assets (e.g. land and land improvement) while credits are directed to 
finance more universal and liquid assets. The internal financing is also necessary to 
secure an effective collateral for lending contracts which is generally demanded to 
recover bank losses in case of investment failure.  
Correlation between own and bank financing is lower for short-term credit users 
where 67% of bank users do not match credit supply with internal funding. Here “future 
crop” is usually used as a guarantee (“yield as collateral”) for loan contracts. Besides, 
bank often explicitly requests “purchase of insurance” to be made by credited farms. For 
instance, a half of the short-term debtors are obliged by relevant banks to buy an 
insurance for vegetable yield, 31% for cereal harvest, and 11% for milk-cows. Such 
insurance is also requested for one-forth of cereals producers and one-third for cow 
owners which use long-term credits from banks. Since the risk of crop failure is 
immense lending banks require their collateral (future yields, milking-cows) to be 
protected (“insured”) from possible losses. Despite there unwillingness farmers have to 
pay the supplementary price for insurance supply in order to obtain needed (interlinked) 
bank credit. In this case the risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance 
company rather than the bank) and debtor-farms are charged with extra (transaction) 
costs to assure bank loans.  
Another interesting form which has developed is to get “free agro-market 
information” from crediting bank – correspondingly 11% and 25% of farms using short-
term and long-term credit. In this case farms receive “for free” additional service supply 
in package (interlinked) with the credit supply contract. Banks gather or buy such 
information since it is vital for their investment, lending etc. decision-making. They 
offer this information to farms since they are interested in high efficiency of their clients 
investments (and timely return of banks loans). Here, economy of scale for organization 
of agro-market information supply is realized by bank and farms get specialized 
information supply though (in package with) lending contracts. This governance mode 
provides individual farms with a service which otherwise would be very expensive (to 
buy from market or to supply through a special private organization) or not available at 
all (blocking of market information supply transactions during first years of transition).  
Independent to existence of lending contracts, some of surveyed farms report 
getting other “free services” from banks – technological knowledge and advises, advises 
on protecting from diseases and predators, veterinary assistance, and farm management 
counsels. Farming related services of banks are extending along with expansion of their 
agrarian credit activities and the number of their prospective customers.  
Despite “enormous” development of agrarian credit markets since the beginning of 
transition, the majority of farms still do not use market for organization of their financial 
supply. In some instances market mode happens to be quite expensive – e.g. “too high” 
interest rate and other related “payments”, lost flexibility (and efficiency) of agrarian 
recourses put (as collateral) under bank’s control. In other cases, market form has not 
been accessible at all - missing market situation. Furthermore, recent financial crisis 
strongly limited available financial resources on the market and increased the costs of 
borrowing. Subsequently, farms have been looking for and designing more efficient non-
market (private, trilateral, hybrid) forms for outside finance supply. 
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A main form for external funding for majority of surveyed farms is “some kind of 
state program for agriculture”. During the entire transition period agrarian credit market 
was blocked in the country and Government intervention in finance supply “made” 
carrying out farming possible. The government assistance has been predominantly 
directed to providing preferential credit for working capital for particular productions 
(mainly cereals). In last years before EU accession preferential long-term funding 
programs have been also made available for some priority areas (e.g. growing vineyard, 
purchasing machinery, modernization rural infrastructure, recovering traditional 
productions etc.).  
Most public programs come with a subsidized interest rate, facile terms and 
collateral requirements. Schemes with a partially granted-credit have also been 
introduced recently (part of the loan is forgiven after investments are made). Thus along 
with necessary credit the farms get “additional” financing through a subsidized loan 
price, forgiven debt, or increased flexibility of own resources. In most cases, there is a 
requirement for sharing investment (and risk) by financed farms aiming to increase 
incentives for efficiency. What is more, since 2000 “cross-compliance” requirements  
(“good farming practices”, eco-conditionality) have been obligatory for participation in 
public support programs. That is why the latter form of public crediting (subsidizing) 
proper farming activity is also a specific (interlinked) mode for public payments for 
additional (e.g. environmental) services by farmers51. Public supply form is preferred by 
most of using farms because of the “best interest and term”. However, the best collateral 
and paper works associated with public mode is also an important for a good number of 
applying farms. 
Different types of farms do not have an equal access to public funds for financing 
activities. Our survey demonstrated that major beneficiaries of preferential short-term 
credit are registered bigger farms. These farms have larger needs for working capital and 
are very active looking for cheap external funding. They have also got better experience 
in preparation of project proposals and lobbying for their selection. Besides, these farms 
develop a special relation-specific capital with funding agencies (personal ties, good 
reputation) and have effective capacity for “under the counter” payments (bribes) for 
projects approval. Finally, larger farms are more important in political and economic 
respects (powerful agents, major suppliers for internal and export markets) and therefore 
have easy access to Government support. Nevertheless, larger farms do not use much the 
public mode for funding long-term assets. They have either greater internal capacity 
(profit generation, equity sell) to cover their long-term needs or an effective access to 
cheaper outside sources for financing (private investors, banks etc.). The formal status 
and the “registration” of farms is important for executing agency since it is easier (less 
costly) to check the history and the reliability of farms, and to enforce the legal 
agreements and liabilities.  
For a good number of surveyed farms state funding of long-term assets is the only 
way for external finance supply. This mode is vital for a significant number of farms 
since 53% of the users of long-term and 17% of the users of short-term credits from 
State programs do not have internal financing at all. Farms getting funding through 
                                                 
51 Nevertheless, the actual compliance to most of the new standards for animal welfare, biodiversity and 
environmental preservation etc. has been low because of the unawareness in farmers and public officers, 
high enforcement costs, insufficient administrative capability, and lack of political will [Bachev 2008].  
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public form indicate that mode is a cost-effective for meeting their financial (short and 
long-term) needs - all involved farms “always or often” have an access to outside 
financing when it is necessary.  
Part of State financing comes through hybrid modes. In some instances, these 
modes are purely public forms – when an international (e.g. European Union, World 
Bank, other donor) funds for farming support are match (shared) by the Government 
contribution (e.g. SAPARD, NAPARD etc.). In other cases, public credit goes through 
private banks. The later hybrid mode allows minimizing the overall costs for public 
lending since programs are executed (and risk bearded) by specialized private agents. 
Banks are much more efficient than public agencies in servicing credit supply, selecting 
clients, controlling contract terms, monitoring loan repayments, securing collateral etc52. 
In some cases the risk is assumed by the state agency against acquisition of agricultural 
land since most banks do not accept farmland as collateral.  
Other forms have also been practiced for direct or indirect public financing of farm 
activities: assisting farm associations and funding their activities; exemption form taxes 
on agricultural land and farm activities; guaranteed minimum prices for some products 
(e.g. tobacco); providing free agro-market information and extension service supply; 
public funding of agrarian research and innovation etc. These trilateral modes either 
assist (public funding, public in-house production, public provision etc.) important 
agrarian transactions which could not be carried out effectively through market or 
private modes; or accelerate development of “private” (or quasi-public) organization for 
collective supply which otherwise would not emerge; or they are associated with 
securing additional own (internal) finance for farms.  
Other instruments have also been used to facilitate market and private financing. 
For instance, a system of “trade with receipt on deposited grain in public warehouses” 
has been institutionalized. That has made possible separation of the moment of 
marketing from the inputs supply transactions. Consequently farms are able to use  
grain-receipts as a collateral and to get a short-term lending for working capital while 
looking for the most favorable date for marketing (usually grain prices are lowest after 
harvesting time when needs for working capital for next season is high).         
A great number of smaller and mainly non-cooperative farms get outside supply 
from “European Union, World Bank, or another international farm program”. 
Targeting such weak (vulnerable) farm groups has been a policy priority for donors 
programs. In fact, up to EU accession in 2007 for all users of that mode of short-term 
finance, and for a significant share of long-tern debtors, that is the single mode available 
for external funding. Moreover, a great share of farms using above mode does not apply 
(have) any internal financing of activities. Other major reasons for short-term funding 
users for selecting that form are the simplified procedures and the lack of side-payments.  
In addition to that, the best interest rate and terms (unusually preferential) are also 
important factor for long-term debtors in choosing an international supplier. All 
participants in long-term international lending program point out there are able to find 
“always and often” external financing they need. Conversely, less than 12% of users of 
that mode are positive about their short-term needs. That is partly associated with a 
                                                 
52 For instance, the big number of bad dept-holders from SFA, the large share of unused (and later on 
canceled by EC) funds from SAPARD - to name just two “good” examples for low (bad) operational 
efficiency of public agencies in farm crediting. 
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(long-term assistance) policy priority of donor agencies, partly with low costs for 
supervision of the efficiency of utilization of received loans. While it is easy to monitor 
the acquisition of new machinery, building of farm facilities, the real investments in 
working capital are often quite expensive to verify (e.g. amount of paid salaries, fees for 
services, short-term inputs in land etc.). 
Since the beginning of transition there have been a number of international 
institutional, Governmental, NGO`s etc. initiatives targeting farming in some regions 
(mountains, borders, less populated, undeveloped); or minority groups (Turkish, 
gypsies); or young (future) farmers; or segments of population (handicaps, drug users); 
or with specific purposes (education, extension, demonstration). All these forms for 
international intervention has come out to fill the gap when a national third party 
(Government, local authority, private) involvement in farm finance supply either failed 
(capacity and competence deficiency, lack of budget recourses) or has not been quite 
efficient (bad planning, mismanagement, corruption).  
For different types of surveyed farms there are diverse reasons for selecting the 
mode of a financial supply. For majority of farms the most important factor for short-
term credit supply is the immediate payments (best interest) and the terms related to 
financing. Dominant “market” criteria are essential for a good part of the registered 
middle-size farms as well. It means that official price and conditions (competition for 
available market and institutional sources) govern well the financing supply. However, 
for a big fraction of farms economizing on overall transacting costs (e.g. related paper 
works, side payments) is also important for choice of financing mode. In addition, 
receiving interlinked services and the tradition are crucial for larger operators. The later 
modes are associated with extra transacting benefits and further cost cuts. Nevertheless, 
for a great proportion of farms there is no alternative form for financial procurement. 
These farms do not have an access to another supplier, and they either have to accept 
financing situation (internal restrictions, bilateral relations, or monopoly situation) or to 
reduce farm size.  
Frequency of finance supply transactions “with a particular partner” (or “mainly 
with the same partner”) is quite high for all type of farms. High recurrence of relations 
between the same parties minimizes transaction costs since there are strong mutual 
incentives to continue bilateral relations and self-restrict opportunism. Besides, it is 
efficient to invest in relation-specific capital (building good reputation, gathering 
information about counterparts, developing trust and mechanisms for coordination, 
interlinking of exchange) because such costs can be easily recovered by multiple 
transactions. No more than 9% of surveyed farms report they “use many suppliers” for 
short-term and 12% for long-term crediting. As far as short-term financing is concerned, 
those are mainly large farms which have bigger needs for funding. They diversify 
suppliers according to investment characteristics (and minimize total costs for finance 
supply), or perform a strategy to avoid dependency from a sole lender. For long-term 
supply, these are predominately middle-size firms which can not assure their growing 
financial needs (associated with the strategy for expansion) from a single supplier.  
“State program” and “cooperative, farm organization” are chief short-term lenders 
for most farms indicating they use “always or mainly the same supplier” (80% and 64% 
accordingly). High frequency with “commercial banks” and “relatives, friends” is 
important for short-term financing of 39% and 28% of farms while recurrence of funding 
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with outside investors is reported by few farms. For long-term repeated financing major 
sources are: “outside investor” (74%) and “State program” (52%). “Cooperative, farm 
organization” and “relatives, friends” are significant for a good number of farms with 
unchangeable lenders (36% and 31% accordingly) while “foreign investor” - for around 
7% of them. The regular (frequent) transactions between the same partners is an 
important factor for costs saving for both sides. Therefore, the above figures give some 
ideas about the most likely external creditors for further enlargement of farms. 
Organization of finance supply from a new supplier is usually associated with large 
costs (to find a “good” lender, negotiate satisfactory contract terms, present reliable 
guarantee, pay premium interests or side payments etc.). That is why no short-term 
funded farm and lees than 9% of long-term externally financed users “change partner 
every time”. Mostly smaller (exclusively unregistered and firm) farms look for a new 
supplier since they are having greater problems to find external funding (new comer, no 
proper collateral, greater financing needs for modernization and extension etc.). 
According to the managers of surveyed farms “the relationships with banks and 
the preparation of projects for crediting” takes high efforts and time for all farms (Table 
5). For various types of farms the overall transacting costs for credit supply (both for 
“successful” and “failed” projects) are different. Their level is greatest for majority of 
large farms and firms, many middle-size farms and cooperatives, and a good number of 
unregistered and small farms. Different farms have unequal needs for external finance 
and divers potential (skills, reputation, ties) to govern credit supply. Nonetheless the 
superior amount of related costs in larger farms, their relative level (for a unit of 
transaction) is smaller since they can explore the economy of scale (and scope) on credit 
supplying activity (e.g. investing in specialized human or relation capital for dealing 
with lending agencies; negotiating a package credit contract for funding a number of 
activities etc.).   
Moreover, credited farms spent different efforts to deal with various suppliers. 
Only a minor share of farms with lenders outside investors, international program, and 
long-term banks and State program, report high efforts devoted for credit supply deals. 
At the same time, a relatively large portion of farms with high efforts are debtors to State 
and bank short-term crediting program, and “cooperative, farm organization” financing. 
The short-term financing from major suppliers is associated with larger transacting costs 
for farms because of the “short-term” nature of contract (and needs for periodical 
recontracting). Besides, transactions with outside investors are much more smoothly 
given the existing high bilateral (assets) dependency and the strong incentives to reach a 
deal with minimum costs. Lastly, transacting efforts with international donors are small 
since these programs are strongly prioritized for particular type of farms - here “small 
number condition” prevails on both sides.  
For majority of surveyed farms “high collateral requirement” is the main factor 
limiting the financial supply. Most agrarian assets are highly farm-specific and therefore 
less suitable to be used as a guarantee for outside (e.g. non agrarian) supplier. Market 
value of such property is much lower than its in-farm significance. Thus external 
supplier wanting to safeguard lending transactions against possible opportunism (misuse, 
delay of return, or expropriation) demands “too high” securities from the farm’s point of 
view. Hence such a high requirement for “economic hostages” (or “unequal” exchange) 
restricts or even blocks the credit supply contracts. Yet another critical factor for 
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numerous farms is the high price (interest and terms) of credit resources. Apparently 
many farms can not use financial funds effectively according to market criteria or 
requirements of lending organizations. 
Significant share of surveyed farms feel there is “no enough agrarian credit 
available in the country”. The high transaction costs make difficult the emergence of 
market and private modes for credit supply, and plentiful farms still have no access to 
external financing. For some part of farms “shortage of information about finance 
opportunities” is a principal reason complicating credit supply. Obviously information 
asymmetry is quite high in the area and for many farms it is too expensive (impossible) 
to get necessary information for funding possibilities. Finally, some farms face 
enormous credit related costs (for preparation of proposals, bureaucratic procedures, 
payments of fees and bribes etc.) which limits or make impossible finance supply 
transactions.  
Furthermore, a number of unwanted forms for off-farm finance supply have been 
broadly practiced. Delay of payments or non-payments by downstream partners 
(middlemen, processors etc.) has been widespread. That is in fact unwelcome (usually 
interest free) crediting of trading partners by farms. For the reason of strong unilateral 
dependency (monopoly) and (or) high enforcement costs of contracted terms (through 
inefficient and expensive court system) farms has to accept that form of “subsidized 
marketing”. Most farms with “bad experience” in that respect either under-invest in 
specific capital (changing or diversifying production structure, decreasing operations 
scale) or look for more efficient forms for governing of (marketing) transactions such as 
requiring deposit and advance payment, using own organization (marketing cooperative) 
or personal contacts, internal integration (in-farm processing), joint investment with 
trading partners etc. Furthermore, a number of undesired off-farm “financing” has been  
a common place as funding of private activities of corrupted government officials 
(informal stakeholders), or special interest groups in cooperatives and agro-companies; 
buying “security services” of criminal firms; loosing large equity or deposits in bankrupt 
banks and joint ventures etc. 
Accession of Bulgaria to EU provides new funding opportunities for farms. CAP 
related financing which agriculture receives (for “agrarian and rural development“, 
“direct area-based payments to farms“, and “market support“) from 2007-2009 on is 5,1 
times higher than the overall level of support to farming before acceding. Besides, 
farming gets funding from the EU Structural Funds and the national budget. There is 
significant public financial resources for subsidizing farms, individual productions, 
farming organizations and essential activities such as: modernization, commercialization 
and diversification of farming; revival of traditional production and heritages; 
introduction of organic farming; maintaining biodiversity and environment; improving 
food safety and animal welfare; support for less-favored areas and regions with 
environmental restrictions; infrastructural development etc. 
Available huge EU and national financing open up new possibilities to resolve 
funding problems of agriculture. Nevertheless, due to restrictive criteria, unattainable 
formal requirement, high costs for participation, and widespread mismanagement (and 
corruption) the new public support benefit unevenly different farms. The bulk of the 
public funding continue to go to few farms while many effective small-scale farms 
receive no or only a tiny fraction of public support [2010].  
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4.6. Governing of insurance supply 
 
During much of the transition Bulgarian farms had no access to specialized 
insurance products since they were either unavailable or too expensive [Bachev 2000]. 
Agrarian insurance market has been developing in last several years but it is not widely 
used by farms. Our survey has proved that the only exception is insuring against “bad 
meteorological conditions” (hail, frost etc.), and “fires and natural disaster” which are 
practiced by a great number of large cooperative and business farms (Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Governing of insurance supply in farms (percent of farms) 
Objects Type of insurance Unregi- Coopera- Agro- Small Middle Large 
  stered tives firms  size  
Grain Burglary 6,25 14,29 0,00 6,25 4,55 12,50 
 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 18,75 60,71 71,88 28,13 54,55 81,25 
 Diseases and pests 6,25 21,43 18,75 3,13 29,55 0,00 
 Fires and natural disasters 31,25 71,43 87,50 37,50 75,00 81,25 
Vegetables Burglary 0,00 0,00 6,25 0,00 4,55 0,00 
 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 6,25 0,00 12,50 6,25 0,00 25,00 
 Diseases and pests 3,13 0,00 0,00 3,13 0,00 0,00 
 Fires and natural disasters 3,13 7,14 0,00 3,13 4,55 0,00 
Fruits and  Burglary 18,75 0,00 21,88 18,75 15,91 0,00 
grape 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 3,13 32,14 21,88 3,13 27,27 25,00 
 Diseases and pests 15,63 17,86 3,13 18,75 11,36 0,00 
 Fires and natural disasters 3,13 25,00 21,88 3,13 22,73 25,00 
Meat  Burglary 9,09 35,71 30,00 8,00 28,00 66,67 
animals 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 0,00 7,14 5,00 0,00 8,00 0,00 
 Diseases and pests 0,00 14,29 15,00 4,00 8,00 33,33 
 Fires and natural disasters 0,00 28,57 0,00 0,00 16,00 0,00 
Milk  Burglary 0,00 21,43 50,00 0,00 36,00 66,67 
animals 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 9,09 7,14 0,00 8,00 4,00 0,00 
 Diseases and pests 9,09 28,57 15,00 12,00 16,00 33,33 
 Fires and natural disasters 0,00 42,86 0,00 0,00 24,00 0,00 
Others Burglary 0,00 7,14 0,00 0,00 4,55 0,00 
 Diseases and pests 2,70 0,00 0,00 2,70 0,00 0,00 
 Fires and natural disasters 8,11 14,29 0,00 10,81 6,82 0,00 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
The larger farms have stronger incentives to sell the risk because they are highly 
specialized huge operators, and in the case of a risky event damages are significant. 
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Besides, they have bigger financial means to insure crops, animals, and related assets. In 
some cases, they are in position to negotiate more favorable terms than bulk of the farms 
(big contracting power, economy of scale, available on farm experts or outside 
expertise).  
Moreover, a “purchase of insurance” is usually explicitly requested by banks 
and/or public agencies for participating in diverse commercial and public support 
programs. The main users of short-term (bank, Government) credits are the big cereals 
farms. Similarly, long-term credits are mostly taken by the larger grain, fruits and grape 
producers. Since the risk of crop failure is immense the lending banks or public agencies 
require their collateral (future yields, milking-cows, vineries) to be protected (“insured”) 
from possible losses. Despite (un)willingness the farmers have to pay the supplementary 
price for insurance supply in order to obtain “interlinked” outside funding. In this case, 
related risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance company rather than 
bank or public agency) and debtor-farms are charged with extra costs to assure needed 
bank loan or public support. 
The rest of the farms use other forms to insure their products and assets such as: 
diversification of production, geographical remoteness of individual plots, hiring full-
time specialists (e.g. pest control expert, agronomist), employing private security guards 
etc. In Bulgaria there is not an effective public system (police, municipal guards, court 
etc.) for protection and recovery of (“absolute rights”) and punishment of offenders. 
Farmers are among the most vulnerable for individual thieves and organized crimes 
since much of farm outputs and property is “in the open”, and dispersed in wide areas 
and many locations. Therefore, agrarian property is widely assured by private modes and 
“costs for protection” for all surveyed farms are significant in terms of time and 
resources spent, hired security guards and services, “payments for property protection 
and restoration” etc.  
A good number of small farms do not use any public (collective) modes for 
insuring risk and face constantly severe hazards and damages. The main reasons for 
avoiding market supply of insurance are the high (unaffordable) premiums, unfavorable 
terms of insurance contracts (not-tailored to particular conditions of an individual farm), 
and low satisfaction from the services of commercial insurance providers (frequent 
disputes about the terms of contracts and extend of harms, lengthy delays of payment for 
damages etc.). Consequently, a great part of farming resources and activities is not 
assured (insuring labor is practically absent, most animal, machineries and buildings are 
uncovered etc.), and a considerable majority of farmers bear the entire risk of failures. 
Despite the potential efficiency (non-for-profit organization, members orientation, 
tailoring products to farms needs) the collective modes for farm insurance have not 
evolved in the country. Here the high transaction costs for initiation and development of 
large member organization, and conflicting interests of different farms etc. impedes that 
process. Moreover, an effective public intervention has not been undertaken to assist 
(initiate, support, legislate) farmers in organization of (“quasi-public”, “quasi-private”) 
mode for collective supply of agrarian insurance. Neither badly needed agrarian 
guarantee and/or compensation fund has been launched. Subsequently, a good part of 
affected smaller and middle-size farms (having little internal capacity to bear yield 
failures and property damages) experience severe looses, and see the scale of their 
operations (assets, financial means) and welfare further decreased. 
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In last few years, the public veterinary, disease, technology etc. control and 
emergency assistance to farms have been enhanced - e.g. isolation and distortion of 
endangered animals, compensation of farms etc. These measures aim at protecting 
against significant industry and/or public risk(s) from certain diseases and epidemics – 
e.g. mad cow disease, foot and mouth disease, avian influenza etc. They have been driven 
by the public concern for potentially huge economic losses for farms, related industries, 
export, and/or human health hazards. Furthermore, some farms have got public aid to 
cover losses (or recover) from recent natural disasters – floods, rainstorms, mudslides, 
and extreme droughts. The later modes have been incidental and affected mostly larger 
operators having incentives and capacity to deal with complicated (and costly) 
bureaucratic procedures. 
Finally, competition in insurance industry has been increasing in recent years 
(including with foreign players). The later leads to an enlargement of the range of 
specific products offered for meet diverse insurance needs of farms. Nevertheless, the 
high assurance and related costs, and the targeted (to larger operators) policies of 
insurance providers make these products inaccessible to a great fraction of Bulgarian 
farms. 
 
 82
 
2.8. Governing of marketing of farm output 
 
A significant part of Bulgarian farms sells only surpluses of major commodity products 
(Figure 18). The portion of subsistence and semi-market farms among censured unregistered 
holdings is particularly high as less than thirty nine percent of them report selling products and 
for more than fifty percent those are surpluses not consumed by households [MAF]. 
 
Figure 18: Share of farms selling regularly and only surpluses in Bulgaria 
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Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 2003                
 
Majority of surveyed farms market their output through some form of sell out deals as 
share of output governed by that mode of realization accounts for a significant part of the brut 
output of farms (Table 7). Most farm produces have “mass” standardized character and 
therefore free market prices or standard sell contract (spot market or wholesale market deals, 
classical contracts) govern effectively relationships with buyers. 
Insignificant number of farms manages their marketing trough a special long-term 
contract for outside processing. However, portion of the output governed with such special 
mode reaches a good part of the overall output in respective farms. That form is most common 
for large farms. Necessity for a special contract form for governing the long-term relations with 
processing industries is caused by a high frequencies of transactions between same partners, 
big transacting uncertainty (price, behavioral), and existence of some form of asset dependency 
with downstream partners. High mutual (capacity, time of delivery, quality specifications) or 
unilateral dependency (negotiation power, monopoly situation) is often responsible for the 
preference to a special private mode for carrying out of farm marketing. Simple sells across 
“free” market would create serious transacting difficulties and could restrict or entirely block 
marketing. Therefore, instead of unreliable (and expensive) spot or classical contract, a long-
term delivery contract is used to overcome transacting problems and minimize related costs. 
 
 83
 
Table 7: Directions for realization of outputs of farms (percent of farms) 
Share of farms using output for: Share of brut output for:  
 
Type of farm 
Househol
d 
consumpti
on 
In-
farm 
consu
mption 
In-
farm 
proces
sing 
Long-
term 
contract 
for 
outside 
processin
g 
Sell Househol
d 
consumpti
on 
In-farm 
consum
ption 
In-
farm 
proces
sing 
Long-
term 
contract 
for 
outside 
processin
g 
Sell
Unregistered 81,08 40,54 21,62 5,41 100,00 18,57 18,00 16,25 10,00 73,59
Cooperative 46,43 64,29 14,29 3,57 100,00 12,46 24,00 19,50 40,00 74,93
Firm 43,75 56,25 40,63 6,25 78,13 20,79 26,11 38,08 10,00 76,96
Small-size 86,49 45,95 16,22 0,00 100,00 20,09 18,53 18,33 0,00 71,14
Middle-size 40,91 40,91 31,82 4,55 93,18 16,78 34,00 25,93 10,00 75,68
Large 43,75 43,75 31,25 18,75 75,00 9,29 35,00 46,00 20,00 84,17
Total 58,76 43,30 25,77 5,15 92,78 17,72 27,90 28,12 16,00 74,94
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Complete (in-farm, ownership) integration is the most effective mean to govern 
“marketing” for highly dependant transactions when possibility to realize economy of scale (or 
scope) could be effectively explored within farm boundaries. Instead of (off-farm) marketing 
in-farm production consumption (diversification into inputs supply) or in-farm processing 
(diversification into processing activity) take place. Number of surveyed farms which entirely 
integrate “output realization” (within farm boundaries) is great as share of output governed in 
that way is significant. For instance, almost all livestock farms integrate the forage production, 
one completely different (namely a crop production) activity, overcoming of big uncertainty 
and risk associated with critical to livestock operations market or outside supply.  
The vertical integration is an effective alternative way for optimization of farm size to 
horizontal (one or more products) enlargement of farm boundaries. When it is too costly to 
trade on open (free) market for inputs procurements or marketing of farm outputs (big 
uncertainty, high unilateral dependency and possibility for opportunistic behavior, missing 
markets situation) then internal organization (in-farm production, in-farm processing) is an 
effective managerial response to market and/or contract “failures”. In-farm integration of 
transactions would be undertaken only if there is a significant costs economizing potential 
comparing to off-farm trade. However, internal organization of new and not-specialized 
activities (diversification into new production, processing, retailing) is inevitably associated 
with an increase on internal transaction and/or production costs. When these costs are 
prohibitively high comparing to the benefit then internal organization fails, and activity is not 
carried at “effective” scale or blocked at all (“small” farms, backward technology 
development, unsustainable structures etc.). 
 “Own consumption” or “giving to relatives and friends” has been traditionally a basic 
mode for realization of output which is still dominating in majority of surveyed farms. This 
form of “direct marketing” is associated with low or zero costs (no searching costs, easy 
planning of demand, facile exchange), and a number of extra benefits such as non-for profit 
activity, full information about technology and origin of produce, interlinking with other 
activities etc.  
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Finally, a good part of surveyed farms take part in service providing transactions. This 
form of marketing of farm services (instead of farm outputs) is more common for cooperatives 
and firms, and middle-size and large farms. Agrarian services occupy around 13% of the 
product of service supply farms. Thus involvement in this kind of contracts is associated with 
utilization of free equipment and labor rather than with investment in specific assets for 
organization of agrarian services. In these instances, it is equally unprofitable (high transacting 
costs) both trading of temporally free resources (leasing out of equipment and machinery; 
selling out labor) and further specialization into services (service trading). 
Dominant modes for governing of marketing are quite specific for different farm 
products (Figure 19). Some market agent (mainly firms, and to the less extend farms or 
cooperatives) is broadly used for marketing of all products. That form is more often used for 
marketing of vegetables, grains, and meat from all type crop and livestock farms. Here 
standardization of products and technologies is higher, and thus market (prices, quality 
standards, competition) governs effectively relations with downstream partners. There is no 
any need to develop or use any special (private) form to carry out transacting, and the classical 
trade (across market) with a specialized market agent (a middle man) dominates.  
 
 
Figure 19: Modes for marketing of major farm outputs (percent of farms) 
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When specificity of farm products to a particular buyer (e.g. processor) increases then 
direct marketing contracts with respective partners are commonly used. Firm-processor is 
the major buyer for vegetables, fruits and grape, and milk for all kind of farms. Since product 
specification (special technology, special origin, special time of delivery, freshens) is 
important for a particular buyer(s), and strong site-specificity is in place (single buyer in the 
region, big capacity dependency), and frequency of transacting with a particular partner is 
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high, facilitating vertical links through direct and tight-up delivery contracts is important for 
both sides. Marketing relations are usually coupled with development of specific capital for 
trade with the particular partner (modes for planning of production and deliveries, controlling 
qualities, dispute resolutions, interlinking marketing with finance and/or inputs supply). Such 
quasi integrating modes intensify and harmonize relationships, and minimize overall 
transaction costs for processor and farms alike. Tight-up marketing contracts with a firm-
processor are also practiced by a half of middle-size livestock farms for meat sells, and by a 
three-forth of large crop farms for grain trade. 
Furthermore, closely coordinated contracts for wholesale marketing to shops, hotels, 
and restaurants are also often applied when control on freshens, origin, quality, tile of 
delivery etc. of farm products is especially important – mainly fruits and grape, and meat; 
and to lesser extend milk and vegetables. This mode of marketing is particularly widespread 
in management of relations between large agro-firm meat producers and such wholesale 
counterparts.  
Direct export is carried out by one tenth of grain, and fruit and grape producers. That 
forms permit to realize full benefits from trading at international markets when profit margin 
is quite significant (wheat, sunflower, fruits and grapes with special origin and quality etc.). 
Direct export is practiced by relatively larger farms which could make and return-back 
investment in specialized capital for such trade (e.g. experience, market information, 
personal ties, special origin and quality of products etc.).  
“Best prices”, “low costs”, and “maximum security” are main reasons for preferring 
the form of marketing to “another farmer, cooperative or firm” by all type of surveyed farms. 
Besides, a good part of farms report they have “many buyers”, and therefore faceless (rather 
than personal) relations dominate and the market mediates effectively transactions between 
agents. However, frequency of deals with “the same partner” for a large share of farms is 
high: 37% of them “mainly” or “always” sell to the same agent, and only 2% of farms change 
the buyer every time (season). Big repetition of relations between the same counterparts 
restrict information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, develop mutual trust and 
mechanisms for facilitating transactions (modes of planning, payment, guarantee, dispute 
resolution), and diminish the overall transacting costs. That is why for the larger operators 
the constant trade with a single buyer is the main mode for organization of marketing deals. 
Traditional form of wholesale market trade is used mainly by fruits and grape, and 
vegetables producers. Here standardization of products is quite developed and critical quality 
margins easily (cheaply) controlled by anonymous traders. This mode is more significant for 
the middle-size firms while majority of surveyed farms still more rely on other effective 
ways for marketing of outputs. Number of farms employing commodity exchange for 
marketing of output is even smaller. It concerns mainly some vegetables, fruits, and grains 
which have commodity (highly standardized) character and where (current and future) trade 
is not associated with great transacting (fees, measurement, enforcement, disputing etc.) 
expenses. 
Main motives for selecting the wholesale market by majority of using farms are the 
“best prices”, “low costs”, and “minimum risk”. That mode is most important for middle-
sized unregistered and cooperative farms. For all farms applying wholesaling the repetition 
of marketing on a particular market is rare (place is changed every time). It means that 
accessible (regional) wholesale market (s) do not give equal opportunities and farmers have 
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to select (change) particular market according to their profiting expectation (demand, price 
level, transportation costs etc).     
Direct retail marketing to final consumers is also practiced by some farms, and it is 
chiefly important for vegetables. It takes various forms - from on-spot “street” or “along the 
road” sells, through trade “on farm” or “farmers markets”, to a customized “home 
delivery”. Here freshens, appearance, origin, production technology (e.g. organic farming) of 
delivered products is extremely important for consumers. This mode does not involve big 
volumes and serve local customers and visitors (e.g. tourists). Despite “superior” sell costs 
(smaller amounts of deals) this form allows to realize “full” (retail) benefits of marketing and 
to get higher pay-off on investments in special capital - special varieties, origin, and quality 
of farm products; elaborated personal (client) relationships with buyers etc. While most 
farms practicing retail trade deal with many buyers, for around 10% of them (smaller 
holdings) clientalisation takes place and they have always the same buyer. In addition, 
cooperatives are traditionally used to supply basic food (e.g. meat, cheese) for their members 
and rural communities. Surveyed farms notify that “best prices”, “maximum profit” and 
“low costs” are the chief reasons for preferences to the retail form of marketing. However, in 
many cases the direct marketing by smaller producers is illegal – e.g. meat and milk do not 
correspond to formal hygiene and sanitary standards; traded vine is not certified etc.    
Member (own) cooperative is used only for a part of fruits and grape, and grain 
marketing. Collective mode of marketing (marketing or general purpose cooperative) is 
associated with a number of transacting benefits unachievable by individual farms – 
economy of scale and scope of marketing activities (search, promotion, operational etc. costs 
savings), better negotiating positions, interlinking transactions with storing, transportation, 
retails etc. That is why this form is common only for non-large farms. “Maximum security”, 
“low costs” and “best prices” are identified as major factors for using the own cooperative 
for marketing. Intensity of sell transacting through that mode is high and all applying farms 
“always” or ““mainly” use the same cooperative for marketing outputs. Nevertheless, despite 
the great potential for governing of transactions (non-for-profit member-owned organization) 
this mode is not widely used by farms – as little more than 4% of surveyed farms are 
members of marketing cooperatives. In transitional conditions development and maintenance 
costs of cooperative organization are quite high and majority of farms prefer to use other 
(more effective) market and private modes for governing relations with other agents. 
Selling out to state reserve is important marketing channel for a good number of 
registered and larger grain producers. State purchase contract is “preferred mode” for large 
farms since it gives a number of transacting advantages – a “stable” demand, a good price, a 
secure payment, low negotiation and enforcement costs. However, the total amount of 
marketed grain through that mode is relatively small. In certain years before EU accession 
there are incidences to use state purchase and sells as a mean to stabilize market prices as 
well53. “Minimum risk” and “tradition” are the most common factors for preferring the state 
agency as a partner by farms. 
Intra-farm (own) processing of farm output is most important for realization of fruits 
and grape, and to lesser extend for meat and milk. This mode of “internal marketing” is 
mainly practiced by larger farms. Namely the larger operational size and the high frequency 
of transacting give an economic opportunity for internal exploration of inter-dependant assets 
(in farming and processing). On the other hand vertical integration let to protect dependant 
                                                 
53 Since 2007 EU CAP is applied having “market intervention” as a main pillar.  
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investments and to pay-off from marketing of final (processed) products – getting full profit 
(on farm and food products), trade with special brand names, lessen market dependency 
(easy storage and transportation) etc. Most often cited reasons for intra-farm (production) 
“consumption” of farming products are “maximum security”, “maximum profit” and 
“minimum risk”.  
Interlinked contracts are frequently used by surveyed farms where a supplier also 
“purchase the farm output”. To the greatest extend these contracts are applied with the 
suppliers of seeds, chemicals, forage, and animals. This form is an indicator for emerging or 
existing (quasi, complete) vertical integration of farming carried out through tight up 
marketing and inputs supply contracts. Usually integrator is a large farmer, trader or 
processor (mostly seeds and animal dealers, milk or meat processors).  This form of 
governance “secure” inputs supply of needed farm products and row materials (in particular 
periods, quantities, qualities, origins) of the integrator through interlinking the critical inputs 
supply to farms. 
In some instances, the outside integrator own the technological know-how or 
exclusive rights on agrarian products (variety of seeds, breads of animals etc.) and contract 
the mass production with respective farms. In these cases, the integrator is the exclusive 
supplier of farms with these inputs (produced or distributed by integrator). In other instances, 
the integrator “organizes” supply of critical to farming inputs (e.g. forage) in order to 
guarantee the quality of needed farm products (e.g. row milk). This mode is preferred by 
farms since it allows to economize on transacting costs for supply of critical inputs and 
marketing of major products. 
In a good portion of farms “supplier assists sells” and that is particularly truth for 
large farms for supply of forage and animals; for a significant share of smaller farms for 
seeds supply; and for a part of middle-size and cooperative farms for chemical supply. These 
“free of charge mediation” in organization of marketing deals (interlinking supply with a new 
service of mediation) makes a particular supplier preferred among competitors.  It secure a 
stable (or increasing) demand of material inputs from a particular farms while for 
participating farms that “trilateral” organization minimizes costs of marketing of final output 
restricting associated uncertainty. 
For majority of surveyed farms (including all unregistered and small farms) there is 
an alternative buyer (s) and they are in a position to chose the most effective way for (and 
thus to govern) marketing of outputs. Only 5% of surveyed farms report they have a single 
buyer, and therefore face a unilateral dependency (monopoly) situation. Most 
commercialized farms confront to the greatest extend the “missing” market situation - more 
than 12% of the largest farms. The lack of markets is particularly vital for vegetable 
producers where according to one-forth of them (exclusively middle-sized firms) there are no 
buyers of output at all. Missing market situation is also being faced by a good part of grain 
producers which accounts for as much as 12% of the large and the cooperative farms. 
Apparently a significant number of commercial vegetable and grain farms “overproduce” or 
can not effectively meet the “market demand” for quality and packing requirements, 
acceptable prices etc. for farm products. In addition, for a significant number of farms “there 
is no information for buyer” which makes marketing of vegetables and grain difficult. 
“Low prices” and “unstable prices” are the main problems for marketing of all sort 
of farm produce in all surveyed farms. It proves that majority of farms are still not able to 
react effectively to market competition and (seasonal) fluctuation of market prices. Besides, 
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“lack of price information” is an important factor obstructing marketing of grain, fruits and 
vegetables. Asymmetry of information in all but vegetables markets is quite significant and a 
good portion of farms feel that “buyer is better informed” which impedes marketing.  
As far as major factors for successful marketing are concerned for all products the 
most important for farms are the “beneficial prices” and the “mutual benefits for partners”. 
On the other hand only negligible number of farms consider outside intervention (a “third 
party support”) as crucial for the marketing deals. Moreover, a minor share of farms (fruits 
and grape producers being exception) regards the “lack of competition” as critical for the 
effective organization of marketing. All these prove that for most farms the expectations for 
well working markets (and thus for a fair unassisted exchange) is the most important factors 
for marketing of farm produces. 
“Unreliability of the buyer” is among the chief factor impeding marketing of 
surveyed farms. With small exceptions (in marketing of vegetables of larger farms) tendency 
for opportunistic behavior of buyers dominates. Irrelevant to the type of farms most surveyed 
farms are a vulnerable side having no reliable (personal, private, public) mechanisms to 
control the opportunism of downstream partners. Moreover, for a significant number of fruit 
and grape, vegetables, meat and milk producers the “breach of contracts” is a major problem 
in marketing deals. In addition, for majority of smaller farms the “enforcement of contract 
terms” is a serious problem.  
For the vegetables, fruits and grape, meat, and milk it is often very difficult to 
formulate in a written (contract) form and to dispute negotiated provisions for quality and 
quantity variations, time of delivery, sequential obligations of either partners etc. Besides, 
contract enforcement for perishable products through a third party is quite expensive or 
impossible at all (technical feasibility, slow or ineffectively working court system). That is 
why some small and inexperienced farms are experiencing essential problems with marketing 
contracts and enforcement of contract terms. 
As far as main factors for successful marketing is concerned the “trust” and the 
“good intention of partners” are important for all type of producers. “Tradition” also plays a 
bigger role in effective sell for some part of surveyed farms. All these means that informal 
governing mechanisms (such as trust, long-term personal relations, self-restriction of 
opportunism, self-enforcement of contract) are considered as extremely important for the 
successful organization of marketing deals of farms. Besides, the “existence of written 
contracts” is a critical factor for marketing of vegetables, fruit and grape, and milk while the 
“oral agreements” are important for vegetables and meat producers. The later confirms that 
for more “delicate” (perishable) farm products a contract coordination (price, quality, 
quantity etc. adjustments) is essential and necessary for the effective organization of 
transacting. 
Our survey has found out that majority of farms put great efforts and time for “finding 
markets for marketing of farm outputs”. The high costs of marketing are particularly typical 
for middle-size and large registered farms. These farms are the most commercialized and 
their overall efficiency strongly depend on the efficiency of marketing organization. That is 
why these farms invest (“efforts and costs”) to a greater extend in marketing than other 
farms. Nevertheless, while the general level of costs for finding best markets in larger farms 
is high, the relative level of transacting costs (per unit of output) is presumably lower than is 
small(er) farms. The larger operational size allows to explore economies of scale and scope 
of marketing activity, gives better negotiating and enforcement positions, and let effective 
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investment in specific capital for marketing such as information costs, advertisement, product 
promotion, development of reputation and brand names, organization for a direct trade etc. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The post-communist transition and EU integration of Bulgarian agriculture has been 
associated with a fundamental modernization of property rights and institutional structure. A 
specific farming organization has evolved in the country consisting of numerous small-scale 
and subsistent holdings, and a few large cooperatives and agro-firms. Furthermore, agrarian 
agents have developed a great variety of effective contractual arrangements to govern their 
relations, resources and activities – formal, informal, simple, complex, interlinked, market, 
private, collective, bilateral, trilateral, multilateral, hybrid etc.  
We have demonstrated that the New Institutional Economics framework let us better 
understand the “logic” of development and the (“high”) efficiency, complementarities and 
sustainability of diverse contractual and organizational modes in the specific economic, 
institutional and natural environment of Bulgarian agriculture. This new approach requires 
giving up the traditional uni-sectorality and uni-diciplinarity; and analyzing de-facto (formal 
and informal) rights and rules, and the extend of their enforcement; and identifying the entire 
spectrum of agrarian transacting, their critical factors, and the comparative efficiency of 
feasible market, private, hybrid etc. forms of governance. What is more, this approach let us 
make more realistic prediction about likely prospects of farming development and the 
specific “Bulgarian” mode of implementation of “common” EU policies.  
These types of analysis have got not just big academic but significant practical 
importance. They could substantially assist the design of individuals, business and collective 
contracts and organizations as well as improvement of public policy and modes of 
intervention in market and private transactions. 
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